The impact of the constitution on transforming the process of statutory interpretation in South Africa. by Singh, Annette.








THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON TRANSFORMING 









THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON TRANSFORMING 







A thesis in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of the Doctor of 
Philosophy in the School of Law, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR GE DEVENISH 
CO-SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR K GOVENDER 
 
 
College of Law & Management Studies 







I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is, unless specifically 
indicated to the contrary in text, my own original work which has not been submitted before 
in whole or in part at any other University for a degree. 
 
 








I, ANNETTE SINGH declare that: 
(i) The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, 
is my original research. 
 
(ii) This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at 
any university. 
 
(iii) This thesis does not contain other person’s data, pictures, graphs or 
other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced 
from other persons. 
 
(iv) This thesis does not contain other persons’ writing unless specifically 
acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other 
written sources have been quoted, then: 
 
a)  their words have been re-written but the general information 
attributed to them has been referenced; 
b)  where their exact words have been used, their writing has been 
placed inside quotation marks, and referenced. 
 
(v) Where I have reproduced a publication of which I am author, co-
author or editor, I have indicated in detail which part of the 
publication was actually written by myself alone and have fully 
referenced such publications. 
 
(vi) This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted 
from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source 










I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors for their guidance and support 
in enabling me to complete my PhD. 
 
I am eternally grateful to my family for their encouragement, understanding and 
patience with what at times seemed insurmountable.  
 
I am also thankful to my Maker, without whose intervention, this journey with its 
joys, trials and tribulations, would not have been possible. 
 
During the past three years and the hundreds of hours of engaging intensely with the 
rules, theories, techniques and maxims on the complex, yet fascinating subject of 
Interpretation of Law, I was often bemused by the remark that: 
‘Making innumerable statutes, men merely confuse what God achieved in ten.’ 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction and Background 
1.1  Introduction  ………………………………………………………………...1 
1.2  Research Problem and Hypothesis  ...............................................................  3 
1.3  Aims/Objectives  ............................................................................................ 3 
1.4 Background/Overview  .................................................................................. 4 
1.5 Chapter Breakdown  .................................................................................... 15 
1.6 Definition of Terms and Concepts ………………………………………...17 
1.7 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………25 
Chapter 2 – An Examination of the Traditional Theories of Statutory 
Interpretation Applied in South African Courts 
  
2.1  Introduction  ……………………………………………………………….27  
2.2  The Literal Theory  ...................................................................................... 30 
2.3  The Contextual Theory …………………………………………………….41 
2.4 The Purposive Theory  ................................................................................. 47 
2.5 The Teleological Theory …………………………………………………..51 
2.6  The Subjective Theory or the Intention Theory  .......................................... 57 
2.7 The Objective Theory  ................................................................................. 59 
2.8  The Judicial Theory  .................................................................................... 61 
2.9 An Appraisal of the Theories Presented  ..................................................... 63 








Chapter 3 – The South African Constitution – Its Role, Significance and Influence 
on Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 
 
3.1  Introduction ………………………………………………………………..68 
 
3.2  The Constitution as a Founding Document  ................................................ 69 
 
3.3  The Differences and Similarities Between Constitutional Interpretation      
and Ordinary Statutory Interpretation  …………………………………….75 
 
3.4  Reading-in, Reading-down, Severance and Reading in Conformity with      
the Constitution ……………………………………………………………79 
 
3.5  An Observation about the Constitutional Remedies ………………………84 
 
3.6  The Canon-Guided Reading Strategies ……………………………………85 
 
3.7  Some Points to Consider in the Implementation of the Adapted Von 
Savignian Model as Presented Above  …………………………………….95 
 
3.8  The Principles that Underlie Constitutional Interpretation  ......................... 99 
 
3.9  The Interpretation and Application of Section 39 ………………………..111 
 
3.10  An Examination of the Seminal Constitutional Court Cases that 
  Illustrate the Emerging Jurisprudence of Transformation – Reflecting 
Deontic Interpretation ……………………………………………………114 
 
3.11 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………..125 
 
 
Chapter 4 – The Relevance of the Common - Law Presumptions of Interpretation 
in the Current Democratic Constitutional Era in South Africa  
 
4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………127 
 
4.2  The State is not Bound by its own Legislation …………………………...129 
 
4.3  Legislation Does Not Oust or Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Courts ……135 
 
4.4  Statutes Do Not Contain Invalid or Purposeless Provisions ……………..144 
 
4.5  The Legislature Does Not Intend that which is Harsh, Unjust or 
Unreasonable ……………………………………………………………..152 
 




Chapter 5 – The Relevance of the Canons and Maxims of Interpretation in a 
System of Constitutional Democracy in SA 
 
5.1  Introduction ………………………………………………………………160 
 
5.2  The Role of the Judge in the Realm of Judicial Law-Making ……………162 
 
5.3  Techniques of Restrictive Interpretation  ................................................... 170 
 
5.4  Techniques of Extensive Interpretation and the Maxims Related to           
Such Interpretation ……………………………………………………….177 
 
5.5  Conclusion  ................................................................................................ 185 
 
 
Chapter 6 – The Influence of International Law and Foreign Law on South African 
Law 
 
6.1  Introduction ………………………………………………………………188 
 
6.2  Comparative Law ………………………………………………………...190 
 
6.3  A Consideration of the Features of Selected Constitutional States and         
their Influence on South African Law ……………………………………194 
 
6.4  The Position Adopted by South African Courts to International Law      
before 1994  ............................................................................................... 199 
 
6.5  The Position Adopted by South African Courts to International Law         
and Foreign Law in the New Constitutional Order  ................................... 202 
 
6.6  Conclusion  ................................................................................................ 214 
   
 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
7.1   Introduction  ……………………………………………………………...217 
 
7.2  A Summary of the Observations and Findings of the Study  .................... 218 
 
7.3   The Formulation of a New Theory Involving Deontic Reasoning ...........  224 
 








INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In reflecting on the subject of statutory interpretation, William Eskridge describes the 
field as the ‘Cinderella of legal scholarship’,1 but adds further that: 
‘Once scorned and neglected, confined to the kitchen, it now dances in the 
ballroom. Although the interpretation of statutes has been an ongoing topic 
of interest since the colonial period, only since the 1980’s have American 
legal academics become intensely excited about statutory interpretation as an 
object of theoretical interest.’2 
Although the author in his examination of the subject, refers to the state of the discipline 
in the United States of America – the description quite aptly mirrors the state of the 
discipline in South Africa prior to the new constitutional dispensation.3 
For a good many years, the attitude to statutory interpretation was haphazard and 
fragmented, and generally ‘not regarded as a subject meriting thorough research, or 
serious academic exposition.’4 As the subject itself is concerned primarily with rules and 
principles, it was unfortunate that during the apartheid era and particularly as a result of 
the system of parliamentary sovereignty, a number of these rules and principles could be 
                                                            




3 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes Prolegomenon at x. 
 
4 Bennion Statutory Interpretation xxvii. 
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easily rebutted by the legislature. The result was that a number of important libertarian 
rules and principles were disregarded and relegated to a third-rate status by the courts.5 
The position changed significantly with the advent of the new constitutional 
dispensation, first by the Interim Constitution in 1994 and thereafter by the Final 
Constitution in 19966, which heralded a new era of constitutionalism and a paradigmatic 
shift from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy. Cameron J succinctly 
summed up the impact of the Constitution in a single statement: 
‘The Constitution has changed the “context” of all legal thought and 
decision-making in South Africa.’7 
Almost instantaneously, everything changed forever – all law and conduct, all traditions, 
dogmas, perceptions, rules and procedures, and all theories, canons and maxims of 
interpretation were all subject to and influenced by the Constitution.8  This essentially 
encapsulates the basis of this thesis, which is poised at the crossroads of statutory 
interpretation and constitutional law. It is significant for two reasons: 
Firstly, it elucidates the effect of the impact of the Constitution9 on the process of 
statutory interpretation;10 and 
                                                            
5 Botha Statutory Interpretation (2nd edition) at 50. Botha has subsequently updated his book, 
however in an earlier edition of the book, 2nd edition, he makes the point that in a system of 
parliamentary sovereignty that the common-law rules and principles could be easily rebutted by 
legislation. 
 
6  In this thesis reference to the Constitution, or the ‘new’ Constitution refers to the Final 
Constitution of RSA of 1996, unless otherwise indicated.  
 
7 Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W). 
 
8 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 100. 
 
9 While reference is made to a number of constitutional provisions, for purposes of this thesis the 
following constitutional provisions, for example, section 1, section 2, section 7, section 35(2), 
section 39, section 232(2) and section 172, are examined more closely.  Even though reference is 
made to the Constitution throughout the thesis, Chapter 3 specifically examines the principles 
which underlie constitutional interpretation. 
 
10 Reference to the ‘process of interpretation’ involves an examination of case-law as a result of the 
impact of section 39 on the various rules, canons and maxims of interpretation. 
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Secondly, it attempts through judicial precedents to establish how the Constitution has 
transformed the theory and methodology of statutory interpretation in South Africa.11 
1.2 Research Problem and Hypothesis 
The Research Problem may be stated as follows: 
 Whether the Constitution, and in particular section 39, has 
transformed the process of interpretation and if so how has this 
influenced statutory interpretation in South Africa? 
As a Hypothesis therefore, this would translate into: 
 The Constitution has transformed the process of statutory 
interpretation in South Africa and there has been an emerging 
jurisprudence that mandates a new methodology. This therefore 
requires a new theory for statutory interpretation in the era of 
constitutionalism. 
The above hypothesis necessitates a careful consideration of the aims and objectives set 
out below. 
1.3 Aims/Objectives 
(i) To establish what are the commonly accepted theories of statutory 
interpretation, that have been used by South African courts, and that 
have underpinned judicial reasoning in South Africa in the past. 
(ii) To examine the relevant constitutional provisions, and in particular 
section 39, to determine how the application thereof has transformed the 
approach to statutory interpretation and the way legislation is interpreted 
in contemporary South Africa. 
                                                            
11 From an examination of relevant case-law, the emerging jurisprudence in the current 




(iii) To examine the influence of the Constitution on the rules, canons, 
maxims and presumptions of interpretation – in order to assess their 
relevance and significance in the democratic constitutional era. 
(iv) To determine how international law and foreign law are applied, and 
why they have to be considered in the process of interpretation. 
(v) To evaluate the emerging jurisprudence in contemporary South Africa 
from an examination of judicial precedents, in order to determine 
whether the traditional theories of interpretation are adequate. 
(vi) To propose and explain a ‘new’ theory of interpretation, with its own 
particular modus operandi – for a transformative South African legal 
system. 
1.4 Background/Overview 
In order to understand the relevance of the research undertaken, it is necessary to trace 
the development of the field of statutory interpretation in South Africa. An examination 
of some of the ideas of jurists and leading experts, and their contributions to the field of 
statutory interpretation-are presented. 
Cross defines statutory interpretation as the ‘process by which the courts determine the 
meaning of a statutory provision for the purpose of applying it to the situation before 
them.’12 The interpretative process as articulated is therefore two-fold: 
(i) Firstly, it involves the determination of meaning, which is a cognitive 
function (this is an act of recognition or discovery); and 
(ii) Secondly, the application of the meaning to a particular factual situation, 
which is a judicially creative function.13 
                                                            
12  Cross Statutory Interpretation at 40. Cross in referring to Gray’s definition of interpretation, 
submits that Gray’s definition calls for some revision. The definition according to Gray is as 
follows: ‘the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman, who has 
occasion to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from the words of a statute- book a 





According to Devenish, the subject involves a ‘kindred triology of phenomena’:14 
(i) Firstly, it is concerned with linguistics, which in turn concerns itself 
with semantics, syntax and the rules of logic; 
(ii) Secondly, it involves not only statute law, but also the common law; and 
(iii) Finally it is inextricably intertwined with jurisprudence or the 
philosophy of law.15 
While from the above definition of the subject, one might gain the impression that the 
interpretation of statutes is concerned mainly with rules and procedures, Devenish 
hastens to add ‘that the interpretation of statutes is not merely a technical procedure but 
also involves a psychological and imaginative procedure using value judgments.’16 
De Ville submits that in order to understand something, we first have to interpret it. He 
is emphatic that ‘no understanding is possible without interpretation.’17 Texts do not 
have a meaning in and of themselves. They only have a meaning in and through the act 
of interpretation.18 Understanding is therefore described as a temporary moment when 
the interpreter decides on the meaning of the text.19 It is interesting that De Ville makes 
the point that interpretation is therefore a ‘conversation between the current perspective 
of the interpreter and the textual and historical perspective of the statute.’20 The 
                                                                                                                                                                               
13 Dickerson The Interpretation and Application of Statutes at 21-22. 
 
14 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 2. 
 
15  Cowen ‘Prologemenon to a Restatement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ 
(1976)Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg at 136 contends that ‘the interpretation of statutes 
finds a place in the books on general jurisprudence because it raises basic questions concerning 
the nature of the judicial process and the relation between the legislature and the judiciary.’  
 (Emphasis Added) 
 
16 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 2. Devenish’s reference to value-judgments cannot be  
more relevant than in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, which requires one to consider 
the ‘values’ that underlie an open and democratic society. 
 
17 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 3. 
 
18 Ibid at 4. See also Du Plessis Re-Interpretation at 116. Du Plessis shares De Ville’s sentiment 
and makes the point that the purpose or object cannot be known prior to interpretation, but has to 
be established through interpretation. (Emphasis Added) 
 





underlying argument therefore is that every understanding is preceded by ‘pre-
understanding.’21 Gadamer, whose scholarly works have dominated the field of 
hermeneutics,22 refers to this pre-understanding as ‘prejudices’23 or ‘biases’, as a result 
of being situated in a communal tradition or interpretive community.24As a result of 
being inextricably situated in a historical and linguistic reality shapes our experience of 
the world. In other words, when we interpret a text, we are already influenced by our 
culture and legal tradition.25 
The following key elements form the gravamen of De Ville’s argument: 
(i) no text has a meaning of its own or can be understood without 
interpretation; 
(ii) the interpretation is always situated within a community of interpreters; 
(iii) legal tradition is contingent and therefore subject to change; 
(iv) prejudices (including the methods of interpretation) should be critically 
reflected on; 
(v) the context – including the social, political and economic context and 
context of the case at hand – are important for understanding, as 




21 Ibid. De Ville supports his statement with the idea that: ‘when we interpret a text we are already 
influenced by (a specific understanding of) our culture and legal tradition.’ 
 
22  ‘Hermeneutics’ is derived from the Greek word hermeneuein which means ‘to interpret.’ 
Hermeneuein is in turn derived from the name Hermes, the messenger god of ancient Greece, 
who had to explain the messages of the Gods to the mortals of earth. Hermeneutics is therefore a 
very old discipline, used by the Greeks. Aristotle addressed the science of interpretation in his 
discourses. Throughout history, it became an important and useful tool in both Christian theology 
and jurisprudence. Biblical hermeneutics (scriptural exegesis) and legal hermeneutics 
(interpretation of statutes) developed as separate fields, although they had a great deal in 
common, since both had very strong normative characteristics. See discussion in Botha Statutory 
Interpretation (5th edition) at 83-84. 
 








(vi) interpretation is a conversation or dialogue between the interpreter and 
the text.26 
According to Baxter, the science of hermeneutics is concerned with the understanding 
and explanation, but more specifically it deals with the interpretation of texts, in order to 
reveal their meaning. He describes contemporary hermeneutics as a synthesis of ideas 
which have their origins in cognate disciplines such as the philosophy of language, 
linguistic philosophy, structuralism and semiology.27 The science of hermeneutics makes 
it clear that words, phrases and sentences – and even texts – can never have intrinsic 
meanings, since in the process of interpretation the context of the language and the 
persons involved are always relevant.28 However, what must be emphasized is that 
hermeneutics is not merely a technical discipline, but is essentially concerned with 
values.29 The fact is that the science of understanding is not a mechanical exercise, but 
one that involves value judgments, applied by the interpreter during the interpretation 
process.30Baxter points out that an understanding of the science of hermeneutics and the 
insights provided by the hermeneutic tradition are ‘of profound importance for an 
understanding of the process of interpretation.’31 Nevertheless, Du Plessis explains the 
relevance of hermeneutics for interpretation of legislation – by drawing an analogy to a 
circle, or, more accurately, a ‘hermeneutic circle,’32where: 
 
                                                            
26 Ibid at 7-8. 
 
27  Baxter Administrative Law  at 315-316. 
 
28 Goodrich Reading the Law 135. 
 
29 Ibid at 144. 
 
30 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 85. The value judgments that are referred to also 
find expression in section 39, which contains a mandate that judges must promote the values that 
underlie a democracy. Judges are therefore under a moral obligation to ensure that interpretation 
is in keeping with constitutional values. 
 
31 Baxter Administrative Law at 318. 
 




‘…every part of a text must be understood in terms of the whole, and in turn, 
the whole in terms of its parts. This is a continuous process during which 
both the whole and the parts are progressively explained.’33 
 
While the contributions made by various authors are by no means an exhaustive 
examination of the subject of statutory interpretation, they are nevertheless presented 
here as a starting point of the discussion. What is evident from an analysis of these views 
and submissions, is that the process of interpretation requires that the interpreter engage 
with the text. A text cannot be understood without according meaning to the words and 
the language that is used.34 Therefore the process of interpretation is intricately linked to 
words and language. Language, in other words, is a medium through which meaning is 
communicated.35 
 
The very nature of words and language is, however, problematic. Even though words 
may be regarded as ‘symbols of meaning’, they cannot attain quantitative precision, as is 
the case with mathematical symbols.36 It is also difficult to express ideas in words with 
complete accuracy. Furthermore, the more complex the idea, the greater the difficulty.37 
This problem appears to be compounded with the drafting of statutes.38 It is often found 
                                                            
33 Ibid. The idea encapsulated in the quotation is in keeping with that of ‘holism.’ Holism in general 
terms (whether in science, sociology, economics, linguistics or philosophy), is the idea that all the 
properties of a given system cannot be determined or explained by its component parts alone, but 
the system as a whole determines in an important way how the parts behave. Semantic Holism is 
a doctrine in the Philosophy of Language to the effect that a certain part of language (for 
examples, a term or a complete sentence) can only be understood through its relations to a 
(previously understood) larger segment of language. http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch-
holism. html (Accessed on October 2013)   
 
34  De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 3-4. 
 
35 Ibid at 8. 
 
36 See discussion in Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 2-3. 
 
37 Ibid at 3-4. See also Venter v Rex 1907 TS 910 at 913: ‘… [N]o matter how carefully words are 
chosen there is a difficulty in selecting language which, while on the face of it expressing 
generally the idea of the framer of the measure, will not, when applied under certain 
circumstances go beyond it, and when applied under other circumstances fall short of it.’  
 
38 Staksy Legislative Analysis and Drafting (2nd edition) at 14-15. ‘In short, whether statutory 
language is broad or precise, the courts can rarely, if ever, be reduced to a mechanical role… 
Further complicating the picture is the nature of the legislative process itself.  Most legislatures 
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that even when statutes are drafted with meticulous legal and linguistic insight, there 
will always be situations that the draftsman could not have anticipated – and for which 
the statute does not make provision.39 
Prior to the new democratic dispensation, the most pervasive theory of interpretation in 
South Africa was the literal theory, or that which Botha refers to as the ‘orthodox text-
based approach.’40  In terms of this theory, the interpreter focused primarily on the literal 
meaning of the provision. Basically, therefore, the methodology or the modus operandi 
was applied as follows – if the meaning of the text was clear, that was the meaning to be 
used, irrespective of the consequences.41It was rather unfortunate, that over a period of 
time, that the courts began to regard the clear, literal meaning of the words as being 
identical to what the legislature intended.42 As a result, only ‘lip-service’ was paid to the 
principle of legislative intent, because courts automatically equated the so-called ‘clear 
and unambiguous meaning of the words’ to the ‘intention of the legislature.’43 
Since the intention of the legislature was to be deduced from the words that were used, it 
was not surprising that most scholars were critical of the judiciary during apartheid. 
Cameron J’s most vehement criticism of the role of judges during apartheid was that due 
to the fact that judges were constrained to apply the law, this often provided them with 
                                                                                                                                                                               
consist of hundreds of elected officials who operate in a highly political environment.  It is not 
uncommon for legislation to be passed in a crisis atmosphere where few legislators have the time, 
interest, or expertise to read and understand everything that they are voting for. Hence, there is no 
such thing as a collective legislative mind which has a readily identifiable intent accompanying 
every statute that is passed.’ 
 
39 Bell and Engle Cross Statutory Interpretation at 2-3. 
 
40  Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 91. 
 




43 Ibid. See also Phillips Lawyers Language – How and Why Legal Language is Different at 107-
108, where it is expounded that: ‘The phrase “intention of Parliament,” is not in itself clear cut.  
The initial complication is that the actual author, the legislature, is collective.  In the case of 
legislation, as with deed, intention is equated with consensus.  Therefore it is to be sought in the 
words which issue forth and not in the statements of individuals. The exclusion of the legislative 
history conforms to the logic of collective intention.  Once “intention of Parliament” becomes 
“legislative intention,” or “intent” or “import,” a subtle charge of significance takes place. The 




the opportunity not only to criticize the proliferation of policies and legislation that were 
reflective of the apartheid regime, but they were quite well poised to curtail these laws 
and policies as well. He therefore submits that not only judges but all lawyers who 
participated in the apartheid system ‘legitimated’ it. He is therefore quite emphatic that 
all lawyers and judges irrespective of their personal beliefs and extent of their 
participation were complicit during apartheid.44 David Dyzenhaus in his analysis of the 
contentious subject, comments quite perceptively, that where there was an attempt to 
mount the challenge to oppose the government’s unpalatable and abhorrent apartheid 
legislation, it was often argued before courts by lawyers that judges should read statutes 
in light of the common-law presumptions.45  In the absence of a Bill of Rights during 
apartheid, the common-law presumptions which were based on what was fair and just 
could have easily operated as a surrogate for the Bill of Rights, to protect individual 
rights and liberty.  Unfortunately however this did not materialize as one would have 
envisaged.46  Cora Hoexter, a strong proponent for transformation of the judiciary notes 
that the problem was further compounded by the fact that South Africa’s highest court 
was for the most part ‘stocked’ with a small minority of judges who were all white and 
who subscribed to the policies of the prevailing National Party government. In limited 
instances when matters could actually be challenged and taken up on review on grounds 
of bad faith, bias and irrationality, almost inevitably the decisions of the lower court 
judges were overruled by the Appellate Division.47 Apart from Edwin Cameron, David 
                                                            
44        Cameron ‘Submission on the role of the Judiciary Under Apartheid’ (1998) South African Law 
Journal at 436.  Cameron justifies his submission that such lawyers were not only lawyers who 
supported apartheid and acted for government, but also those lawyers who considered themselves 
‘politically neutral’  and who pursued their commercial and other activities under the apartheid 
framework.  
 
45   Dyzenhaus ‘The Pasts and Future of the Rule of Law in South Africa’ (2008) 124 South African 
Law Journal at 734. 
 
46   The Role of Presumptions is examined more fully in Chapter 4. 
 
47  Hoexter ‘The Principle of Legality in South African Administrative Law’ (2004) Macquarie Law 
Journal at 165.  Due to the limitation inherent in the literal theory or with the enquiry for the so-
called ‘intention of the legislature’, courts were bound by the ordinary grammatical meaning of 
the word.  Courts were therefore restricted to the limited grounds of review as provided for in 
terms of legislation which included bad faith, bias and irrationality.  Theses grounds could not be 
extended under any circumstances.  The literal theory must be compared to the purposive theory 
which focuses on the purpose for the promulgation of the Act. A purposive methodology is more 
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Dyzenhaus and Cora Hoexter,  John Dugard and Hugh Corder, were also ‘unflattering’ 
on the tendency of judges to only refer to the so-called ‘will’ or ‘intention of the 
legislature’ – particularly in respect of harsh, unjust apartheid laws.48 However, it was 
only with the advent of the new democratic constitutional dispensation, and in particular 
section 39, that there was an upsurge in interest in the role of the judiciary in the process 
of interpretation. 
In terms of section 39 – the interpretation provision in the Constitution – it is provided: 
(1)  When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
 (2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
What is manifest from examination of section 39, is the unmistakable directive that 
courts and judges in ‘promoting the values that underlie an open and democratic society’ 
–to assume a far more creative role in the interpretation process.49 There has been a 
paradigmatic shift in emphasis from the literal approach with its focus merely on words, 
to a more purposive or teleological mode of interpretation, resulting in an emphasis on 
those seminal values suited to a constitutional democracy. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
suited to advance the aims of a transformative constitutional system.  An in-depth analysis of the 
Theories of Interpretation is dealt with in Chapter 2. 
 
48 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes Prolegmenon at xi.  See also Dugard ‘Courts and the 
Poor in South Africa: A Critique of Systematic Judicial Failures to Advance Transformative 
Justice’ (2008)  24 South African Journal on Human Rights at 214 
 




There have been a number of academics who have been instrumental in transforming the 
notion of purposive interpretation to that of teleological interpretation.50 Etienne 
Mureinik promoted a value-coherent interpretation as one that aspires to the higher 
ethical coherence of a common law legal system as a whole.51 Devenish has argued 
emphatically in favour of a value-laden teleological approach to statutory 
interpretation.52  Christo Botha expounded the merit of a teleological approach to 
interpretation in the new constitutional era.53 
While the transition and shift in emphasis from the literal approach to a more purposive 
methodology has occurred, it nevertheless still begs the question as to whether the 
teleological theory is the most appropriate in the current constitutional order in South 
Africa. From an examination of the field of statutory interpretation – through the eyes of 
scholarly experts on the subject – what emerges is that ‘the approach of the courts varies 
according to the judges’ perception of their constitutional role at any given period.’54  
This perception undoubtedly influences the theory of interpretation that gains dominance 
in a particular legal system.55  What is expected of judges in the current constitutional 
order, is that they should engage in a moral evaluation of the legislative text.  Lord 
Denning declared that judges should actually believe that they are involved in a moral 
activity.56  It is therefore postulated that the most appropriate theory in interpretation in 
the South African context, is one that incorporates ethical and moral considerations in 
the process of reasoning.  Such a theory would be deontic in nature and therefore 
referred to as the deontic theory. 
                                                            
















Law as a social science is a discourse that is infused with value judgments.57 Such a 
value-coherent approach is specifically mandated by the Constitution and in particular 
section 39(2), which requires that in the process of interpretation that one has to consider 
the values that underlie an open and democratic society.  Legal reasoning does not only 
involve purely rational arguments but also an evaluation of conflicting ethical interests 
and the making of value judgments.58 
In actual fact, a solution to a particular legal problem will require both inductive and 
deductive reasoning.59  However, because legal reasoning requires a more complex and 
specialized reasoning than reasoning in general, legal reasoning in its entirety is not 
reducible to merely a species of inductive and deductive reasoning, but is in fact a 
synthesis of inter alia, inductive, deductive, deontic logic which involves moral and 
ethical principles.60  The elements identified above which include ethics and morality 
form the basis of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation.  It is therefore 
                                                            
57 Black The Behaviour of Law at 3-4. 
 
58 See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 265-266, for that which comprises reasoning.  In 
quoting Greenwood, he describes ‘reasoning as a process which is one of a passing from certain 
propositions already known or assumed to be true… and that all forms of reasoning are reducible 
to one or the other of the two fundamental processes of reasoning, namely deduction and 
induction.’ 
 
59 Ibid at 266. Deductive reasoning – A syllogism is an example of deductive reasoning. In 
deductive reasoning, the conclusion must follow from the premises, as a matter of logical 
necessity.  If one accepts the premises, then one must accept the conclusion, as a logical follow-
up or consequence as a result of accepting the premises. So for example, to use the syllogism 
that: All men are mortal – major premise. Socrates is a man – minor premise. Therefore it can be 
inferred deductively that :Socrates is mortal - conclusion 
In applying the syllogism to a legal problem, means that the legal rule is the major premise and 
the determination of the facts is a minor premise.  A legal consequence can therefore be inferred 
deductively from the major and minor premise. 
Inductive Reasoning – In a broader sense, it encompasses all kinds of reasoning in which the 
premises support but do not compel the result or conclusion.  An apt illustration or example of 
such inductive reasoning is proffered by Morris about the eighteenth-century physician Edward 
Jenner who discovered the cure for smallpox. Jenner found that while nearly all milkmaids 
contracted cowpox, they very seldom were affected by smallpox, as they were apparently 
immune to the smallpox germ.  As a result of this finding and by applying inductive reasoning, he 
proceeded to develop and find a vaccine for smallpox.  
Likewise a lawyer will have to examine a number of cases, before he can arrive at a finding, 
based on the major premise which underlies all the cases examined.  This form of reasoning and 
analysis is referred to as inductive reasoning. 
 
60 Ibid at 276. See also Gottlieb The Logic of Choice at 32. 
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maintained that the most appropriate theory of interpretation for the current 
constitutional order, is one that: 
 involves deductive and inductive legal reasoning; 
 encapsulates ethics and morality; and 
 is applied in a pro-active manner. 
It is therefore submitted that a theory of interpretation that incorporates all of the above 
elements, would be most suited to achieve social and economic justice in South Africa.  
An exemplary precedent of the pro-active approach is found in the recent Constitutional 
Court decision of the MEC for Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary 
School.61  While the case essentially revolved around the admission of a Grade 1 learner, 
the issue that the court had to decide on, was who had the ultimate authority to decide on 
matters of capacity of public schools- is it the School Governing Body, the officials 
from the Provincial Department of Education or should the dispute in actual fact be 
resolved by a combination of the two, working in co-operation with each other? 
The Constitutional Court held that although in terms of the Schools Act,62 the School 
Governing Body may determine the capacity of the school as an important part of the 
admission policy, the Department always has ultimate control over the implementation. 
The position maintained by the court was clear that in casu, the parties were required to 
uphold the principles of co-operative government, to attempt to resolve the dispute so as 
to avoid litigation, in terms of section 40(2)63and section 41(1)(h)(vi)64of the 
Constitution. The court therefore emphasized that ‘co-operation’ is pivotal to resolving 
disputes between the school Governing Body and the Department – and in matters of a 
                                                            
61 2013 (12) BCLR 1365 (CC).      
 
62 84 of 1996. 
 
63 Section 40(2) of the Constitution provides: ‘All spheres of government must observe and adhere 
to the principles of this chapter.’  
 
64 Section 41(1) (h) (vi) of the Constitution provides: ‘All spheres of government …must co-operate 




similar nature that the parties are urged to ‘co-operate’ in an attempt to resolve the 
matter, to avoid litigation.  
While the minority judgment is based on a minimalistic approach,65 the majority on the 
other hand, in giving expression to section 39(2), maintained a more innovative and 
undoubtedly a more pro-active position on the matter.66 
It is therefore submitted that a close examination of the field of statutory interpretation 
has revealed that the most workable theory of interpretation in the democratic era, is a 
theory which has its genesis in section 39, is based on deontic reasoning, with particular 
emphasis on ethical and moral considerations, and which must be applied pro-actively.  
The proposed deontic theory of interpretation and the modus operandi that underpins its 
application, is a theme that pervades the thesis.  From an examination of seminal case-
law, exactly how the proposed deontic theory of interpretation would apply with regard 
to the rules of interpretation, the canons, the maxims and the presumptions of 
interpretation, will be explored. 
1.5 Chapter Breakdown 
The thesis is structured so that each identified important aspect of statutory 
interpretation, is dealt with in seriatim in the respective chapters. 
Chapter 1 – is the basic introduction. It provides an overview of the field of statutory 
interpretation in South Africa and the motivation for undertaking the research. 
Chapter 2 – interrogates the commonly accepted theories of statutory interpretation. 
Each of the theories is critically examined to determine their significance and to assess 
                                                            
65 See Woolman The Selfless Constitution – Experimentalism and Flourishing as Foundations of 
South Africa’s Basic Law at 580-581, for a discussion on Minimalism vs Judicious Avoidance. A 
pro-active approach must be contrasted to a minimalistic approach. While pro-active reasoning, 
would enable a court to make a decision for the future, a minimalist court because it seeks to 
decide on cases on narrow grounds, would settle a case, but would leave many things undecided. 
 
66 In giving expression to section 39 (2), of the Constitution, the court had applied a ‘value-based’ 
approach. The Rivonia Primary School case, as well as other relevant cases will be examined in 
more detail in subsequent chapters to shed light on the meaning of pro-activism. 
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how much emphasis courts have placed on them in the process of statutory 
interpretation. 
Chapter 3 – focuses on the Constitution. As suggested by the title, the Constitution is the 
basis of the thesis. For this reason, the various aspects of the Constitution, which include 
(but are not restricted to) an understanding of the concept of constitutionalism, a 
comparison of constitutional law and ordinary statutory law, as well as the relevant 
statutory provisions – are fully examined. This is to determine firstly, the extent of the 
influence of the Constitution and secondly, to assess how it has transformed the process 
of interpretation in South Africa. 
Chapter 4 – has at its core the common-law presumptions of interpretation. As it is 
submitted that a detailed examination of all the common-law presumptions is not 
necessary for purposes of the research, only a selected number of the common-law 
presumptions are discussed. In keeping with the approach adopted with regard to the 
examination of other aspects of interpretation, the chapter essentially seeks to establish 
the significance of the common-law generally, as outlined in section 39, and specifically 
in relation to the operation of the presumptions. 
Chapter 5 – examines the more popular canons and maxims of interpretations. From an 
examination of judicial precedents, the relevance and significance of the canons and 
maxims in the current constitutional era are highlighted. 
Chapter 6 – emphasizes the importance of international law and foreign law in the 
process of interpretation. Because there is a constitutional imperative in terms of section 
39 (2) – that international law and foreign law have to be considered in the process of 
interpretation – this has changed the way legislation is interpreted  in South Africa. 
Chapter 7 – from a detailed examination of the various aspects of statutory 
interpretation, as outlined above, the thesis supports the hypothesis that the Constitution 
has transformed the process of interpretation and has resulted in a jurisprudence that 
17 
 
requires a ‘new’ theory of interpretation. The proposed theory is referred to as a deontic 
theory of interpretation. 
 
1.6 Definition of Terms and Concepts 
The terms and concepts that form part of the glossary are intended to provide clarity on 
their meaning and to emphasize their significance to the research. 
1.6.1 Theory 
A theory is defined as a set of reasoned ideas to explain facts or events.67 The theories of 
interpretation are both explanatory and justificatory at the same time.68 While the 
theories of interpretation are also referred to as theoretical or interpretive approaches, or 
theoretical schools of thought, the most commonly accepted term used by authors, is the 
word ‘theory’.69 
Generally, South African courts have favoured the more traditional theories of 
interpretation, with the emphasis and preference prior to the new democratic 
constitutional dispensation being on the literal theory or the text-based approach, and 
with a shift in preference subsequent to the Constitution to the purposive theory which 
requires a value-orientated approach.70  It has been argued, however, that subsequent to 
the Constitution, the teleological theory or value-based method of interpretation with its 
emphasis on values, has been regarded as the most legitimate theory of choice amongst 
judicial officers.71  Nevertheless, apart from the traditional theories, a number of modern 
                                                            
67  The definition of the word ‘theory’ is indicated as per the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 
(4th edition) at 1330. 
 
68 See Chapter 2, for a closer examination of the various theories of interpretation. 
 
69 Authors generally prefer the use of the word ‘theory.’ See Botha Statutory Interpretation at 91, 
and Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 25. 
 
70 A more detailed examination of the traditional theories of interpretation and their modus 
operandi is found in Chapter 2.  
 
71 The following cases illustrate an application of the teleological theory of interpretation: Qozeleni 
v Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) BCLR 735 CC; Baloro v University of 
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theoretical schools or post-modern theories have emerged that examine the law together 
with other disciplines – for example, economics, political science, linguistics, and 
philosophy. These theoretical schools of thought must be understood in the spirit of 
post-modernism72  and a rejection of a meta-narrative or an all encompassing narrative. 
Post-modernism is not a school of thought, but rather an intellectual style, a condition or 
a spirit of the times. Post-modernism accepts that everything is relative, and in the 
process it welcomes problems, paradoxes and contradictions. In terms of it’s application 
therefore, it defies a complete definition, because post-modernism rejects preconceived 
ideas, definitions and categories.73 
This therefore raises the question on what forms the theoretical basis of a deontic theory 
– which is postulated as a ‘new’ perspective for understanding statutory interpretation. 
The ensuing discussion will attempt to address these concerns. 
1.6.2 Deontic Theory 
Deontology is broadly defined as the ‘science of duty or moral obligation.’74  The word 
deontology has its roots in the Greek word deon, which means science. Thus deontology 
is the ‘science of duty.’ Key questions which deontological ethical systems ask include: 
 What is my moral duty? 
 What are my moral obligations? 
 How do I weigh one moral duty against another?75 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Bophuthatswana 1995 8 BCLR 1018(CC) and Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen 
Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC). 
 
72 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 87. 
 
73 Ibid. Postmodernism is described as a late 20th century style and content in the arts, architecture, 
and criticism which represents a departure from modernism and is characterized by the self-
conscious use of earlier styles and conventions, a mixing of different artistic styles and media, 
and a general distrust of theories. See definition –  
http://www:oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/postmodernism (Accessed on October 
2014)  
 




The modern development of deontic logic was first initiated in the early 1950’s by GH 
van Wright who coined the term based on the Greek Seov, meaning – ‘as it should be’ or 
‘duly’.76 Deontic logic is the logic of normative concepts which includes morality and 
ethics. Its major application outside of ethics has been to the philosophy of law.77 
Due to the fact that law is dynamic in nature and is infused with the value judgments,78  
it is particularly relevant in the current constitutional order. Horovitz, therefore in 
looking at the inter-relationship between law, theory, deontic and inductive logic 
provides that: 
‘Because law is socially directive and co-ordinate, it is dependent upon 
theoretical psycho-sociology and calls for a deontic and inductive logic.’79 
However, Devenish asserts that legal reasoning in its entirety is not reducible to merely a 
species of inductive and deductive reasoning, but is in fact a synthesis of inter alia 
deductive, inductive, and deontic logic – which involves moral and ethical 
principles.80He submits further, in agreement with Gottlieb, that the operation of this 
kind of reasoning in relation to law and the interpretation of statutes, is essentially ‘to 
tell sound arguments from unsound ones…’.81 
The task and role of a judge as an interpreter and adjudicator finds expression in the 
words of the judicial oath – that they have to: 
‘administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice’82 
                                                                                                                                                                               
75 http://atheism.about.com/od/ethicalsystem/a/Deontological.htm (Accessed on August 2013) 
 
76 Lee, Nguyen and Pagnoni ‘Securing Uniqueness of Rights e-Documents: A Deontic Process 
Perspective’ (2008) 3 Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronics Commerce Research at 19. 
 
77 Ibid at 4. 
 
78 Black The Behaviour of Law at3-4. 
 
79 Horovitz Law and Logic at 1. 
 
80 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 278. 
 
81 Gottlieb The Logic of Choice at 31. 
 




Lord Denning observes that as far as the interpretive function of the judiciary is 
concerned, in respect of the judicial oath, judges should assume the position that they are 
engaged in a moral activity.83 It is submitted that Denning’s view about the role of the 
judiciary and the application of the law, forms an important component of a deontic 
theory, which is proposed as the ‘new’ theory of interpretation in the current 
constitutional order. A value-based theory of interpretation – the teleological theory of 
interpretation – has been most favourably received in the era of constitutional 
democracy, and highlights the ‘values’ that are required in an open and democratic 
society,84while the proposed deontic theory takes heed of the conceptual inadequacy of 
the teleological theory and reinforces the directive that in the process of interpretation, 
judges are to engage in an ethical and moral evaluation. 
1.6.3 Method/Methodology 
A method is defined as a way of doing.85  While the theories and theoretical approaches, 
as discussed above, may be regarded as being synonymous, the method or the 
methodology – as a result of applying a particular theory – may also be described as the 
way one would go about applying a theory. This also can be referred to as the modus 
operandi – which basically describes the way in which a thing, in this case a theory, 
operates.86 
In effect the method is influenced by the theory. To explain further – a literal theory 




84  In terms of section 39 (2) of the Constitution, it is mandated that the process of  interpretation is 
consistent with a ‘value-coherent’ approach to interpretation. 
 
85 See definition as per the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (4th edition) at 780. 
 
86 Ibid at 799. 
 




or method to be followed in applying the literal theory, proceeds along the following 
lines:88 
(i) The primary rule of interpretation, is that if the meaning of the text is 
clear, the plain meaning should be applied; 
(ii) If the ‘plain meaning’ of the words is ambiguous, vague or misleading, 
the wider context or surrounding circumstances are considered, giving 
rise to the mischief rule. 
(iii) If a strict literal interpretation would result in absurd results, then the 
court may deviate from the literal meaning to avoid such an absurdity.  
This is known as the golden rule of interpretation.  
(iv) The court will then turn to the so-called ‘secondary aids’89 to 
interpretation, in order to find the intention of the legislature; and  
(v) Only when the ‘secondary aids’ to interpretation prove insufficient to 
ascertain intention, will the courts have recourse to the so-called 
‘tertiary aids’90 to construction. 
A purposive or a teleological theory, on the other hand, requires a text-in-context or an 
unqualified contextual methodology.91 As the text-in-context approach provides that the 
purpose or object of the legislation is the prevailing factor in interpretation, the modus 
operandi therefore requires a search for the purpose of legislation – which recognizes 
the contextual framework of the legislation right from the outset even when the text is 
clear and not only in cases where a literal or text-based approach has failed.92  Likewise, 
in applying the proposed deontic theory, as postulated above, it would be necessary to 
follow a method or modus operandi that is unique to the theory as presented. The basis 
                                                            
88 Ibid at 91-92. 
 
89  The secondary aids to interpretation include for example, the long title, the short title, headings, 
marginal notes, the preamble, sections, sub-sections, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs. 
 
90 Tertiary aids refers to the common law presumptions of interpretation. 
 
91 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 97. 
 




of the method of application of a deontic theory is an ‘eclectic method’ or eclecticism. 
Exactly what an ‘eclectic method’ or ‘eclecticism’ entails is discussed more fully below. 
1.6.4 Eclecticism 
In earlier decades of behavioural sciences, there was a tendency in many disciplines to 
identify with only one theoretical position. However, as various theories appeared to 
come into competition with one another, many behavioural scientists became more and 
more uncomfortable about the idea of simply ‘allying themselves with a single 
perspective’93 as an exhaustive theory.  The tendency in recent years, therefore, has seen 
substantial support for the idea of refraining to endorse only one theory as correct, or 
even as the best theory of human behaviour. The procedure that developed in response 
thereto was to ‘select in all what appears to be true and good and consequently 
everlasting.’ Such a school of thought has been described as eclecticism.94   It is felt that 
the optimal ‘strategy’ for understanding human behaviour is to borrow ideas or 
constructs from all reputable theories.95To illustrate further, by way of example: 
In attempting to explain love, or interpersonal attraction, a psychologist might say that 
psychodynamic theory explains some phenomena of attraction, because people do have 
a strong sexual instinct that they have to gratify. He/she might also believe that people 
are sometimes conditioned by reinforcements to be attracted to some people and not to 
others. Further, the psychologist might believe that some, but not all conditioning, 
occurs automatically, and that sometimes cognitive processes intervene to determine just 
how stimuli and information produce attraction responses. Finally, the same 
psychologist might believe that people are also motivated in their loving and attraction 
by a need or desire for self-actualisation.96 
                                                            
93 Slife and Williams What’s behind the Research? Discovering Hidden Assumptions in the 
Behavioral Sciences at 45. 
 
94   Kelley ‘Eclecticism and the History of Ideas’ (2001) 62 Journal of the History of Ideas at 577. 
 
95 Slife and Williams What’s behind the Research? Discovering Hidden Assumptions in the 
Behavioral Sciences at 45. 
 
96 Ibid at 46. 
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What we find is that all of the above-mentioned theories may seem to be in operation at 
the same time (or in particular persons in particular situations).This approach is referred 
to as eclectic.97 Due to the fact that eclecticism allows one to find value or merit in all 
theories, as alluded to, and therefore to embrace all the positions (or parts of them), it is 
not surprising that eclecticism has been described as a sort of ‘higher plagiarism.’98  
What is suggested for its application therefore is an enlightened eclecticism, which 
requires that all schools borrow from them what they possess of the true and neglect 
what in them is false.99  An eclectic theory however is not new as the counter-narrative 
indicates.100  It has been here all along, however it is only over the past few decades that 
there has been an increase in its popularity and use.101 
With regard to the proposed deontic theory, it is suggested that an eclectic method or 
approach would best suit the modus operandi. In terms of its application, therefore, one 
would initially start the process with the literal approach, and an examination of the text 
                                                                                                                                                                               
 
97 The word ‘eclectic’ means that which is composed of elements drawn from various sources. 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/eclectic ‘Eclecticism’, also referred to 
above, is a conceptual approach that does not hold rigidly to a single paradigm or set of 
assumptions, but instead draws upon multiple theories, styles or ideas to gain complementary 
insights into a subject, or applies different theories in particular cases. Eclecticism was first 
recorded to have been practiced by a group of ancient Greek and Roman philosophers who 
attached themselves to no real system, but selected from existing philosophical beliefs whose 
doctrines seemed most reasonable to them. Out of this collected material, they constructed their 
new system of philosophy. http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Electicism (Accessed on August 2013)                                            
 
98   Kelley ‘Eclecticism and the History of Ideas’ (2001) 62 Journal of the History of Ideas at 579-
580. The locus classicus of eclecticism was provided by the second century doxographer, 
Diogenes Laertius, whose unreflective and gossip-ridden Lives and Opinions of Imminent 
Philosophers defined an intellectual cannon which came to be known as the history of 
philosophy.  Eclecticism became especially entangled in religious thought.  The strength of 
eclecticism was that it tried to accommodate the entire agenda; its weakness was its less-than-




100   Lake ‘Theory is dead, long live theory: The End of the Great Debates and the rise of Eclecticism 
in International Relations’ (2014) European Journal of Human Relations at 572.  Lake states that 
an eclectic theory is the source of some of the most progressive research in our discipline.  It 
represents the future of international relations- not a new future, since it already has a long 
history, but the future nonetheless. 
 
101 Slife and Williams What’s behind the Research? Discovering Hidden Assumptions in the 
Behavioral Sciences at 46. One of the reasons that the authors suggest for the popularity in the 
eclectic approach, is because eclecticism allows one to believe in all the positions (or embrace 




to ascertain the ipsissima verba, or the exact meaning of the words that are used. The 
process would thereafter require an examination of the context or the background, which 
is reflective of the contextual theory. Nevertheless, the process should always seek to 
find the purpose of the legislation. This is the prevailing factor and is central to the 
purposive theory. Next it is necessary to determine whether interpretation is compatible 
with the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, which is compliant with 
teleological theory. The process however does not end here. The proposed deontic 
theory for interpretation incorporates reasoning that is ethical and moral in nature, and in 
the words of the preamble to the Constitution: 
‘ heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights… to improve the quality 
of life of all citizens…’102 
What is pivotal to the operation of the proposed theory, is that it has to be applied pro-
actively, mindful of the above considerations, so as to achieve social transformation. A 
pro-active approach must be compared to a minimalistic approach adopted by courts.  
While pro-active reasoning, would result in an outcome or decision which would be 
more favourable to what is to be decided for the future, a minimalist court, because it 
seeks to decide cases on narrow grounds and aims to settle the case before it, leaves 
many issues undecided.103 Therefore a pro-active approach is advocated for application 
in a transformative democratic state. 
The amalgamation of the theoretical positions as indicated above, is clearly an 
illustration of the eclectic approach that is used and applied in a number of other 
disciplines. The reason for the choice of an eclectic approach as an interpretive strategy 
of the proposed deontic theory is based largely on the idea that no single formula can 
                                                            
102 Reference to the Preamble of the Constitution. 
 
103 Woolman The Selfless Constitution – Experimentalism and Flourishing as Foundations of South 




capture everything.104  The eclectic method is therefore ‘borrowed’ from contemporary 
behavioural science and adapted as a model for statutory interpretation. It is presented 
as a strategy to provide an explanation for the operation of the proposed deontic theory. 
1.7 Conclusion 
Du Plessis states resoundingly, that: 
 
‘The Constitution determines and shapes statutory interpretation in an all-
pervading manner.’105 
 
Chapter 1 conceptualises exactly what this means in a democratic constitutional era in 
South Africa. The background sets the scene, and basically describes the essence of 
statutory interpretation, and how the process differed prior to and subsequent to the 
Constitution. The chapter also highlights the motivation for the study and articulates 
how this will be achieved through the aims and objectives of the research. In 
acknowledging that the Constitution has indeed influenced the process of interpretation 
in South Africa, the thesis is structured so as to assess how each component of the 
statutory process is influenced by the application of section 39. The chapter breakdown 
is clearly indicative of the key elements that form the basis of this thesis. An 
examination of judicial precedents will reveal the unfolding of the subject, to prove the 
hypothesis that the Constitution has transformed the process of interpretation in South 
Africa, and therefore requires a new theory and methodology for the interpretation of 
legislation in the current constitutional era. 
 
Since the advent of constitutionalism, ‘there is always room for a transformation of 
conventional ideas on justice,’106 to those appropriate for a society reflecting social and 
                                                            
104   Tebbe ‘Eclecticism’ (2008-2009) 25 Constitutional Commentary at 317.  In his article on 
Eclecticism, Tebbe argues that a sound interpretive strategy begins by looking at ground-level 
conflicts and extrapolating- as far as possible, to more general guidelines. 
 
105 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes Prolegomenon at viii.       
                                           
106 Ibid at xvii. 
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economic justice. This is the mindset that informs the rationale for the study and which 




AN EXAMINATION OF THE TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION APPLIED IN SOUTH 
AFRICAN COURTS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In the field of statutory interpretation, there are a number of ‘theories’, as they are 
referred to, that inform the subject. In this chapter, it is intended: 
 
a) to examine these ‘theories’ more critically to determine their significance; 
and  
 
b) to assess their relevance to statutory interpretation in the democratic 
constitutional era in South Africa.  
 
While an attempt is made to explore these theories fully, it is submitted that this list 
is by no means exhaustive. The more commonly or widely used theories of statutory 
interpretation applied in South African courts will form the basis of this chapter. 
 
The word ‘theory’ appears to be used somewhat loosely in the legal parlance.1  In 
some instances it is used to describe a ‘rule’ or a ‘precept’. For example, the 
‘expedition theory’ in the law of contract is in fact a rule which stipulates ‘that a 
contract concluded by mail comes into existence the moment that the written 
acceptance of an offer is posted.’2 In a more conventional sense, a ‘theory’ may on 
the one hand really be an ‘explanation’ or an ‘explication’, and on the other hand,3 it 
is further submitted that a theory can be an idea accounting for a situation, and 
                                                            
1  Woolman, Roux Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2nd edition) at 32-28. 
 
2 Hosten, Edwards, Bosman and Church Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 
(2ndedition) at 704 - 705. 
 
3 For example, a consensus theory in the law of contract, explains that a contract is based on a 
concursus animorum of the parties. On the other hand, a theory can also be an idea 
accounting for a situation and as a resultjustity a certain course of action. See discussion in 




justifying a certain course of action. The theory would then advance a principle or 
principles on which the practise of an activity is based.4 
 
The theories of statutory interpretation are both explanatory and justificatory at the 
same time, and may also be referred to as ‘interpretive approaches’.5  Michelman 
speaks of such ‘interpretive approaches’ or ‘methods’ (to use yet additional 
terminology), which he states a judge either chooses (or perhaps just falls into).6  In 
choosing one of these available ‘interpretive approaches’, the judicial officer would 
have to resign himself to the consequences that follow as a result of the choice.7 
While the terms ‘theory’ and ‘approach’ appear to be used interchangeably, the term 
‘theory’, it is observed, is more popular and more widely used amongst legal 
scholars.8  Some of the more ‘acknowledged’ theories of statutory interpretation that 
have been identified and applied by courts, whilst not necessarily always 





4 Ibid at 32-29. 
 
5 Michelman ‘A Constitutional Conversation with Professor Frank Michelman’ (1995) 11 
South African Journal on Human Rights at 482. In his article, Michelman concedes that the 
terminology used is generally not fixed but recognises following as a standard list of 
interpretive approaches or methods that are available, namely, Literalism, Intentionalism, 
Purposivism, Instrumentalism and Moralism. Literalism is applying the text to the case 
according to the ordinary meaning of the words.  Intentionalism is applying the clause judges 
the writer of it would have done. Purposivism is applying the clause in the way that one 
judges will best accomplish the lawmakers primary or higher or transcendent purpose. 
Instrumentalism is determining the sense of a legal text’s or doctrine’s application to a 
particular cases by first comparing the predicted social consequences of applying it in one or 
the other sense, and then preferring the sense that has preferred consequences, as measured 
by a kind of ad hoc or pragmatic common sense. Moralism is determining concrete 
applications by reference to a high-level, substantive moral theory supposed to be 
instantiated by the constitution as a whole.   
 
6 Ibid. The ‘interpretative approaches’ that Michelman refers to bears striking similarity to 
some of the more commonly accepted theories in South Africa. For example, Literalism 
compares quite favourably with the literal theory and purposivism and the purposive theory 




8 Seefor example, Botha Statutory Interpretation (5thedition)at 91and Devenish Interpretation 
of Statutes at 25, where the authors show preference for the term theory. 
 
9 See discussion in Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 25-56 and Du Plessis Re-





1) Literal Theory 
2) Contextual Theory 
3) Purposive Theory 
4) Teleological Theory 
5) Intention Theory 
6) Objective Theory; and  
7) Judicial Theory. 
 
Cowen postulates that each theory of statutory interpretation is characterised by a 
specific viewpoint on one or more of the following seminal aspects of interpretation: 
 
a) the nature and functions of language; 
b) the relevance and meaning of the intention of the legislature;  
c) the role of the judiciary, which refers to  the extent of judicial discretion; and 
d) the time frame within which statutes operate.10 
 
What is also significant is that each of the theories tend to operate in terms of their 
own modus operandi. This is unique to a particular theory and is the distinctive 
feature of a theory that distinguishes it from another. With regard to the manner in 
which they operate, it is noted that ‘some are conflicting, others are complementary 
but all tend to overlap to some extent.’11  Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that 
‘courts tend to use these theories in a capricious way,’12  favouring certain theories 
above others, the obvious ‘degree of merit’13 in each of them cannot be overlooked. 
This will be interrogated more fully in the discussion below, to determine their 




10 Cowen ‘Prolegomenon to the Restatement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ 1976 
Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg at 150. 
 
11 See discussion in Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 25, where it is further submitted that 
without an articulated modus operandi, anchored in a jurisprudentially sound theory, the 











2.2  The Literal Theory 
 
According to this theory, in its ‘crude, unqualified form’, the true meaning of the 
provisions of the statute can be ascertained from the ipsissima verba, or the actual 
words used by the legislature.14  Essentially, therefore, in terms of the application of 
the theory, words should generally be accorded the meaning which the normal 
speaker of the English language would understand and use.15  While Devenish refers 
to this as the ‘literal or ordinary meaning rule’,16  Botha explains that words are to be 
given a literal or grammatical meaning, as part of the ‘plain meaning’ approach.17 
 
The case of Ebrahim v Minister of Interior18 has been quoted as an ‘exemplary’ 
application of the literal theory.19  In terms of section 15 of the South African 
Citizenship Act20, it was provided that a South African citizen would lose his 
nationality if he acquired a foreign nationality ‘whilst outside the Union’. The 
majority held that Ebrahim, a South African seaman, who had applied for British 
citizenship in order to secure employment, did not forfeit his South African 
citizenship. He had falsely claimed to be resident in the United Kingdom, when he 
was actually living in Durban. However, on the date when British nationality was 
                                                            
14 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 93. Du Plessis makes the point that in its crude 
and unqualified  form, the meaning of a statutory provision can (and must) be retrieved from 
the ipsissima verba in which it is couched, regardless of manifestly unjust or even absurd 
consequences. 
 
15 Cross Statutory Interpretationat 1. 
 
16 See comments by Devenish as indicated in the Interpretation of Statutes at 26, where it is 
submitted that the clear that the ordinary or the literal meaning of the word is in fact common 
to all theories of interpretation. The reason offered in support of this, is that the modus 
operandi must always start with the actual words used. 
 
17 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 193. Botha acknowledges that the ‘plain 
meaning rule’ is an orthodox application of literalism.  See also a Chapter 3 3.6 The Canon-
Guided Reading Strategies for a discussion on Grammatical Interpretation.  The obvious 
overlaps with the Literal Theory and the Grammatical Interpretation, a component of a Von 
Savigny Quarter are noted.  It is stressed however that while there are similarities, a reading 
strategy does not qualify as a theory.              
 
18 1977 (1) SA 665 A. 
 
19 The application of the literal theory in Ebrahim’s case, has been described as an ‘exemplary 
contemporary application’ of the literal theory. See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 27. 
 




conferred on him, he was coincidentally on a ship within South African territorial 
waters. In giving effect to the literal theory, Joubert JA maintained that if the words 
of a statute are ‘clear and unambiguous it is the function of a Court of law to give 
effect thereto.’21 
 
Nonetheless, literalism is almost always closely associated with the ordinary 
meaning rule of statutory interpretation.22 The primary rule that words are to be 
given their ordinary, grammatical or natural meaning, is the first step in the 
interpretation process. According to the literal theory, the primary rule may only be 
deviated from: 
 
(i) Where it would lead to obscurity or a result which is unjust, 
unreasonable or inconsistent with the other provisions or repugnant 
to the general object, tenor or policy of the statute. 
 
This is – in essence – a description of the golden rule.23 
Du Plessis posits that the application of the golden rule is justified in instances where 
the interpretative result is so absurd and repugnant to ‘common sense’, that the 
legislature could hardly have intended the outcome.24  Driedger explains further that 
the absurdity required must be an obvious absurdity. It must be extracted from the 
                                                            
21 See discussion of the case in Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 27 - 28. See judge’s 
comments on the findings of Ebrahim case at 680 A. Further support for the literal approach 
is clearly evidenced in Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 A 520 
at 534 where the stance of the court was clear that - ‘Prima facie the intention of the 
legislature is to be deduced from the words which it has used ...’  
 See also Union Government v Mack 1971 AD 713 at 750 where the court held that:  ‘We 
should first of all consider ... what the legislature has actually said in words .’ 
 
22 While the comment is made that literalism is closely associated with the ordinary-meaning 
rule, Du Plessis clarifies this statement that ordinary language is not characteristically always 
clear and unambiguous. See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 93. 
 
23 For an illustration of the application of the golden rule, see decisions of Venter v Rex 1907 
TS 910 at 913 and Grey v Pearson [1843 – 60] All ER Rep 21 (HL) 36. 
 
24 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutesat 93 - 94. A classical exposition of the golden rule of 
interpretation can be found in Lord Wensleydale’s dictum in Grey v Pearson [1843-60] All 
ER Rep 21 (HL) 36 where it was held that ‘The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words 
is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or 
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary 





whole instrument and must lie in the words of the statute, rather than in the 
consequences of the application of the statute to a particular case.25A criticism that 
has been levelled at the application of the golden rule, is ‘what seems an absurdity to 
one man might not necessarily seem absurd to another.’26 Du Plessis advances the 
argument with a series of questions, for example who and what would determine 
what an absurdity is and when is an absurdity sufficiently glaring to allow the golden 
rule to kick in?27 The determination of the exact meaning of the other criteria 
contained in the golden rule – which include injustice, unreasonableness and 
inconsistency with the other provisions or repugnancy to the general object of the 
statute – is also problematic, since ‘they are manifestly open to arbitrary 
application.’28 The comment that the golden rule is meant to be ‘literalism’s lifeway, 
not its critical companion’,29 is an interesting one. It is meant to qualify literalism in 
order to salvage it, not to criticise it.30 
The primary rule may also be departed from: 
(ii) where words are ambiguous. Here it is permissible to have recourse 
to outside sources for the purpose of discovering the true meaning. 
                                                            
25 Driedger The Construction of Statutes at 48. The point that is made is that the absurdity must 
be objective or absolute rather than relative. 
 
26 See Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation in the Nicolson Judgment- Jacob Zuma v The 
National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 All SA 54N’ (2009) 30 Obiter at 786 – 
787. 
 
27 See discussion by Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 105, where Du Plessis raises 
several pertinent question about the unreliability of language in its literal sense. First, what 
criteria can be trusted to show up an unreliability of language in its literal sense? Second, 
following from the first question, who or what determines what an absurdity is and when is 
an absurdity sufficiently glaring to allow the golden rule to kick in? An absurdity is 
nonsensical and cannot but be glaring. How much nonsense should an interpreter then be 
expected to stomach before (s)he concludes that an absurdity is ‘utterly glaring’?  Finally 
when the intention of the legislature is brought into the picture, a petition principia mars the 
golden rule. The intention of the legislature can be gleaned from the (clear and unambiguous) 
language of the provision. How can it happen that an intention contrary to the intention of the 
legislature can be gleaned from the very language which this supposed to be the fans etorigo 
of the intention of the legislature?     
 
28 See discussion by Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 29, where it is maintained that the 
distinction between what is absurd and utterly absurd, is, by its very nature, arbitrary. 
 
29 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 94. It is submitted that the operation of the golden 
rule is not meant to criticise nor to contradict the application of the literal rule. 
 




This is the third rule of the literal theory, referred to as the mischief 
rule and is to be applied in instances of ambiguity.31 
In terms of the application of the mischief rule, the interpreter has to heed the 
situation prior to and during the passing of the Act – to interpret an obscure or 
ambiguous provision. First expounded in the old English case of Heydon,32 the rule 
was articulated as follows: 
 
‘That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general ... 
four things are to be discerned and considered: 
(i) What was the common-law before the passing of the Act; 
(ii) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law 
did not provide; 
(iii) What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure 
the disease of the Commonwealth; and 
(iv) The true reason of the remedy. 
And then the office of all the judges is always to make such 
construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.’ 
 
In the landmark case of Hleka v Johannesburg City Council, 33 Van den Heever JA 
set out the above rules, and called on history to show what facts existed to bring 
about the relevant statute – namely the War Measure Act.34 To remedy the situation, 
a number of War Measures were passed, which were amended on a number of 
occasions.35 With regard to the question of what amounts to ambiguity, from Ex 
                                                            
31 See application of the mischief rule in Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation – Jacob Zuma v 
The National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 All SA 54 N’ (2009) 30 Obiter at 787. 
 
32 Heydon (1584) 3 Co Rep 7aat 7b. The Heydon case was the first case that employed the 
mischief rule. In terms of the rule, it allows for an examination of the historical 
circumstances of the statues, from which the purpose of the legislation can be inferred.  
33 1949(1)SA 842at852. 
 
34 18 of 1947. 
 
35 From the findings of Hleka’s case, the War Measure Act 18 of 1947 was enacted to ensure 
that persons who were removed to any place (in accordance with War Measure Act 31 of 
1944), could again be removed from that place, if the magistrate or native commissioner was 
satisfied ‘that the said place provides no suitable accommodation elsewhere, or that they have 




Parte Slater, Walker Securities (SA) Ltd,36 the court described ambiguity as that 
which ‘would appear to include lack of clarity or uncertainty.’37  It has to be 
conceded that what may be ‘clear or reasonable to one person may be obscure or 
absurd to another’.38 Therefore, in practice, the application of the golden and 
mischief rules have been criticised in that ‘they appear to be capricious’39 and are 
bound to result in uncertainty. Although generally when applying the three rules of 
the literal theory, the proponents of literalism tend to apply the literal rule first, 
followed by the golden and mischief rules thereafter, this is somewhat artificial and 
unnatural since the process of interpretation is not hierarchical, but integrated and 
complementary.40 
 
2.2.1 The Introduction of the Literal Approach into the South 
African   Legal System 
 
The doctrine of legal positivism influenced the adoption of the literal approach in 
England. The positivistic ideology expounded by John Austen that the essence of the 
law is to be found in the ‘command or decree’ established by a ‘sovereign’ – gained 
prominence, especially in the 19th Century.41 The literal theory (more specifically 
the plain meaning approach and golden rule) came to be introduced into the South 
African legal system in a ‘roundabout way from English law’.42 
                                                            
36 1974(4) SA 657(W). 
 
37 Ibid. In the case Ex Parte Slater, Walker Securities (SA) Ltd, there was a difficulty 
experienced in interpretation of sufficient magnitude to warrant reference to the history of the 
section(in dispute)in aid of construction. 
 
38 See the discussion in Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation in the Nicholson Judgment – 
Jacob Zuma v The National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009], All SA 54 N’ (2009) 30 





40 Pearce Statutory Interpretation in Australia at 14. According to Pearce, in the ascertainment 
of the meaning of legislation, courts have chosen to break up the process of comprehension 
into components, commonly known as the literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief rule. 
To say the least, this has been unfortunate because it has often resulted in the use of only one 
of the elements of comprehension instead of it being recognized that they are all part of a 
process. 
 
41 Johnson, Pete and Du Plessis Jurisprudence - A South African Perspective at 72 - 75. 
 





In De Villiers v Cape Divisional Council,43 Chief Justice de Villiers made a 
controversial decision with far-reaching consequences – which was that legislation 
adopted after the British had taken over the Cape, should be interpreted in 
accordance with the English rules of statutory interpretation.44 This decision 
manifestly affected all legal jurisprudence in the realm of judicial law-making for 
more than a hundred years. In terms of English law, a conquered territory continued 
to apply its own legal system.45 In the case of the Cape, the prevailing system was 
Roman-Dutch law even after the British seizure of the Cape. As a result of De 
Villiers’ decision, the Roman-Dutch law which was more purposive approach was 
replaced by the literal approach of English law.46 
The literal approach, as a result was applied rather mechanically by courts. In 
construing the meaning of the statute, courts automatically equated the ordinary or 
literal meaning as being identical to what the legislature intended.47 In the earlier 
reported decisions of Union Gort v Mack48 and Farrar’s Estate v CIR,49the court 
erroneously held that the intention of the legislature was equivalent to the words used 
in the legislation. More recent cases have mirrored this position, for example Ensor v 
Rensco Motors (Pty) Ltd50 and Engels v Allied Chemical Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd,51 
where the approach of the court was that if the legislature had a specific intention, it 
                                                            
43 1875 Buch at 50. 
 
44 See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (5thedition) at 92. 
 
45 Campbell & Hall (1774) 1 Cowp.204, 98E.R. 1045 (KB). The island of Grenada was taken 
by the British arms, in open war from the French King. In accordance with the articles of 
capitulation, the island of Grenada surrendered, was by reference to the capitulation upon 
which the island of Martinique had before surrendered.  It was further held:- A country 
conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of the King in the right of his crown; and, 
therefore, necessarily subject to the Legislature, the Parliament of Great Britian. 
 
46 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 92. 
 
47 Ibid. The reason that the courts automatically equated the ordinary or the literal meaning as 
being identical to what the legislature intended, is due to the ‘pre-dominance of the word,’ 
and the intention of the legislature was demoted to the status of the literal meaning of the 
text. 
 
48 1917 AD 731. 
 
49 1926 TPD 501. 
 
50 1981(1)SA 815(A). 
 




would be reflected in the clear and unambiguous words of the text.52 The result of the 
application of the literal theory in the afore-mentioned manner, meant that where the 
language was clear and unambiguous one had to give effect to it irrespective of how 
harsh or unjust the outcome of the literal interpretation. This had prejudicial 
consequences in South Africa during the pre-democratic constitutional era. In 
accordance with the iudicis est ius dicere sed non dare rule, which, when translated, 
means that it is the province of judges to expound the law and not to make it,53 the 
courts declared that they had no choice or discretion but to give effect to harsh, 
unjust and abhorrent apartheid legislation.54 This position is clearly reflected in the 
dictum of R v Sachs,55 where Centlivres CJ made the point that: 
 
‘Courts of law do scrutinise such statutes with the greatest care but where 
the statute under consideration in clear terms confers on the executive 
autocratic powers over individuals, courts of law have no option but to give 
effect to the will of the legislature as expressed in the statute.’ 
 
This has been described as being ‘par excellence the position in South Africa’ during 
the apartheid era – where courts adopted the view that they had no choice but were 
‘obliged to give effect to notorious racial and draconian security legislation.’56 
 
It was only the advent of the new democratic era that ushered in a marked 
paradigmatic shift away from the literal approach – towards a more purpose-
orientated approach.57 In spite of this transition, some courts have nevertheless still 
                                                            
52 See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition)at 93. 
 
53 Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 39. In keeping with the maxim of the iudicis est 
ius dicere sed non dare, it is usually said that … ‘judges  proceed to give meticulous effect to 
what they regard to be the will, and wishes of the legislature.’ 
54 See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 28. The point is made that where the language is 
clear, irrespective how harsh the interpretation may be, the courts had no choice or discretion 
but to apply it. 
 
55 1953(1) SA 392(A). See Also Volschenk v Volschenk 1946 TPD 487 at 487 – where it was 
held that ‘The cardinal rule of construction is that words must be given their ordinary, literal, 
grammatical meaning.’ Further, in Ebrahim v Minister of Interior 1977 (1) SA 665 (AD), 
Joubert AJA commented at 678 A, that ‘if the words (of a statute) are clear and unambiguous, 
then effect should be given to their ordinary … literal and grammatical meaning.’ 
 
56   Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 162. 
 
57 The purpose-orientated methodology is discussed in more detail in this chapter. Refer to 2.4 




continued to apply the literal approach. In Public Carriers Association v Toll Road 
Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd,58 Smalberger JA in giving effect to the intention of the 
legislature, maintained that: 
 
'it must be accepted that the literal interpretation principle is firmly 
entrenched in our law and I do not seek to challenge it’. 
 
Further support for the literal school of thought can be seen in a more recent 
judgment of Swanepoel v Johannesburg City Council,59 where it was provided that: 
 
‘The rules of statutory (exegesis) are intended as aids in resolving any 
doubts as to the Legislature’s true intention’. 
 
Such an intention-based approach to statutory interpretation is favoured by Ekins 
who advocates that the notion of the legislature’s intention is to be propounded as a 
proper standard of statutory interpretation. In ascertaining the ‘intention of the 
legislature’, Ekins argues that the legislative process does not constitute merely 
aggregations of intentions of individual legislators but that the process is more aptly 
described as determining the collective intentions which are structured so as to 
further its legislative purpose.60  Nevertheless despite the robust defence of the 
intention-based approach to statutory interpretation in some quarters, such a 
mechanical approach to statutory interpretation in Kalla v The 
Master,61Commissioner SARS v Executor Friths Estate62 and Geyser v Msunduzi 
Municipality63 has attracted much criticism.64 The application of the literal approach 
                                                            
58 1990(1)SA 925(A). 
 
59 1994(3)SA 789(A). 
 
60   Ekins The Nature of Legislative Intent at 219.  Ekins develops his account of legislative intent 
in  three  stages.    First,  he  argues  that  the  intention  of  the  legislature  need  not  be 
understood,  as  it  standardly  is,  as  the  aggregate  or  sum  of  the  intentions  of  individual 
legislators.    Instead,  it  should  be  seen  as  the  joint  intention  of  a  rational  group  agent.  
Second, he offers an account of how a well‐formed  legislature would operate.   Finally, he 




61 1995(1)SA 261(T) at 269 C - G. 
 
62 2001(2)SA 261(SCA)273. 
 




by courts, clearly reveals the limitations inherent in the approach. The submission 
that the ‘intention theory is a denial of the creative role which the judiciary can and 
ought to play’ is well received.65 In respect of the above cases, we note that in 
applying the literal theory, not only do judges give effect to an outmoded and 
discredited approach to interpretation, but the theory of literalism is clearly in 
conflict with section 39(2) – the interpretation clause of the Constitution.66 
 
2.2.2  Criticisms of the Literal Theory 
 
In examining the literal theory, the defects inherent in the theory become obvious. 
One of the main criticisms of the literal approach is that the modus operandi with 
regard to the application of the theory is flawed. This is because words do not have 
‘intrinsic meaning in language,’ since ‘their meaning is invariably determined by a 
concatenation of contextual factors.’67 Therefore placing too much emphasis on the 
preponderance of the word only is problematic, in that the ‘crucial role of the context 
of the legislative text’ is ignored or minimised – in that it is ‘reduced to a mere 
inanity.’68 As a result, the internal and external aids which are normally used to 
determine the contextual meaning, do not apply. Furthermore, the significance of the 
common-law presumptions during the interpretation process is also undermined – 
and reduced to a ‘last resort’ aid to interpretation, to be applied only if the text is 
                                                                                                                                                                        
64 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 104 – 105. Botha is critical of the approach 
adopted with regard to the above-mentioned cases, namely, Kalla v The Master, 
Commissioner SARS v Executor Friths Estate and Geyser v Msunduzi Municipality, that the 
traditional rules of statutory interpretation still form part of the law.  Contrary to the demands 
of the Constitution, the court nevertheless still applied the primary rule of interpretation and 
gave effect to the ordinary or the grammatical meaning of legislation. 
 
65 Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 36. Du Plessis makes the point that a judge 
should not merely be ‘his masters voice,’ charged with carrying out and giving effect to the 
wishes of the legislature.  This sentiment is shared by Dugard and re-iterated in his article 
entitled,‘The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty’ 1971 South African Law Journal 
at 182-183 and 186–187.  
 
66 See Singh ‘The Question of Interpretation in the Nicholson Judgment – Jacob Zuma v The 
National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] All SA 54 N ’ (2009) 30 Obiter at 788 – 789, 
where the author is critical of the application of the literal theory, on the basis that it is in 
conflict with section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
 
67 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 26. Devenish qualifies his statement that words do not 
have intrinsic meaning with the submission that the relationship between words and their 
meaning is not mathematical or quantitative but is variable. 
 




ambiguous.69 The point here is that the context and presumptions are given some 
prominence and become a ‘necessary’ part of the process of statutory interpretation 
only when the text seems ambiguous.70 While generally a good dictionary often 
provides an exhaustive list of possible meanings of words,71 it certainly is not 
sufficient, particularly when regard has to be made to the context or the background 
of the enacted text – for the purposes of interpretation. This stance was reflected in 
the dictum of Loryan (Pty) Ltd v Solarsh Tea and Coffee (Pty) Ltd,72 where the 
position of the court was clear, that: 
 
‘The task of interpretation is not always fulfilled by recourse to a dictionary 
definition, for what must be ascertained is the meaning of the word in its 
particular context in the enactment.’ 
 
The case of Jaga v Dönges,73 was a landmark case in the interpretation of statutes in 
South Africa, where the dissenting judgment of Schreiner JA – as early as the 1950’s 
– was seen to move beyond the literal meaning of the word to embrace the wider 
context of the legislation. Nevertheless, in spite of this, the transition proved to be 
                                                            
69 Ibid at 30. 
 
70 Ibid. (Emphasis Added) 
 
71 In the Minister of Interior v Machadodorp Investments1957(2)SA 395(AD)at 402, Steyn JA 
referred to The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and to The Standard Dictionary of the 
English Language to interpret the meaning of the word ‘tribe.’ In Association of Amusement 
and Novelty Machine Operators and Another v Minister of Justice and Another 1980 (2) SA 
636 (AD), the appellants owned ‘pinball machines,’ which they claimed were not prohibited 
in terms of the Gambling Act 51 of 1965.  In court, the parties on each side resorted to 
unconventional methods to establish the meaning of ‘pin-tables’ and ‘pinball machines.’ The 
appellants for example tendered the evidence of persons who ‘professionally engaged’ in the 
‘amusement machine business’ and of a person who ‘habitually plays on the apparatus 
concerned.’ The opinion evidence of a language expert was tendered on each side.  The 
researchers of each embraced a number of dictionaries.  See  Cockram The Interpretation of 
Statutes (3rd edition) at 37-39. 
 
72 1984 (3) SA (WLD) at 846 G. A similar stance was maintained by the Court in the case of 
Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd 1962(1)SA 458(AD)at 
476, where it was maintained that: ‘It is the duty of the court to read the Section of the Act 
which requires interpretation sensibly, that is with due regard, on the other hand to the 
meaning which permitted grammatical usage assigns to the words used in the section in 
question, and on the other hand, to, the contextual sense …’ See Cockram The Interpretation 
of Statutes (3rd edition) at 40-41. 
 




painstakingly slow – with the advent of the ‘new’ constitutional dispensation 
marking the first real paradigmatic shift from literalism to purposivism.74 
 
Arguably, the most well-known criticisms of the literal approach in academia have to 
be those of Davis,75 in his analysis of the decision of S v Mhlungu.76 This essentially 
revolved around the question of the interpretation of section 241(8) of the interim 
Constitution. The section that was subject to scrutiny, provided that: 
 
 ‘All proceedings which immediately before the commencement of the 
Constitution were pending before any court of the law […], exercising 
jurisdiction in accordance with the law then in force, shall be dealt with as if 
this Constitution had not been passed.’ 
 
What emerged in the interpretation of the afore-mentioned section, saw the 
Constitutional Court sharply divided on the issue of whether Mhlungu was entitled to 
the protection offered by the Constitution. While the dissenting (advocated by 
Chaskalson and Kentridge J) maintained that the Constitution and the protection it 
afforded did not apply to Mhlungu, the majority court (advocated by Mahomed J), 
was clearly not in agreement. The Court’s interpretation and analysis of section 
241(8) meant that although the old apartheid courts should complete the cases before 
them, it did not mean that the substantive law that had to be applied in these cases 
after 27 April 1994, was unaffected by the Constitution. As a result the Constitution 
had to be applied to Mhlungu, and the evidence against him had to be excluded. 
 
What is clear is the stark contrast between the approaches of the minority and 
majority judgments in the case. While the support for the literal approach was clearly 
reflected by the minority judgment and the noticeable adherence to the Westminster 
approach to the interpretation of statutes, 77 the stance of the majority court seems to 
                                                            
74 An analysis of the contextual, the purposive and the teleological theories is conducted in this 
chapter. See discussion in 2.3 The Contextual, 2.4 The Purposive Theory and 2.5 The 
Teleological Theory. 
 
75 Davis ‘The Twist of Language and the Two Fagans: Please Sir May I Have Some More 
Literalism!’ (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights at 541. 
 
76 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC). 
 
77 Davis ‘The Twist of Language and the Two Fagans: Please Sir May I Have Some More 
Literalism!’ (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights at 509 
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extend beyond purposivism. The view adopted by the majority court was that the 
rules of interpretation – which should inform the process of interpretation – are a 
result of a ‘new grundnorm’78 heralded by the new constitutional order, such that it 
might develop a jurisprudence that represents a ringing break from the past.79 The 
judgment in Mhlungu, not only represents a clash between two forms of legal 
communication,80 but also speaks directly to the traditional theories of interpretation. 
The point was soundly made that the advent of the new constitutional era promised 
the creation of a new legal community – for ‘constitutionalism is a far more 
challenging enterprise than that required of ordinary legislative interpretation.’81 
Indeed, what is required, therefore, in the process of interpretation in the democratic 
era, accentuates the role of judges so that they think ‘in ways beyond the ordinary 
meaning of the words’82 and fulfil a moral or ethical function. 
 
2.3  The Contextual Theory 
Contextualism – or the contextual approach – basically means that the meaning of a 
provision is determined either by reading its words, language or the provision itself – 
in context.83 To put it another way, contextualism is a theory of statutory 
interpretation which in essence provides that the meaning of an enacted provision 
and its words and language, can only be determined in light of its context or 
‘background conditions.’84 In examining the principles of contextualism from case-
law, the obvious overlaps with purposivism are unmistakable. From the dictum of 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
78 Ibid at 508. 
 
79 Ibid at 512. 
 
80 Ibid at 509. The two forms of legal communication that Davis refers to in his article 
essentially deals with the literal and the purposive theory. 
 




83 The contextual approach was applied in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Brey 1980 (1) SA 
472 (A) at 478 A-B, where it was stated that for purposes of ascertaining the meaning of the 
words in a legal document like a contract, a will or a statute, the words will have to be 
examined in their contextual setting. See also S v Motshari 2001 (2) All SA 207 (NC) par 8. 
 
84 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-32.The contextual 
approach has been affirmed in plethora of more recent cases. See for example, Ferreira v 





Secretary for Inland Revenue v Brey,85 there is support for the idea that 
contextualism and purposivism often go ‘hand in hand.’86 
 
Rumpff CJ stated that: 
 
‘For purposes of ascertaining the meaning of words in a legal document like 
a contract, a will or a statute, a court never looks at the words in stark 
isolation. It looks at words in their setting, and the context in which the 
words are used and at the purpose for which the words are intended.’ 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the terms ‘contextualism’ and ‘purposivism’ are 
often used interchangeably – even though the use of the terms may not be entirely 
accurate or appropriate. Nevertheless, even though both are considered as ‘post-
literalist approaches’,87 it has to be emphasized that the purposive theory must be 
understood as a concept separate to that of contextualism. The case of Jaga v 
Dönges88 is one of the first cases in South African jurisprudence that applied the 
contextual approach. It is also regarded as one of the first manifest efforts to 
acknowledge the wider context, and to attempt to move away from the plain-meaning 
approach of the literal theory.89 
The dissenting judge Schreiner JA maintained that: 
 
                                                            
85 1980 (1) SA 472 (A) 478 A-B. 
 
86 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 111. Du Plessis draws from the dictum of the 
Secretary for Inland Revenue v Brey 1980 (1) SA 472 (A) to support the idea that 
contextualism and purposivism go ‘hand in hand.’ 
 
87 Ibid at 112. 
 
88 1950(4)SA 653(A).In casu, the court had to decide what meaning was to be accorded to the 
term ‘sentenced to imprisonment.’ The reason that the term was brought into contention was 
because Jaga had received a suspended prison sentence and the question had arisen was 
whether he could be deported on the grounds that he had been ‘sentenced to imprisonment.’ 
The majority court adopted a textual method of interpretation and were of the view that a 
suspended sentence was a sentence of imprisonment and that Jaga was to be deported. The 
view of the minority court, was influenced by a contextual method of interpretation and 
therefore concluded that a suspended sentence was not a sentence of imprisonment and that 
Jaga could not be deported. From the findings of the case however, Jaga was ordered to leave 
South Africa permanently. The case is significant because it highlights the implications of the 
far-reaching consequences of the court electing to adopt a literal approach instead of a 
contextual approach. 
 
89 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 98. Botha succinctly sets out the guidelines that 




‘Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statement that the words 
and expressions used in a statute must be interpreted according to their 
ordinary meaning is the statement that must be interpreted in light of their 
context.  But it may be useful to stress two points in relation to the 
application of the principle. The first is that ‘the context’, as used here, is not 
limited to the language of the rest of the statute regarded as throwing light of 
a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted. Often of more importance is 
the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, 
its background.  The second point is that the approach to the work of 
interpreting may be along either of two lines. Either one may split the 
inquiry into two parts and concentrate, in the first instance, on finding out 
whether the meaning confining a consideration of the context only to cases 
where the language appears to admit of more than one meaning; or one may 
from the beginning consider the context and the language to be interpreted 
together.’  
From an analysis of the approach applied in the above-mentioned case, the guidelines 
that ought to steer the interpretive process can be articulated as follows: 
 
(i) Right from the outset, the interpreter has to consider the wider 
context of the provision (in other words, its ambit and purpose);  
(ii) Irrespective of how clear or unambiguous the grammatical meaning 
of the legislative text, the relevant ‘contextual’ factors – which 
include the history or background –must be heeded; 
(iii) This wider context may even be more important than the legislative 
text; and  
(iv) Once the meaning of the text and the context is ascertained, it must 
be applied. 
(v) This meaning has to be accorded, irrespective of one’s opinion 
regarding the legislature’s intention.90 
 
In his analysis of the judgment and findings in the Jaga case, Du Plessis is perceptive 






regard for the context, the second way or approach always requires simultaneous 
consideration of language and context. The end results of the two approaches 
therefore only always coincide, if one is prepared to accept that the ‘clear language’ 
always dominates.91 He is therefore critical of the ‘literalist assumption’ underlying 
the approach. Because both the ‘context and the language enjoy equal status, his 
description of the court’s approach in maintaining a stance that is ‘post-literalist’ 
without being ‘anti-literalist’ is therefore quite apt.92 Nevertheless, the minority 
judgment in Jaga’s case did have a certain ‘appeal’ among judges – who were keen 
to go beyond the ordinary meaning of the word.93 It is observed that the 
Constitutional Court has emphasized the importance of the ‘context’, requiring that 
when considering legislation, due regard is to be given to the history and background 
of the legislation.94 In examining South African case-law, it is observed that the 
contextual approach has been met with approval in a host of decisions.95 In 
University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council,96 the approach of Rabie JA – in 
examining all the contextual factors in ascertaining the intention of the legislature – 
irrespective of whether the words of the provision were clear or not, is unmistakably 
an application of the contextual approach.97 Further support for the approach is 
evident in Mjuqu v Johannesburg City Council,98 where Jansen JA gives due 
recognition to the entire spectrum of available aids and surrounding circumstances – 
                                                            
91 See Du Plessis’s analysis about the findings of the courts decision with respect to Jaga’s case 






94 Jaga’s case has been relied on by a number of judgments decided subsequently. See for 
example – S v Radebe 1988 (1) SA 772 (A), University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council 
1986 (4) SA 903 (A) and Thoroughbred Breeders Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 (4) 
SA 551. 
 
95 Cases that have applied the contextual approach include - S v Makwangane and Another 
1995(6) BCLR 655 (CC); Ferreira v Levin NO 1996(1)SA 984 (CC) and Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1)SA 765(CC). 
 
96 1986 (4) SA 903 A. 
 
97 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 98. 
 




to determine the purpose of the legislation under consideration. This has been 
described as a ‘model of the contextual approach.’99 
 
Because South Africa’s political history has affected every aspect of South African 
society,100 its importance of the interpretation of the Constitution and ordinary 
legislation cannot be disregarded. The use of the historical context is therefore well 
illustrated in case-law.101 In Brink v Kitshoff,102 the position suggested by the 
Constitutional Court was that: 
 
‘... The deep scars of this appalling programme are still visible in our 
society. It is in light of that history and the enduring legacy that it 
bequeathed that the equality clause needs to be interpreted.’ 
 
What is therefore evident is that the context or the determination of the context is 
‘crucial’ for the interpretation of any text – whether this is a contract or the 
provisions of the statute, or the Constitution.103 Contextual interpretation has also 
been compared to as ‘systematic interpretation’.104 This gives due recognition to the 
fact that the Constitution is a document as a whole and therefore cannot be read as if 
it consists merely of a series of individual provisions read in isolation.105 Its 
                                                            
99 See commentary on the application of the contextual approach in the Mjugu’s case, in an 
earlier edition of Botha’s book. See Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 52.  
 
100 De Waal and Currie The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 141. The authors describe 
the Constitution as a consequence and a reaction to South Africa’s history. 
 
101 In the following cases the court acknowledged the significance of the historical background 
when construing legislation - S v Mhlungu 1995(3) SA 391(CC); and Shabalala v Attorney 
General of the Transvaal 1996(1)SA 725(CC) 
 
102 1996(4) SA 197 (CC). 
 
103 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th  edition) at 143-144. The authors submit that 
in keeping with the idea of systematic interpretation, that there is a duty to read the 
provisions against the context of the Constitution, and to harmonise the various provisions 
and to give effect to them. In United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC), it was held that ‘where there was tension, the courts 
must do their best to harmonise the relevant provisions and give effect to all of them.’ 
 
104   See also Chapter 3-3.6.2 Systematic or Contextual Interpretation and 3.6.4 Historical 
Interpretation for a discussion of the Canon-Guided Strategies.  A Contextual Theory as 
presented, with a consideration of the contextual framework or historical context compares 
quite favourably with Systematic and Historical Interpretation which comprises the Von 
Savigny Quarter.  While the similarities are noted, it is provided that a reading strategy is not 
the equivalent of a theory of interpretation.  
         
105 Ibid. The fact that the constitution (and in fact all legislation) cannot be read in isolation is an 
interesting idea is raised by the authors. In philosophy, the principle of Holism, was 
46 
 
application in the decision of Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal,106 
has been described as one of the ‘most controversial’ use of the contextual 
interpretation.107  In casu, the Constitutional Court held that the right to life (section 
11),108 did not impose a positive obligation on the State to provide life-saving 
treatment to a critically ill patient. The Court’s findings, in a nutshell, were that the 
positive obligations of the State to provide medical treatment were expressly spelled 
out in section 27,109 and that the court could not interpret the right to life to impose 
additional obligations that were inconsistent with section 27.110 
 
2.3.1 Criticisms of the Contextual Approach 
Even though contextual interpretation has proven to be beneficial in the process of 
interpretation – shown by the courts’ application of the methodology in the array of 
cases discussed above – it has to be used with caution.111 
The first danger is that courts tend to use contextualism to limit rights instead of 
interpreting them.112 Another danger is that contextual interpretation may be used as 
                                                                                                                                                                        
described by Aristotle as ‘The whole is more, than the sum of its parts.’ It had its origin in 
Greek meaning ‘holos’, ‘all’ or ‘total.’ The term ‘holism’ was only introduced into language 
by the South African statesman Jan Smuts in 1926. In essence what is provided, is that 
language can only be understood through its relations with the larger segment of language. In 
1884, GottlobFrege formulated his Contextual Principle, according to which – it is only 
within the context of a proposition or sentence that a word acquires its meaning. 
http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch - holism.html (last accessed October 2013) 
 
106 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
 
107 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 145. 
 
108 Section 11 of the Constitution provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to life.’ 
 
109 Section 27 of the Constitution, is the right to health care, food, water and social security and 
provides that: 
‘(1)Everyone has the right to have access to - 
(a)health care services, including reproductive health care; 
(b)sufficient food and water; and 
(c)social security, including if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants 
with appropriate social assistance, 
(2)The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
(3)No-one may be refused emergency medical treatment.’  
 
110 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 145. See also the cases of S v 
Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC) and Ferreira v Levin NO and Others 
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), where the court made extensive use of contextual interpretation. 
 




a shortcut to eliminate ‘irrelevant’ fundamental rights. Contextual interpretation 
should not be used to identify and focus on ‘the most relevant right’.113 The more 
important consideration should be the attainment of social justice. In giving effect to 
what is fair and just would obviate some of the concerns highlighted above in terms 
of applying the contextual approach.  
2.4 The Purposive Theory 
In terms of the purposive theory, the focus is not dependent exclusively on the literal 
meaning of the words; it requires that the interpreter move beyond the manifested 
intention of the legislation.114 While the quest for the subjective intention of the 
legislature is said to be elusive, and may perhaps even be regarded as being ‘a 
fiction’ because it is unascertainable,115 the search for the purpose or the object of a 
statute is considered as being a very real exercise.116 The determination of the 
purpose of the legislation requires a purpose-orientated approach, which gives due 
consideration to the contextual framework right from the outset, and not only in 
                                                                                                                                                                        
112 Ibid.  See also for example Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751(CC). In considering the right 
to privacy meant that it only applied to the inner sanctum of a person, his or her family life, 
sexual preference and home environment. 
 
113 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 145. See also Osman and Another 
v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1998 (4) SA (CC). Due to the fact that the appellants did not 
rely on a specific fundamental right in the High Court, it was not open to them to raise it 
before the Constitutional Court. 
 
114 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 36. According to the purposive methodology, the 
interpreter has to endeavour to infer the design or purpose which lies behind the legislation.  
In order to do so, the interpreter has to make use of an unqualified contextual approach, 
which allows an unconditional examination of all internal and external sources.  See also S v 
Mhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at 916, where Sachs J in quoting Lord Denning 
stated that ‘… Judges do not go by the literal meaning of the words or by the grammatical 
structure of the sentence. They go by the design or purpose which lies behind it.  When they 
come upon a situation which is to their minds within the spirit – but not the letter – of the 
legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the design and purpose of the legislature – at 
the effect it was sought to achieve.  They then interpret the legislation so as to produce the 
desired effect.  This means that they fill in the gaps, quite unashamedly, without hesitation.  
They ask simply: what is the sensible way of dealing with this situation so as to give effect to 
the presumed purpose of the legislation…’ 
 
115 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 96. According to Du Plessis, ‘fiction’ is meant 
somewhat negatively, because it stands for what is unreal. However, he explains further that 
in the legal discourse, fictions as ‘accepted untruths’ often help explain complex phenomena. 
 




cases where the literal approach has failed.117 In terms of such a purpose-orientated 
(or-text-in-context) approach, the purpose or object of the legislation is the 
overriding consideration.118 It seems appropriate then to describe the legislative 
function as a ‘purposive activity’.119 
The question that arises when analysing the purposive methodology, is how does one 
ascertain the ‘purpose’ of legislation?120 According to the classical version of 
purposivism in the common-law tradition, the prime purpose of enacted law is to 
suppress the mischief.121 The mischief rule which was first expounded in the 
Heydon’s case, comprises an enquiry of four questions to be answered in interpreting 
a provision.122 In Hleka v Johannesburg City Council, 123 Van den Heever JAset out 
the rules articulated in Heydon’s case and then proceeded to discuss what the law 
was before the Act in contention – the War Measure Act 124 – was passed and how 
the legislature sought to remedy the existent problematic state of affairs.125 In more 
recent case-law, it is evident that purposivism seems to be fast becoming a substitute 
for ordinary language or ‘clear language’ as the primary consideration in 
constitutional interpretation.126 In Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order,127 the court 
                                                            
117 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 97-98. Botha also refers to this approach as the 
text-in-context approach. In terms of the text-in-context approach, there has to be a balance 
of the grammatical and the contextual meaning.  
 
118 Ibid at 97. 
 
119 Ibid. See also Chapter 3-3.6.3 Teleological Interpretation of Purposive Interpretation for 
a discussion of Canon Guided Reading Strategies.  The similarities of a purposive theory 
with a focus on the search for the purpose or the object of the statute and Purposive 
Interpretation, which is an element of the Von Savigny Quarter are noted.  It has to be 
emphasised however that a reading strategy does not qualify as a theory of interpretation. 
 
120 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 96. 
 
121 Ibid.  
 
122 See discussion at 2.2. Literal Theory in this chapter, for an analysis of the four-tiered test 
expounded  in Heydons case.  
 
123 1949 (1) SA 842 A. 
 
124 18 of 1947. 
 
125 See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 130 – 131, for the application of the mischief rule 
in Heydons case and Hleka’s case. Some of the other reported cases that have illustrated the 
use of the mischief rule, include, for example, S v Conifer (Pty) Ltd 1974(1)SA 651(A), Reek 
NO v Registrateur Van Aktes Transvaal 1969 (1) SA 589 (T) and Glen Anil Development 
Corporation Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1974 (4) SA 715(A).  
 
126 Woolman et alConstitutional Law of South Africa (2nd  edition) at 32-37. There are a plethora 
of cases that have applied a more purposive approach to interpretation since the advent of the 
democratic order. See for example, Matiso v Commanding officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and 
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held that ‘the previous constitutional system of this country was the fundamental 
“mischief” to be remedied by the application of the Constitution’. The argument was 
that the ‘Constitution is a remedial measure that must be construed generously in 
favour of redressing the mischief of the past and advancing its own objectives for the 
present and the future.’128 Nevertheless, in spite of its popularity in more recent case-
law,129 a note of caution is to be heeded – that purposive interpretation is not to be 
regarded as the ‘Open Sesame!’130 or the end all and be all with regard to the 
approach to statutory interpretation.  
2.4.1 Criticisms of the Purposive Approach 
A criticism of the purposive interpretation is that sometimes the purpose of a statute 
may not be easily and clearly discernible.131 This is usually the case where the 
purpose or reason for the Act itself is the subject of controversy. This may result in 
difficulty in ascertaining the true meaning of the provision.132 
Mureinik notes further that ‘if the policy of a statute is iniquitous, a purposive 
interpretation may well foster iniquity’.133 This was indeed the position in South 
Africa during the apartheid era when courts were reluctant to challenge harsh, unjust 
and discriminatory legislation.134 As alluded to, what is evident from an examination 
of case-law, is that purposiveness seems to be replacing the ordinary language or 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Another 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE); Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); and Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head, Department of 
Education, Mpumalanga and Others 2009 (3) SA 422 (SCA). 
 
127 1994 (3) SA 625 (E). 
 
128 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 117 - 118. 
 
129 See the courts clear endorsement of the purposive approach with regard to - Potgieter v 
Kilian1995 11 BCLR 1498 (N) at 1515 B - F; In Re: Former Highlands Residents: Sonny v 
Department of Land Affairs 2000 (2) SA 351(LCC) and Sefalana Employee Benefits 
Organisation v Haslam 2000 (2) SA 415 (SCA).  
 
130 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 116. 
 
131 Dickerson The Interpretation and Application of Statutes at 91.  
 
132 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 38. 
 
133 Mureinik ‘Administrative Law in South Africa’ (1986) 103 South African Law Journal at 
624. 
 




‘clear language’ approach to statutory interpretation.135 This applies to both 
constitutional and non-constitutional legislation. Nevertheless, in spite of its appeal 
amongst judges – particularly in the current constitutional era136 – a cautionary note 
is sounded, that purposive interpretation is not to be regarded as the ‘the panacea for 
ills of the literalist-cum-intentionalist’.137 
In terms of its application, purposive interpretation in the abstract, and by itself, can 
even be counter-productive.138 Hence, the suggestion that ‘purposiveness and 
contextualism best go hand in hand,’ makes sense.139 There is a danger in assuming 
that the interpretive process is to start off as an exercise in giving expression to the 
purpose or the object of a statutory provision. The reason is that the purpose or the 
object cannot possibly be known prior to interpretation. This can only be established 
‘through’ interpretation.140  If not so, Du Plessis argues that this could open wide the 
door to surmise and conjecture.141  Eskridge also emphasises that purposivism cannot 
be accepted as a general theory to statutory interpretation, since it neglects critically 
important values.142 
Generally, a teleological theory which is a more value-coherent approach, is regarded 
as a theory which embraces the values that the purposive theory tends to neglect or 
even negate. Nevertheless, its application will be tested to determine its relevance in 
the democratic era in South Africa. 
 
                                                            
135 See Davis Cheadle and Hayson Fundamental Rights in the Constitution at 11 - 13. 
 
136 See Derby Lewis v Chairman, Amnesty Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee 2001 (3) SA 1033 (C) at 1055 H - I where the court applied the purposive 
methodology and distinguished between legislative purpose and legislative intent. 
 
137 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 247. 
 
138 See discussion in Singh ‘An Illustration of Teleological Interpretation Par Excellence – 
Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC),’ 
(2009) 72 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law at  at 342-343, for a critique of the 
purposive approach.  
 











2.5 The Teleological Theory 
The teleological theory is also described as a value-coherent, value-orientated or a 
value-activating method of interpretation. This theory reflects Aristotle’s teachings 
‘that all laws … must be tempered by equity’. 143 Even though some authors refer to 
the teleological method of interpretation as purposive,144 this is not entirely accurate, 
since in terms of its application, teleological interpretation ‘seeks to proceed beyond 
ad hoc purposivism.’145 It also needs to be stressed that the modus operandi is not 
‘merely purposive’ – but what is central to its operation, is the element of equity or 
fairness.146 
Crawford acknowledges the philosophical component to the teleological theory:147 
 
‘Under the equitable or philosophical theory of interpretation, the bounds of 
“genuine interpretation” are considerably extended.’  
 
It is appropriate that the teleological theory has also been referred to in some quarters 
as ‘philosophical interpretation.’148  However, the American scholar, Singer, 
qualifies the concept of equity used here. Singer draws attention to the fact that in 
this context, equity is unrelated to fairness or the historic division of judicial power 
between law and equity. Instead, it is submitted that it is more or less equated with or 
synonymous with that which is referred to as the ‘spirit’ or ‘principle’.149  This 
comment is particularly interesting when analysing section 39, the interpretation 
clause of the Constitution. What is clear, is that the section ‘demands’150 an 
                                                            
143 Corry ‘Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes’ 1937 University of Toronto 
Law Journal at 294. 
 
144 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (3rd edition) at 119. In the earlier edition of their 
book, the authors have  submitted that: ‘The Constitutional Court has on several occasions 
committed itself to an interpretation of the Bill of Rights which is usually referred to 
as“purposive” but sometimes also as“value-orientated” or “teleological”.’ 
 
145 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 119. 
 
146 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 39-40. 
 
147 Crawford The Construction of Statutes at 243.  
 
148 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 41 - 42. 
 
149 Ibid at 42. 
 
150 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 146. It is interesting that the 
authors prefer the use of the word ‘demands,’ since in an earlier edition of their book, see De 
Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (5th edition), they use the ‘requires,’ but revert to the 
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interpretation that promotes the ‘values’ or 'principles’ which underlie an open and 
democratic society, and mandates that in the process of interpretation the courts must 
promote the 'spirit’, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.151 It should be noted 
that the wording is undoubtedly pro-active. This, in essence, encapsulates a 
teleological or a value-coherent method of interpretation. Denning, a strong 
protagonist of the teleological approach, explains the modus operandi of the 
approach as follows, ‘Whenever there is a choice, choose the meaning which accords 
with reason and justice.’152  Dugard – who advocated support for a value-orientated 
method of interpretation – describes this as a ‘realist-cum-value-oriented 
approach’.153  It is suggested that Dworkin’s theory of constructive interpretation is 
also in essence teleological, and is based on his perception of ‘law as integrity’.154 Of 
all the above-mentioned protagonists, Mureinik has endeavoured to go further than 
merely identifying a teleological or a value-coherent method of interpretation as a 
‘superior conception of interpretation’.155  In South Africa during the apartheid era, 
the rights and liberties of individuals were severely curtailed by harsh discriminatory 
legislation. Mureinik’s bold and perceptive assertion was that, in apartheid South 
                                                                                                                                                                        
use of the word ‘demands’ in the later edition of their book. The word ‘demands’ is more in-
keeping with the idea of a moral obligation that is imposed on judges to give expression to 
the values of the Constitution. 
 
151 Section 39 of the Constitution provides that: -  
‘(1)  When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum -  
(a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on        
human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law;and  
(c) may consider foreign law 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.’ 
 
152 Denning The Discipline of Law at 22. 
 
153 Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 400. Dugards asserts that even 
though the realists and those who belong to the school of natural law are seen as 
irreconcilation enemies, the two schools do in fact have much in common.  He quotes Harry 
W Jones in this regard: ‘In leeway situations, the positive law is not a command but, at most, 
an authorization of alternative decisions. The choice between alternatives, the selection of the 
path to be pursued, cannot but be influenced by the decision – makers ought to be. Legal 
realism, with its emphasis on the inevitability of choice and discretion in the life of the law, 
casts its vote – though for very different reasons – with the tradition of natural law, and 
against Austin and the positivists, on the old issue of the complete analytical separateness of 
the law that is from the law that ought to be.’  
 
154 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 46. 
 




Africa that a value-coherent approach to interpretation was to be regarded as the 
judge’s chief weapon against legislative injustice.156 It is indeed quite remarkable 
that even before the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, he foresaw the 
merits of a value-coherent method of interpretation. 
 
While generally prior to the current constitutional era, courts were reluctant to apply 
the teleological method of interpretation, however, the guidelines contained in 
section 39 of the Constitution have changed this position dramatically. This is 
succinctly summed up in Holomisa v Argus Newspapers,157 as follows: 
 
‘The Constitution has changed the “context” of all legal thought and 
decision-making in South Africa.’ 
 
Since the inception of the new constitutional dispensation, a myriad of case-law has 
surfaced that has shown a decisive inclination by courts to adopt either a purposive 
or a value-based approach.158 The court’s application of a value-coherent 
methodology in Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) 
Ltd,159 is undoubtedly an illustration of teleological interpretation par-excellence. In 
this case, the court had to ascertain whether the Popela community - all former 
tenants of the land of Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits – were a ‘community’ 
dispossessed of a right in land as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices. The land in issue was the farm Boomplaats, which had been subsequently 
consolidated into the farm Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd. The applicant’s 
contention that they formed a community formed the crux of the dispute. They 
therefore sought to achieve the constitutional aims of land restitution and land 
reform. The respondent in the matter opposed the claim. 
 
                                                            
156 Ibid at 623 -624. 
 
157 1996 (2) SA 588 (W). 
 
158 See cases for example Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625 (E); Baloro v 
University of Bophuthatswana 1995 (8) BCLR 1018 (B) and Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) BCLR 687 (CC). 
 




In deciding on whether the Popela community constituted a ‘community’ for the 
purposes of the Act,160 Moseneke DCJ reasoned that ‘a generous notion of what 
constitutes a community fits well with the wide scope of the rights in land.’161 As a 
result of employing a broad, purposive or a teleological method of interpretation in 
his jurisprudential analysis, Moseneke DCJ deduced that the Popela community were 
undoubtedly a community at the time they had been dispossessed.162 What is 
observed is that a value-coherent interpretation which requires that the purpose of 
legislation must be measured against the values of the Constitution, forms the 
underlying basis of Moseneke DCJ’s jurisprudential analysis.163 
With regard to whether the individual claimants were dispossessed ‘as a result of’ 
past discriminatory laws and practices, Moseneke DCJ maintained that the term ‘as a 
result of’ was to be interpreted to mean no more than ‘as a consequence of’ and not 
‘solely as a consequence of.’ According to this interpretation, Moseneke DCJ 
maintained that there had to be a reasonable connection with the discriminatory laws 
and practices on the one hand, and dispossession on the other. As a result, it was 
necessary to consider the context and historical background of the legislation.164 
In applying a value-orientated method of interpretation which is founded on a ‘moral 
evaluation’165 of the circumstances and the plight of the claimants, the judge – in 
attaching ‘less than the usual weight to linguistic and purposive considerations and 
more than the usual weight to general legal values’166 – found in favour of the 
applicants and awarded them restitution in terms of the Restitution Act.167  It is noted 
                                                            
160 A ‘Community’ in terms of the Definition Section of the Restitution of the Land Rights Act 
22 of 1994 is - ‘unless the context indicates otherwise ... any group of persons whose rights 
in land are derived from shared rules determining access to land held in common by such 
group and indicates part of any such group.’ 
 
161 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC) at para 41. 
 
162 See Singh ‘An Illustration of Teleological Interpretation Par Excellence – Department of 
Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC),’ (2009) 72  
Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law at 339 – 340 for an examination of the term 
‘community’ as provided in terms of the Restitution of the Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. 
 
163 Ibid at 344. 
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165 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 47. 
 
166 Mureinik ‘Administrative Law in South Africa’ (1983) 3 South African Law Journal at 624. 
 
167 22 of 1994. 
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that a moral evaluation, as embarked on by Moseneke J, was at the heart of the 
decision-making. In adopting this stance, Moseneke J was able to fulfil the aims of 
social justice sought in the case. It is stressed, therefore, that an ethical and moral 
assessment of the factors, has to form the central or core consideration by courts. 
The case of the African Christian Democratic Party v the Electoral Commission168 is 
also relevant. In this case, the Constitutional Court was called upon to determine 
whether the African Christian Democratic Party (hereinafter referred to as ACDP), 
the applicant in the matter, had complied with sections 14 and 17 of the Local Govt: 
Municipal Electoral Act.169 In terms of these provisions, it was specifically required 
of parties that ward candidates who intended to contest an election, lodge with the 
Electoral Commission a deposit as prescribed by legislation, together with a notice of 
intention to contest the election.170 While the applicant had lodged an application 
clearly indicating its intention to oppose, it had, however, not lodged a separate 
deposit in respect of the Cape Metropolitan area. The view of the Electoral 
Commission was that the applicant had not complied with the provisions of the 
statute, and, as a result, this disqualified the ACDP from participating in elections. 
Because the Electoral Court upheld the decision of the Electoral Commission, the 
ACDP sought relief from the Constitutional Court.171 
The view of the Constitutional Court differed from that espoused by the Electoral 
Court. While the Electoral Court maintained that the ACDP had not complied with 
the relevant provisions, O’ Regan J was of the view that the ACDP had, in fact, met 
the registration requirements of the Electoral Act.172 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
168 2006 (5) BCLR 579 (CC). See also discussion by Singh ‘An Illustration of Teleological 
Interpretation Par Excellence – Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits 
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Democratic Party case. 
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170 Singh ‘An Illustration of Teleological Interpretation Par Excellence – Department of Land 
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It is evident from the judgment, that O’ Regan J’s reasoning and findings were as a 
result of construing the provisions in ‘light of their purpose’173 This view reflects ‘the 
general trend away from the strict legalistic to the substantive’.174 What is therefore 
quite clear from the judgment, is that O’ Regan J’s approach to statutory 
interpretation was unmistakably ‘purposive and value-based rather than literal’,175 
and may indeed be regarded – as submitted by Le Roux – as being an ‘emphatic 
example of the teleological approach to statutory interpretation’.176 
2.5.1  Criticisms of the Teleological Theory  
One of the criticisms of the teleological approach, is that it leads to unpredictability. 
However, exponents of the teleological theory claim that the approach is much more 
objective than the literal approach.177 Another inherent problem with the approach is 
that as an individual’s perception of what is just and fair would differ from that of 
others, and so too would a particular judge’s perception of justice.178 
De Waal et al are of the view that a purposive or teleological interpretation is indeed 
quite helpful, in that it acknowledges that the interpretation of the Bill of Rights 
involves value judgments. However, the authors are critical that it does not prescribe 
how such a value judgement is to be made.179 This submission, however, is not 
entirely correct, since the guidelines for the interpretation of the Bill of Rights are 
explicitly articulated in section 39 of the Constitution. Section 39(1) clearly 
                                                            
173 Devenish ‘African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission: The New 
Methodology and Theory of Statutory. Interpretation’ 2006 123 South African Law Journal 
at 403. 
 
174 Le Roux ‘Directory Provisions - Section 39 (2) of the Constitution and the ontology of 
Statutory law - African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission 2006 (3) SA 305 
(CC)’ (2006) 21 South African Public Law at 388. 
 
175 Devenish ‘African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission: The New 
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179 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 138. The point is made that value 




prescribes that for purposes of interpretation, a court must promote ‘values’ which 
underlie an open and democratic society, which is based on freedom and equality. 
From the plethora of cases that have been decided subsequent to the adoption of the 
interim Constitution, it is obvious that the application of section 39 by our courts has 
resulted in findings that are certainly much more than purposive.180 Of all the 
theories that have been applied, it seems that the teleological theory with a value-
based methodology or modus operandi, offers the most jurisprudentially sound 
option thus far. However, it begs the question whether the theory is adequate for 
addressing the needs of social transformation. 
2.6  The Subjective Theory or Intention Theory 
Steyn, a strong proponent of the intention theory, postulates that the determination of 
the real intention of the legislature is of paramount importance in the process of 
statutory interpretation, and that once discerned, it must be given effect to.181 While 
overlaps with this theory are noted, the point of departure is that while the literal 
theory focuses on the ordinary, literal and grammatical meaning of the word, the 
intention theory draws a distinction between the language on the one hand and ideas 
and thought on the other.182 In South Africa, it would appear that the particular 
version of the intention theory that developed has its origin in literal theory 
reasoning.183 
Because the theory does not equate the ‘expressed intention’ to the ‘authentic 
intention’ of the legislature (as does the literal theory), it is submitted that the 
intention theory is actually ‘intellectually and jurisprudentially more sound’.184 
Given that ascertainment of the ‘intention of the legislature’ is a highly subjective 
                                                            
180 See for example S v Makwanyane  and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) and S v Zuma 1995 
(4) BCLR 401 for the application of section 39 - the interpretation provision of the 
Constitution.        
 
181 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 94. 
 
182 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 33. 
 
183 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 95. 
 




enquiry, it makes sense that the intention theory has been referred to, and is often 
described as, the subjective theory.185 
2.6.1  Criticisms of the Intention Theory 
Steyn’s advocacy and support of the intention theory is based on the idea that the 
intention of the law is a reconstruction of the thinking inherent in it.186 The problem 
with the application of this theory, as presented above, is with the question of 
‘locating’ the intention of the legislature.187 In terms of the legislative processes, 
there are a number of factors that come into play. For example, the persons who draft 
legislation and who pass legislation are not the same, the draft legislation is also 
extensively debated and there is sometimes widespread disagreement about the final 
legislation – which is usually a product of compromise. This questions whose 
thinking is demonstrated in the expressed intention of the legislature.188 
Another criticism of the subjective and intention theories is that the determination of 
the ‘intention of the legislature’ – which is central to the theory – is in itself elusive 
and problematic. As a result, most commentators and jurists who resort to using the 
phrase, ‘intention of the legislature’ do so without being able to furnish a complete or 
detailed explanation of exactly what it means.189 The effect of the application of the 
intention theory, in practice, has been literalism in the guise of intentionalism.190 
What has resulted, is an amalgam of the literal and the subjective theories – referred 
to as intentionalism-cum-literalism. 191 
Even though the application of the theory in the manner described is discredited the 










189 In Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 (1) SA 925 (A), 
the ‘intention of the legislature’ was emphasized as the primary rule of interpretation.  
 
190 Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 31.     
 
191 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-31. 
 




African law, particularly prior to the current constitutional dispensation, has been a 
predilection of the courts to use this particular combined methodology.193 Generally, 
South African courts appear to have previously accepted the underlying basis of the 
intention theory and it is observed that it has been applied in case-law ‘with little, if 
any, sensitivity to its numerous pitfalls’.194 
With the paradigmatic shift from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional 
supremacy, ‘the legislative will of parliament can no longer be sovereign’,195 as it is 
now subject to the Constitution and its values. The resultant effect of this, is that the 
intention theory – which was very popular prior to the era of constitutional 
supremacy – ‘can no longer be the paramount rule of statutory interpretation’.196 
2.7 The Objective Theory 
The objective theory is regarded as an antidote to the subjectivism of the intention 
theory.197 According to the way the theory works, it is provided that once a statute 
has been promulgated, it brings to an end the task of the legislature – and the 
legislative text assumes an existence of its own.198 This theory is also known as the 
delegation theory – a name that was probably derived when considering the role of 
the courts in the process of interpretation. In carrying out their function, courts are 
said to be ‘acting as the legislature’s delegates’.199 The American scholar Curtis 
makes the point that when construing legislation, the words in a statute are to be 
                                                            
193 The following cases have affirmed adherence to the intention theory - S v Weinberg 1979 (3) 
SA 89 A at 98 - 99; S v Ngwenya1979 (2) SA 96 (A) at 100 – 101; and S v Yolelo1981 (1) SA 
1002 A at 1011.   
 
194 Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 35. According to Du Plessis to list all South 
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195 See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 95-96, for a criticism of the intention theory. 
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regarded as ‘delegations’ to the courts to interpret ‘within their authority’.200 He 
explains further that ‘the more imprecise the words are, the greater is the 
delegation.’201 
In terms of the modus operandi of the theory, it is submitted that when interpreting 
legislation, the interpreter has to do so – being mindful of the time frame within 
which they function.202 This process would therefore require the interpreter to 
consider the policies that existed at the time a statute became law – as well as 
changes that might have occurred as a result of implementation of such policies.203 
2.7.1  Criticisms of the Objective Theory  
The obvious flaw inherent in the objective theory is that statutory interpretation does 
not only involve an acknowledgement of the ‘past intention’ of the legislature.204 It is 
a ‘continuous process’, in terms of which the ‘present realization’ is just as, if not 
more relevant, when interpreting a text.205 Du Toit is vehemently opposed to the 
application of the objective theory. He bases his argument on what he calls 
‘dimension of futurity in law.’206 It is maintained that ‘past meaning’ must be 
transposed into present terms, and the consideration of ‘present meaning’ opens up 
vistas of futurity bearing in mind that the law as a social science is a dynamic 
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phenomenon and not static.207 It is understandable why objectivism has not met with 
approval in South African courts.208 
When considering the interpretive guidelines outlined in section 39 of the 
Constitution, which require that courts, tribunals and forums promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society, as well as give due consideration to 
international law and foreign law, it is submitted that this analysis is a far cry from 
the application of the theory, as discussed above. Our courts are now specifically 
mandated to consider both past and present legislation and make a value-judgment 
with respect to the matter under consideration. In its pristine form, therefore, the 
objective theory does not have relevance in the current South African legal system. 
2.8  The Judicial Theory 
The judicial or ‘free theory’, as it is termed, basically recognizes the creative role 
played by the judiciary in the process of interpretation and application of the law.209 
It acknowledges the ‘freedom’ that judges have in choosing one rule of interpretation 
over another.210 The theory – as presented above – can be perceived as being a 
reaction to primitive literalism, since it has at its core the ‘element of subjectivity’ 
                                                            
207 Ibid at 16-19. 
 
208 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 98. 
 
209 Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 34.See also Dugard Human Rights and the South 
African Legal Order at 382, where Dugard recognizes the creative powers of judges in the 
process of interpretation: ‘Once there is a clear recognition of the creative powers of the 
judiciary in the interpretation of statutes, it will be easier for judges to be guided by accepted 
legal values, rather than by subconscious preferences, in their law-making task. Of course, 
…judges should be guided by legal values and policy… The legal principles should be 
employed to guide judicial policy… and to form part of the South African legal heritage.’ At 
the time that Dugard made the above submission, South Africa did not have a democratic 
Constitution and a justiciable Bill of Rights. With the advent of the current democratic 
dispensation, the role of judges has changed substantially. Judges are now mandated and 
obliged to give effect to the fundamental values which forms the basis of the democratic 
order.  It is therefore submitted that judges are under a moral obligation to give effect to the 
values and principles of the Constitution. 
 
210 Devenish The Interpretation of Statutes at 49.  See also Zimnat Insurance Co Ltd v 
Chawanda1991 (2) SA 825 (ZSC) at 832 H-I, where the position of the court was that: ‘… 
judges have a certain amount of freedom or latitude in the process of interpretation and 
application of the law.’ 
62 
 
which judges adopt when interpreting legislation.211 This, in essence, supports the 
more radical form of the theory. The moderates however contend that in ascertaining 
the intention of the legislature, judges are only able to make sense of a particular 
enactment by filling in the gaps where necessary.212 Their role, therefore, might also 
extend to ‘remedying’ defects’ in statutes and deficiencies that sometimes arise in 
practice.213 
The impression created in the exposition of this theory, as provided above, that ‘the 
law of statutory interpretation has become a bag of tricks from which courts can pull 
respectable sounding rules to justify any possible result the judge desires’,214 is a 
gross distortion of the judicial theory and of the role of the judiciary in the process of 
interpretation.  
2.8.1  Criticisms of the Judicial Theory 
While there is merit in the argument that a judge’s character, upbringing and 
education play a role in the decision-making process,215 this is where the level of 
subjectivity starts and ends. It has to be understood that the process of interpretation 
involves a ‘rule-bound evaluation’216 that is guided by ‘objective’ canons of 
construction.217 It is not simply a ‘capricious choice’,218 but an ‘evaluation’ which 
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212 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 97.  Du Plessis uses an interesting term to describe 




214 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 48 - 49. 
 
215 See Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 379-380, where the author 
quotes FN Broome, Judge President of Natal from 1951 to 1960, shortly after his retirement : 
‘The judges mental make-up must necessarily influence his judgement, and the influence is 
of course nearly always subconscious. Nearly every judge who has anything of a judicial 
personality … may be placed in one or other of two categories which are difficult to describe 
preciselybut which may be broadly called the conservative and the liberal …’ 
 
216 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 49. 
 
217 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 98, where it is maintained that while the canons of 
construction are used to justify the interpretive result, the outcome is actually predetermined 
by the interpreting judge’s pre-understanding.  De Ville is also in agreement with the idea of 
a judge’s pre-understanding in the interpretive process.  See De Ville Constitutional and 
Statutory Interpretation at 6, where he submits that: ‘Only by being aware of one’s 
prejudices can they be critically reflected on.  A judge who holds that “the text is clear” can 
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involves ‘both linguistic and non-linguistic considerations’.219 What is evident in the 
interpretation and application of section 39(2), is that not only does the section 
mandate a purposive methodology, but it also undoubtedly unlocks the creative 
powers of judges. While the parameters of the functions of judges extend outside the 
scope of the research undertaken, it is quite clear that the application of section 39 
(2) implores that judges in their interpretation and application of legislation, fulfil the 
role of ‘guardians of constitutional values’.220 Put another way, in the current 
constitutional order, it is fundamental that judges heed the ethical and moral 
considerations as part of the process of interpretation and decision-making. A 
judicial theory and the possibilities that it holds for the new constitutional order, 
must – in light of the above submissions – be revisited.  
2.9 An Appraisal of the Theories Presented 
An analysis of the theories of statutory interpretation, precipitates some interesting 
results. While the South African courts have applied in one way or other almost all 
the theories examined, there has certainly not been a ‘consistent approach’ to the 
interpretation of statutes.221 However, with the advent of the new constitutional era, 
this position is notably different. Subsequent to the Constitution, it is apparent that 
there has been a distinct shift from literalism to purposivism.222 In spite of this, it is 
unfortunate, however, that even though the Constitution clearly mandates a value-
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based approach to the process of interpretation, some courts and judges have been 
slow to embrace this challenge – with the result that a number of judges still apply an 
outmoded literal approach to interpretation.223 While, perhaps, the ‘exigencies of 
each case’ and the ‘measure of latitude’ accorded to judges may result in a particular 
theoretical position being favoured by a particular judge, this does not detract from 
the role and the responsibility of judges in the current constitutional order. As 
illustrated, what is expected of judges in a transitional constitutional democracy, is 
that they give expression to the values that underlie an open and democratic society, 
and conduct an ethical and moral evaluation of all of the factors under consideration. 
It is therefore submitted that while some of the more popular theories – for example 
the purposive and the teleological theory – tend to embrace external factors, there is 
no theory that explicitly requires that the interpreter give expression to a moral code 
and reasoning and embodies pro-activism as part of its modus operandi. A deontic 
theory of interpretation, which is based on ethics and morality, involves reasoning 
other than inductive and deductive reasoning and an analysis that is consistent with 
the emerging jurisprudence in South Africa, in that it is to be applied in a pro-active 
manner, is proposed in response to all of the inadequacies or shortfalls identified in 
the theories that have been examined. 
The question that emerges following examination of the theories of statutory 
interpretation, is whether a particular approach or approaches can be singled out to as 
a ‘one size fits all’ solution when deciding on issues of statutory or constitutional 
interpretation. This is indeed a vexatious question, and one that has plagued scholars 
well versed in the field of statutory interpretation, for many a year. 
Cowen has suggested that the following factors are to be taken into consideration in 
the process of interpretation, which are the: 
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(i) literal text; 
(ii) subject matter of the statute; 
(iii) general historical context; 
(iv) legal history of the enactment; 
(v) purpose of the enactment, and its mischief; 
(vi) practical consequences of the various interpretations, bearing in 
mind that the legislature must be presumed to have intended a 
sensible, fair and workable result; and  
(vii) common law expressed in the presumptions.224 
 
While the clarity of the language in the literal text must be taken into account in the 
process of interpretation, the approach requires that due consideration must also be 
given to the context. Cowen, however, does not refer to the methodology outlined 
above, by name – for example, a purposive or a contextual approach. What is 
apparent though, is that the theory or the approach suggested – which requires a 
‘weighing-up’ of all of the elements enumerated225 – is akin to a teleological 
evaluation. Even before the advent of constitutional democracy, Devenish postulated 
the need for a justiciable Bill of Rights with a provision ‘authorizing’ or prescribing 
a teleological method or theory of interpretation,226 which involved an unqualified 
contextual weighing up of linguistic, legal and jurisprudential consideration, and 
which would place the process of interpretation on a ‘sounder jurisprudential 
footing’.227 
Du Plessis, in his attempt to present the most appropriate method of interpretation, 
has propounded what has been referred to as a ‘practically inclusive method of 
interpretation’. Initially suggested as a technique for constitutional interpretation, Du 
Plessis suggested that the methodology is suitable and can be applied to statutory 
interpretation as well.228 The five ‘reading strategies’ that are central to the approach, 
                                                            
224 Cowen “Prolegomenon to a Re-Statement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ (1976) 
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228 Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights at 73 - 74. 
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include grammatical interpretation, systematic (or contextual interpretation), 
teleological interpretation, historical interpretation, and comparative interpretation.229 
The modus operandi of the methodology is that the above-mentioned reading 
strategies are complementary and inter-related, and should be applied in conjunction 
with one another.230 The operation of the different reading strategies working in 
conjunction with one another – which is endorsed by Du Plessis – compares 
favourably with an eclectric methodology proposed as the modus operandi for the 
operation of a deontic theory of interpretation. Basically, what is suggested, is that a 
deontic theory of interpretation, would require an amalgamation of the 
methodologies of the various theories of interpretation, and is to be applied pro-
actively, to give effect to the constitutional aims of transformation and restoration. 
2.10 Conclusion 
What is evident is that the advent of the new constitutional era and the application of 
section 39 in particular, mandates the process of interpretation of legislation. The 
Constitution reinforces the values that have to be given expression to – which include 
liberal values and socio-economic values. The emerging jurisprudence, therefore, in 
giving expression to and upholding the values that underpin the democratic order, is 
notably one that requires a methodology for a transformative constitutional order. 
With the shift away from literalism to purposivism, our jurisprudence is also 
evolving. The emerging jurisprudence, which is a distinct move away from 
positivism, appears to be akin to natural law – with the Constitution as the supreme 
law. Therefore, the way one would approach the process of interpretation subsequent 
to the adoption of the interim Constitution, is different. The emerging jurisprudence 
requires a ‘new’ theory, and a new theory requires a ‘new’ methodology.  
The proposed deontic theory, which has its genesis in section 39, suggests that the 
most decisive way that courts and judges can give expression to the values of the 
Constitution, is by conducting an ethical and moral evaluation of the provision under 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
229 See Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 192-195 for a discussion of the five 
techniques of interpretation. 
 
230 Ibid at 58. A more detailed analysis of the five techniques identified above or the ‘reading 
strategies,’ as they are also referred to, will be conducted in Chapter 3. 
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consideration. Such reasoning and analysis is consistent with deontic reasoning that 
forms the basis of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation.  With its own 
particular modus operandi, which requires an eclectic methodology, and a pro-active 
approach to the interpretation and application of legislation, it is maintained, that for 
the reasons submitted, a deontic theory of interpretation – which embraces all of the 
elements identified above, provides a more holistic approach231 to the process of 
interpretation. 
                                                            
231 Kim Statutory Interpretation – General Principles and Recent Trends at 1-2. The author 
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION – ITS ROLE, 
SIGNIFICANCE AND INFLUENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, the Constitution has 
manifestly affected every aspect of South African life and also influenced the 
development of law.1 The emerging jurisprudence as a result of the Constitution has 
seen a paradigmatic shift away from positivism to that which may be considered as 
being akin to natural law.  The aim of Chapter 3 is intended to explore fully how the 
Constitution has influenced both constitutional interpretation and statutory 
interpretation and to determine the nature of the emerging jurisprudence in the 
constitutional era in South Africa.  For this reason, the approach with regard to the 
examination of the subject in this chapter is to carefully consider; 
a)  the principles that underlie constitutional interpretation; and   
b)  the relevant constitutional provisions, which include, section 1, section 2, 
section 39, and section 172,2 that inform the process of interpretation in the 




1  See Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para 
21, where Langa DP explains that: ‘Section 39 (2) of the Constitution means that all statutes 
must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights … As such, the process of 
interpreting the context in which we find ourselves and the Constitution’s goal of a society 
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights. The spirit of 
transition and transformation characterizes the constitutional enterprise as a whole.’ 
 
2 It is submitted that while Chapter 3 focuses mainly on the sections referred to, the other 
chapters of the thesis also make reference to and discuss other relevant sections of the 
Constitution, where necessary.  
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3.2 The Constitution as a Founding Document 
Since the inception of the new democratic era in 1994,3 the Constitution has become 
‘the frame of reference within which everything must function, and against which all 
actions must be tested’.4 Gaining its authority from the supremacy provision set out 
in section 2, which provides that: 
 
‘The Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it in invalid,’5 
 
it affirms that the Constitution is not merely another legislative instrument, but the 
supreme law of the land or the lex fundamentalis.6 A constitutional state with a 
supreme constitution has two essential components that form the basis of the 
structure. This includes a formal element (including aspects such as the separation of 
powers, checks and balances on government and the principle of legality), and a 
material or a substantive element – which refers to a state bound by a system of 
fundamental values such as inter alia justice and equality.7 
The Constitution declares its own supremacy – that operates in a manner that can be 
described as being two-fold. Firstly, in terms of section 1 (c), the Republic of South 
Africa is said to be founded on the values of the supremacy of the Constitution. In 
essence, therefore, the founding statement affirms that this ‘value status’ is 
guaranteed and is expected to pervade all law in the legal system.8 
                                                            
3 This refers to the situation initially with the Interim Constitution of 1993 and thereafter with 
the Final Constitution of 1996. 
 
4 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 184.See also Investigating Directorate Serious 
Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit2001 (1) SA 545 (CC). 
 
5 Section 2 of the Constitution provides that: ‘The Constitution is the Supreme law of the 
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it 
must be fulfilled.’ 
 
6 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 185. A supreme Constitution is not merely 




8 Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2nd edition) 32-97. In Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4) SA 592 
(SE), at 597 G-H, Froneman J explained that: ‘The interpretation of the Constitution will be 




Secondly, in terms of section 2 of the Constitution, it is stated that the Constitution 
‘is the Supreme law of the Republic’ and that ‘law or conduct inconsistent with it, is 
invalid.’ This ‘trumping sense’9 supremacy of the Constitution, basically means that 
if any law conflicts with a constitutional provision, the constitutional provision will 
take precedence. The resultant effect of the operation of a Constitution is that the 
Constitution has a ‘decisive impact on the conventional hierarchy and status of all 
legal rules and legislation in South Africa.’10 The most distinctive feature of South 
Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional system, is that of constitutional supremacy,11 
and the decision to make the Constitution supreme has had far-reaching 
implications.12 Section 1 is of profound importance, as it sets out some of the most 
important values on which the South African Constitution is founded.13 Section 1 
provides: 
 
‘The Republic of South Africa is a one sovereign, democratic state founded 
on the following values - 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a rational common voters roll, regular 
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to 
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.’ 
 
The Constitution does not only set out the values, processes and structures that place 
a limit on governmental power, but the Constitution also expresses the ideal to 
which, as a society, most South Africans aspire to. The idea that South African 
society should be based on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom has 




10 Ibid. (Emphasis Added) 
 
11 De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context at 54. 
 
12 Ibid at 55. 
 
13 Ibid at 57. 
 




to most favour a value-based methodology is a broad purposive or a teleological 
theory of interpretation. Even though recent Constitutional Court decisions have 
shown an inclination to favour a value-based methodology or a teleological theory of 
interpretation,15 it begs the question about the applicability of the teleological theory 
in the new constitutional dispensation, in South Africa. 
 
It is submitted that the Constitution as a memorial ‘serves to remind the nation of 
their pledge (and provides them with the appropriate legal means) to achieve social 
justice’.16 It is described as both a memorial (which commemorates) and a monument 
(which celebrates).While the difference in meanings is subtle, the terms are not, 
however, synonymous.17 According to Du Plessis, while heroes and achievements 
are generally celebrated, the same does not apply to anti-heroes and disasters. It is 
provided that while they may be remembered, they can hardly be celebrated. An 
appropriate term, therefore, would be to ‘commemorate’ or to ‘remember’ the 
incident or perhaps the victims involved.18 
Additional popular imagery used by academics to capture the ‘special status’19 
ascribed to the supremacy of the Constitution, has been the bridge metaphor. While 
Mureinik describes the Constitution as forming ‘a bridge in a divided society,’20 Van 
der Walt argues that the bridge metaphor allows for another interpretation whereby 
‘the bridge is not simply an instrument for getting out of one place and into another, 
                                                            
15 Ibid at 59. 
 
16 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at  32-76. 
 
17 See Snyman ‘Interpretation and the Politics of Memory’ (1998) Acta Juridica at 317-321. 
 
18 See Du Plessis ‘The South African Constitution As Memory and Promise’ (2000) 3 
Stellenbosch Law Review at 385-386, where the author distinguishes between the terms 
‘celebrate’ and ‘commemorate.’ He draws a comparison with the German words Denkmal 
and Mahnmal and explains that while a Denkmal can celebrate (and may even 
commemorate), a Mahnmal on the other hand warns, and may even castigate. 
 
19 Botha Statutory Interpretation, (5th edition) at 187. 
 
20 Mureinik ‘A Bridge to where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights (1994) South African 
Journal on Human Rights at 32. In-keeping with the bridge metaphor, Mureinik submits that: 
‘If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must 
be a bridge to. It must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of 
power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests on the 
cogency of the case offered of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command. 
The new order must be built on persuasion, not coercion.’    
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but an edifice that is inherently related to the abyss which it spans.’21 Le Roux adds 
that ‘it is not the bridge itself that is significant, but the act of bridging, of linking the 
past and the future, reality and imagination, in order to create new ideas in the 
present’.22 Commenting on the metaphorical bridge that both Van der Walt and Le 
Roux describe, Michael Bishop refers to such a bridge as a ‘transformative bridge’.23 
He maintains that such a ‘transformative bridge envisions constant change and re-
evaluation’ rather than a ‘move from one point to another.’24 In keeping with the 
analogy, he makes the point that ‘the transitional bridge is a path, while the 
transformative bridge is a space’.25 
In drawing on this analysis, it would seem that such a bridge has indeed paved the 
way for transformative constitutionalism. Specific features of the transformative 
South African Constitution have been identified as ‘the attainment of inter alia 
substantive equality, the infusion of the private sphere with human rights and a 
culture of justification in public law interactions’.26 To determine how the 
transformative nature of the Constitution has the potential to ‘profoundly and 
comprehensively’27 affect constitutional interpretation, will be explored more fully in 
this and subsequent chapters. 
3.2.1 Understanding the Transformative Nature of the 
Constitution  
It is submitted that the South African Constitution has often been aptly described as a 
‘transformative Constitution’. De Vos et al have attempted to unpack what this 
means by contextualizing the South African Constitution. The authors submit that the 
                                                            
21 Van der Walt ‘Dancing with Codes – Protecting, Developing and Deconstructing Property 
Rights in a Constitutional State’ (2001) 118 South African Law Journal at 258. 
 
22 Le Roux ‘Bridges, Clearings, Labyrinths: The Architecture of Post-Apartheid 
Constitutionalism’ (2004) South African Public Law: Public Law in Transformation at 634. 
 






26 Pieterse ‘What do We Mean When We Talk about Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2005) 
20 South African Public Law at 161. 
 




Constitution was written in response to the urgent need for social, economic, legal 
and political transformation.28 Davis further explains that South African 
constitutionalism therefore should transform South African society from a deeply 
divided legacy of a racist and unequal past into a society based on democratic 
principles of social justice, equality, dignity and freedom.29 In elucidating the idea of 
‘transformative constitutionalism’, the former Chief Justice Pius Langa stressed that 
the objective of transformative constitutionalism was to create a truly equal society 
and ‘to heal the wounds of the past and to guide us to a better future’.30 Langa, in a 
legal sense, therefore describes ‘transformation’ as: 
 
 ‘…a social and an economic revolution … The provision of services to all 
and the leveling of economic playing fields that were so drastically skewed 
by the apartheid system must be absolutely central to any concept of 
transformative constitutionalism’.31 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the idea of a transformative Constitution, has been 
reflected in a plethora of Constitutional Court judgments.32 In furthering the agenda 
of social transformation, the Court in S v Makwanyane and Another held that the 
Constitution attempts to provide ‘a transition from these grossly unacceptable 
features of the past to a conspicuously contrasting future’.33 In Mhlungu the 
Constitutional Court was adamant that ‘the new constitutional order might develop a 
jurisprudence that represents a ringing break from the past’.34 In Du Plessis and 
                                                            
28 De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 27. 
 
29 Davis Democracy and Deliberation: Transformation and the South African Legal Order at 
44. (Emphasis Added) 
 
30 Langa ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ Prestige Lecture delivered at Stellenbosch 




32 See for example Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 (2) BCLR 
150 (CC) at para 81 and Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu Natal) 1997 (12) 
BCLR 1696 at para 80, amongst others. 
 
33 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 at para 262. 
 
34 Davis ‘The Twist of Language and the Two Fagans : Please Sir May I Have Some More 
Literalism!’(1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights at 507. In S v Mhlungu 1995 
(3) SA 867, Mohamed DP is quite emphatic in his assertions that : ‘… the new Constitution 
represented a ringing break with the past which perpetuated inequality and irrational 




others v De Klerk, the Court went further and asserted that the Constitution ‘is a 
document that seeks to transform the status quo ante into a new order’.35 What can be 
garnered from an examination of case-law, is that the process of interpretation of a 
transformative Constitution in South Africa, requires looking both backward and 
forward.36 It is necessary to look backward at the history of South Africa to 
determine which negative aspects of the past the Constitution as a document seeks to 
redress and transform. At the same time, the process of interpretation has to be 
‘forward-looking’ to improve the prevailing situation – to achieve economic, 
political and social transformation.37 
 
A new South African jurisprudence that has emerged has been described as post-
liberal and transformative in nature.38 It therefore raises the question about the role of 
judges in interpreting the constitutional text. While the earlier discussions on the 
theories of interpretation39 have revealed a definite shift from literalism to 
purposivism with regard to ordinary statutory interpretation, it is safe to say that the 
courts have indeed also recognized the significance of a value-based system with 
regard to constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, in spite of this, it would seem 
that even though the notion of establishing an ‘objective normative value system’ 
would appear to be important to the process of constitutional interpretation, the 
subject has unfortunately not received sufficient attention from the courts and 
judges.40 In Carmichele and Geldenhuys v Minister of Safety and Security, the court 
affirmed that the content of this normative system does not only depend on an 
abstract philosophical inquiry, but rather also upon an understanding that the 
Constitution mandates that ‘our constitutional dispensation had to be instilled with a 
                                                            
35 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at para 157. 
 
36 De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 28. 
 
37 Ibid. See also De Vos ‘A Bridge Too Far? History as context in the Interpretation of the 
South African Constitution’ (2001)  17 South African Journal on Human Rights at 1-33. 
 
38 Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal 
on Human Rights at 146. 
 
39 See Chapter 2 for an indepth analysis of the theories of interpretation. 
 




new operational vision based on foundational values of our constitutional system’.41 
This reflects a pro-active methodology which brings about social justice. 
 
The dictum above has to be considered in light of the earlier submissions made,42 
that the difficulty in establishing an ‘objective normative value-system’ relates 
directly to the fact that the theories of interpretation, as presented, are inadequate. It 
is submitted that the emerging jurisprudence – as a result of the transformative nature 
of the Constitution – requires a ‘new operational vision based on foundational 
values’.43  It is submitted that the proposed deontic theory which requires that judges 
– in the process of interpretation – provide a more philosophical enquiry by giving 
due consideration to the moral and ethical dimension in the process of legal 
reasoning and in so doing, to achieve the vision of a transformative Constitution that 
is holistic in nature.  
3.3 The Differences and Similarities Between Constitutional 
Interpretation and Ordinary Statutory Interpretation 
3.3.1 Similarities 
Acknowledging that there are both similarities and differences between constitutional 
and ‘ordinary’ statutory interpretation, it is acknowledged that the similarities are not 
to be under-estimated and that the differences are not to be over-emphasised.44 
Structurally, it has been observed that the Constitution and ‘ordinary’ statutes have 
many similar features.45 As enacted law texts, they are both subject to what is 
                                                            
41 In Carmichele and Geldenhys v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2002 (4) SA 719 
(CC) at 728 G-I, the court maintained that the ‘objective normative value system seeks to 
establish a society based on human dignity, equality and freedom …’ 
 
42 See discussion and submissions made in Chapter 2 relating to the theories of interpretation. 
 
43 The position has been affirmed in Carmichelle and Geldenhys v Minister of Safety and 
Security and Another 2002 (4) SA 719 at 728, where it was maintained that the development 
of South African society required a new operational vision based on foundational values of 
our constitutional system. 
 
44 Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights at 88. 
 
45 Some of the structural similar features include for example preambles, headings, sections, 





referred to as ‘legal interpretation’.46 Because ‘text genre co-constitutes textual 
meaning and therefore co-determines the manner in which the text is to be read and 
understood’47 or put in another way that ‘both are members of the same broad 
interpretive family’,48  it is to that extent that the similarities are important.  
De Ville also shows support for this contention. He maintains that: 
 
‘The constitutional theory which inspires the interpretation of the 
Constitution should ... also inform statutory interpretation.’49 
 
From an analysis of section 39(2),50 which clearly mandates a broad value-based 
purposive interpretation of the Constitution, it follows that this value-based or value-
orientated methodology should also guide the process of ‘ordinary’ statutory 
interpretation.51 Because the Constitution and ‘ordinary’ statutes have similarities in 
both the ‘formal and operational style’,52 it allows for both to depend on similar 
reading strategies53 for interpretation. In his analysis of these reading strategies of 
interpretation, Du Plessis submits that in constitutional interpretation, such strategies 
can be overridden by ‘more pressing constitutional concern’,54 which also re-inforces 








48 Botha Statutory Interpretations (5th edition) at 184. 
 
49 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 60. Support for this approach can be 
found in both constitutional as well as judgments of the Land Claims Court.  See for example 
Minister of Land Affairs and Another v Slamdien and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 413 (LCC); and 
Dulabh and Another v Department of Land Affairs 1997 (4) SA 1108 (LCC). 
 
50 Section 39 (2) provides:- 
 ‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.’ 
 
51 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 184. 
 
52 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 123-128. 
 
53 The reading strategies that are referred to are the conventional canons of statutory 
interpretation, which are examined in greater detail in this chapter. See 3.6 Canon-Guided 
Reading Strategies. 
 




3.3.2  Differences 
 
While the debate between the similarity and the dissimilarity continues, the idea of 
the distinctiveness of constitutional interpretation among South African scholars is a 
popular topic. In drawing attention to the unique features of the Constitution, Du 
Plessis also highlights the differences between constitutional and statutory 
interpretation.55 In essence therefore, it is noted: 
 
 The Constitution, as supreme law, is a long-lasting, enacted law-text 
at the highest point or the ‘apex’ of all legal norms within the legal 
order; 
 The Constitution provides for justiciable laws and therefore 
mandates a standard for assessment of the validity for both ‘law’ and 
‘conduct’; 
 The Constitution verbalizes characteristically broad, inclusive and 
open-ended language values and beliefs that are consistent with a 
democracy within a constitutional state; and 
 The Constitution is a product resulting from a culmination of intense 
negotiation and encapsulates the ideological aspirations of the 
democratic society. 
 
What is evident in identifying the above-mentioned features, is that the main reason 
for the distinctiveness between constitutional interpretation and ‘ordinary’ statutory 
interpretation – can be attributed to the supremacy of the Constitution. A direct 
consequence of constitutional supremacy, is the obligation to declare invalid law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution. The relevant provision in this 
regard is section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, which basically provides that: 
‘a court must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the 







When it is alleged that a statutory provision is prima facie constitutionally invalid, a 
court will first attempt to interpret the impugned provision, so as to make it 
constitutionally valid. This is generally known as a reading-down process.56 If 
reading-down is not possible, the court will have to declare a law invalid. However, 
to prevent a law from being declared completely invalid, a court may attempt to 
‘limit the substantive impact of the declaration’, by either severing the offending 
words, or reading in new words to ‘cure’ the constitutional defect.57 This is also 
referred to as ‘modifying’ or ‘adapting’ legislation to keep it constitutional and 
‘alive.’58The Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another,59 is an 
excellent illustration of the stance of the Constitutional Court in effecting the 
reading-in of words into legislation to make it constitutionally valid. The Fourie 
Court found that the common-law and section 30(1) of the Marriage Act60 were 
inconsistent with section 9 of the Constitution, in that they made no provision for 
same sex persons to enjoy the same status as heterosexual persons.  As a result of the 
incompatibility of the common-law and the Marriage Act with the Constitution, O’ 
Regan J’s approach to resolving the matter was exemplary. She makes the 
submission that:  
 
 ‘Before I conclude this judgment I must stress that it has dealt solely with 
the issues directly before the court. I leave open for appropriate future 
legislative consideration or judicial determination the effect, if any of this 
judgment on decisions this court has made in the past concerning same-sex 
life partners who did not have the option to marry.  Similarly, this judgment 
does not pre-empt in any way appropriate legislative intervention to regulate 
the relationships (and in particular, to safeguard the interests of vulnerable 
parties of those living in conjugal or non-conjugal family units, whether 
heterosexual or gay or lesbian, not at present receiving legal protection… 
What ever comprehensive legislation governing all domestic partnerships 
may be envisaged for the future, the applicants have established the 
                                                            












existence of clearly identified infringements of their rights, and are entitled 
to specific appropriate relief. 
  
 In keeping with this approach it is necessary that the orders of this Court, 
read together, make it clear that if Parliament fails to cure the defect within 
twelve months, the words “or spouse” will automatically be read  into 
section 30(1) of the Marriage Act. In this event the Marriage Act will, 
without more, become the legal vehicle to enable same-sex couples to 
achieve the status and benefits coupled with responsibilities which it 
presently makes available to heterosexual couples.’61 
 
O’Regan J’s submission where it is provided that ‘…I leave open for appropriate 
future legislative consideration…’ and ‘… whatever comprehensive legislation 
governing all domestic partnerships may be envisaged for the future …’, is clearly 
reflective of a more innovative and pro-active approach in dealing with the matter of 
same-sex persons wishing to enter into marriage.  
Reading-down, reading-in, and severance are discussed more fully hereunder. 
 
3.4 Reading-in, Reading-down, Severance and Reading in 
Conformity with the Constitution 
3.4.1 Reading-Down 
 
While the Interim Constitution – in terms of section 35(2) and section 232(2) – 
explicitly authorized the reading-down of legislation which was unconstitutional, the 
1996 Constitution does not contain a similar provision.62 Nevertheless, reading-down 
and reading-in techniques are a valid and necessary part of constitutional review.63 
A good illustration of reading-down of a statutory provision in order to prevent it 





62 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 195. 
 




Security.64 The provision in contention was section 49(1) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act,65 which basically provided: 
 
‘If any person authorized … to arrest or to assist in arresting another, 
attempts to arrest such a person and such person – 
(a) resists the attempt and cannot be arrested without the use of force;  
(b) flees when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him is being made, or 
resists such an attempt and flees; 
the person so authorized may, in order to effect the arrest, use such 
force as may in the circumstances be reasonably necessary to 
overcome the resistance or to prevent the person concerned from 
fleeing’66 
 
As a result of the reading-down of section 49(2), the Supreme Court of Appeal 
maintained that the use of a firearm or similar weapon to effect an arrest may be 
warranted, only if the person authorized to carry out the arrest has reason to believe 
that the suspect: 
1) poses an immediate threat to him or her, or a threat of harm to members of the 
public; or 
2) has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
bodily harm.67 
In respect of the afore-mentioned decision, Olivier JA provided that the criteria that 
have to be considered by courts during the reading-down process, to keep legislation 
constitutional, are: 
 
‘(a) to examine the objects and purport of the Act or the Section under 
consideration; 
 (b)  to examine the ambit and meaning of the rights protected by the 
Constitution; 
                                                            




66 The provision in dispute was section 49(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
 
67 See Du Plessis’ comments about Govender’s case in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of 




(c) to ascertain whether it is reasonably possible to interpret the Act or  
Section under consideration in such a manner that it conforms with the  
Constitution, i.e. by protecting the rights therein protected; 
(d) if such interpretation is possible, to give effect to it, and 
(e) if it is not possible, to initiate the steps leading to a declaration of  
constitutional invalidity’68 
 
What is therefore evident from the above dictum, and is often the case in practice, is 
that reading-down is not always possible. A court can only read-down a legislative 
provision if the provision is reasonably capable of a constitutional interpretation.69 
Reading-down is therefore strictly speaking not a remedy, as is reading-in and 
severance, but has been described as a mandatory rule of interpretation which is used 
to avoid the invalidity of a provision.70 Reading-down must therefore be 
distinguished from reading-in. While reading-in is applied only where a court has 
made a finding of invalidity, with reading-down the finding of invalidity is prevented 
as a result of reading-down the impugned provision.71 It has far reaching 
consequences. It necessitates that a judge has a moral function to fulfill in the 
interpretation of the law.  Reading-down reflects deontic reasoning in that it is a 
technique involving moral reasoning rather than merely inductive or deductive 




With regard to reading-in, words are literally read into an unconstitutional legislative 
provision in order to salvage it or to render it constitutional.72 Reading-in is a more 
drastic measure used by courts to change legislation – in order to render it 
                                                            
68 In Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others : In Re- S v Walters 2002 (4) SA 613 
(CC), the Constitutional Court endorsed the Supreme Court of Appeals approach in 
Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA). 
 
69 De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 396. 
 
70 Ibid at 395. 
 
71 Ibid at 396. 
 




constitutionally alive.73 In such circumstances, the court will effectively ‘read’ or 
insert  something into a provision in order to ensure its validity. Because a court does 
actually ‘change the legislation’ in question, the reading-in process is to be applied 
with caution.74 Therefore, before words are read into a statute, a court has to ensure: 
 first, that the newly created provision to which words have been 
added is consistent with the Constitution; and  
 second, that the result achieved would interfere with the laws 
adapted by the legislature as little as possible.75 
It is noted that reading-in is the opposite of severance.76 While severance allows for 
the impugned parts of the legislation to be severed or cut-out from the rest of the 
legislation, reading-in refers to the insertion of words or phrases to the affected 
legislative provision to ensure that it is in keeping with the Constitution.77 
3.4.3 Severance 
The term severance basically refers to the process which allows for the severing or 
cutting out of the parts of the provision that are unconstitutional. The test used to 
effect severance is whether ‘the good is not dependent on the bad’ and whether the 
inconsistency can be separated from the rest of the statute.78 The manner in which the 
court would apply severance, therefore, is to determine whether, after the parts have 
been cut-off due to invalidity, the part remaining will still be able to give effect to the 






75 De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 399. 
 
76 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-141. 
 
77 Ibid.  Reading-in must also be distinguished from reading-up. Reading-up occurs when there 
is more than one possible reading of the legislative text, and as a result a more extensive 
reading is adopted to keep the legislation constitutional. In Daniels v Campbell 2004 (5) SA 
331 (CC), the court held that a person who is a party to a monogamous Muslim marriage 
does not qualify as a ‘spouse’ in terms of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 and the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. In order to avoid unconstitutionally of the 
legislation, the court applied a more extensive or broad interpretation, so as to include 
persons married according to Muslim rites. 
 




 first, whether it is possible to sever or cut-off the invalid provisions, 
and  
 second, if so, does what remains give effect to the purpose of the 
legislation? 
What has been observed, however, is that it may not always be possible to separate 
the good from the bad and still give effect to the purpose of the impugned provision. 
Where this occurs, the court has no option but to declare the provision as a whole 
invalid.79 Severance, however, must be distinguished from notional severance. While 
similar to severance, it allows for the unconstitutional parts to be removed, leaving 
certain parts unaffected. The difference, however, is that the section is given a 
particular meaning, which would only apply to certain cases or in certain 
circumstances.80 
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs,81 the 
Constitutional Court maintained that the following principles are to be applied with 
regard to reading-in or severance: 
 The results of the reading-in or severance must be consistent with the 
Constitution and its values; 
 The result achieved must interfere with the existing law as little as 
possible; 
 The courts must be able to define – with sufficient precision – how 
the legislative meaning ought to be modified to comply with the 
Constitution; and 
 The remedy of reading-on ought not to be granted where this would 
result in an unsupportable budgetary intrusion.82 
                                                            
79 Ibid at 396-397. 
 
80 A good illustration of notional severance was evident in Islamic Unity Convention v 
Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others 2002 (5) BCLR 433. The Constitutional 
Court found that a regulation which prohibited the broadcasting of material that was ‘likely to 
prejudice relations between sections of the population.’ The Court declined to strike down the 
relevant portion quoted above, because ‘a dangerous gap would result.’ As a result thereof, 
the Court decided that national severance was the only just remedy. 
 
81 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
 
82 See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 195-196, for the factors that 
the Court will take into consideration to effect reading- in or severance. 
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3.5  An Observation about the Constitutional Remedies 
Unlike reading-in and severance which are generally regarded as constitutional 
remedies granted to litigants who successfully raise a constitutional complaint, 
reading-down as explained above is a method of statutory interpretation that is 
mandated by section 39(2). The process of reading-down or reading statutes ‘in 
conformity with the constitution’, basically means that: 
 
 ‘…all statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights. 
[and] All law-making authority must be exercised in accordance with the 
Constitution’.83 
 
Therefore, in giving effect to the values of the Bill of Rights in the process of 
interpretation, requires that: 
 
 ‘judicial officers must prefer interpretations of legislation that fall within 
constitutional bounds over those that do not …’.84 
 
In so doing, judges are expected to embrace the challenge to effect economic, 
political and social justice for transformation– by reading-down legislation in 
conformity with the Constitution. This would therefore require that judges – in-
keeping with section 39(2) which mandates a value-orientated approach to 
interpretation – give particular consideration to morality and ethics in the process of 
reasoning. Such reasoning is therefore not only concerned with inductive and 
deductive techniques but with moral and ethical considerations. This process 
resonates with deontic reasoning and is central to the deontic theory of interpretation 
that is postulated.85 The mechanism of reading-down has changed the nature of 
statutory interpretation.  All statutes must be interpreted and applied to ensure that 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
83 The constitutional foundation for the new methodology to statutory interpretation, was 
explained by Langa DP in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai 
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para 21. 
 
84 De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 395. 
 
85 A deontic theory which is proposed as a new theory for interpretation, has its origin in the 
classical philosophy of ethics. Deontology is therefore defined as the ‘science of duty or 





substantive justice is done in each case.  This involves deontic reasoning, where 
moral and ethical values are used as a method of legal reasoning. 
3.6 The Canon-Guided Reading Strategies 
First propounded by Von Savigny, these ‘methods of interpretation’ commonly 
referred to as the ‘Von Savigny Quartet’, have also been adapted for use by 
Labuschagne who describes the methods or modes of interpretation as invalshoeke or 
angles of approach.86 Originally suggested for constitutional interpretation, these 
methods or modes of interpretation have also been applied for statutory 
interpretation.87  While these canon-guided reading strategies seem to have received 
a ‘reasonably positive’ response among South African academics,88 a closer 
inspection of the quartet is necessary in order to assess its relevance for constitutional 
interpretation. Because these canon-guided reading strategies encompass 
grammatical interpretation, teleological interpretation, historical interpretation, and 
comparative interpretation – each of which is discussed in detail hereunder – it is not 
surprising that the term that has been coined to describe this technique for 
constitutional interpretation as a ‘practical inclusive method of interpretation’,89 
which facilitates an eclectic methodology.  Although this method incorporates what 
was to some extent discussed under theories, it is the synthesis involved in the 
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3.6.1 Grammatical Interpretation 
 
This aspect of the quartet acknowledges the importance of the role of the language of 
the legislative text.90 The focus is on the linguistic and grammatical meaning of the 
words, phrases, sentences and other structural components of the text, and also the 
rules of syntax. It is, however, emphasized that grammatical interpretation does not 
require of the interpreter to focus exclusively on the literal theory and the orthodox 
‘ordinary or plain meaning of word’ approach. It merely reveals the importance of 
the legislative text in the complex process of interpretation.91 
In examining the Constitution, what is evident is that the language of the 
Constitution is expansive and open-ended and can hardly be ‘expressed categorically 
or conclusively’.92 There is a convincing reason for this. The Constitution is intended 
to be a long-lasting text and its provisions are expansively formulated so as to allow 
for an inestimable number of unpredictable situations. Therefore, it is obvious that 
the Constitution – by its very nature – defies the assumption of clear and 
unambiguous language. What is apparent, therefore, is that the canons of 
grammatical interpretation, in not placing emphasis on the ordinary or plain meaning 
of the word rule, cannot be regarded as ‘incarnations of the literalist-cum-
intentionalist’ approach.93 
In heeding the conventions in the use of language, what is obvious is that the canons 
of and aids to grammatical interpretation tend to limit the plethora of possible 
meanings that the language of a legislative instrument can generate. Examples of  
such conventions are that the legislature will use ordinary language, which is in 
keeping with the rule that the language should be read in its ordinary sense, and that 
technical language is meant to have a technical connotation, and that the same word 
or phrase is meant to mean the same throughout one and the same statutory text.94 It 
                                                            




92 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition)  at 32-161. 
 






is therefore evident that the Interpretation Act95 and the definition clauses contained 
in legislative texts and interpretive precepts of the Constitution, even though they are 
worded in expansive and open-ended language, fulfill the limiting function outlined 
above.96 
As already alluded to, as with other classifications of the canons of construction, in 
accordance with the Savignian model, this categorization is not watertight and the 
overlapping is inevitable – as is the case with grammatical interpretation and 
systematic and purposive interpretation.97 Language is always relevant. The critical 
issue, is the extent to which it influences meaning. 
3.6.2 Systematic Interpretation (or Contextual Interpretation) 
Systematic interpretation amounts to contextualization98 which facilitates the 
ascertainment of the meaning of a particular legislative provision in relation to the 
legislative text as a whole. Therefore the emphasis is on the ‘wholeness’ of the text.99 
This process may be described as being two-fold. Firstly, it must be emphasized that 
in principle, words, phrases and as a result provisions, cannot be read in isolation. 
The provision has to be understood in relation to and in light of the other components 
of the legislative text of which it forms part. This therefore requires a drawing on the 
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99 In Ferreira v Levin 1996 (2) SA 984 (CC), the Constitutional Court used the structure of the 
Interim Constitution, as well as the formulation of the fundamental rights, to interpret the 
right to freedom of the person. In philosophy, any doctrine that emphasizes the priority of a 
whole over its parts is holism. Alternatively, a ‘holistic’ definition of holism denies the 
necessity of a division between the function of separate parts and workings of the ‘whole.’ 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/holism (Accessed on October 2013) The idea of ‘holism’ which 
is discussed throughout the thesis, is used to illustrate the basis of the deontic theory and the 
eclectic methodology that underpins its operation. The emphasis is on the idea that the 
various theories of interpretation would operate in conjunction with each other to facilitate 
the operation of the eclectic methodology. An eclectic methodology embraces the various 




‘system’ or ‘logic’ or the ‘scheme’ of the text as a whole – hence the reference to this 
particular method as systematic interpretation.100 
A systematic interpretation also requires that the macro-text is considered in the 
process. The focus is not only restricted to the other provisions and parts of 
legislation, but also requires extra-textual or contextual considerations to be taken 
into account in a holistic manner.101 Such considerations are, for example, the social 
and political environments in respect of which the legislation operates.102 Von 
Savigny asserts that the very task of systematic interpretation is to forge links with 
this ‘extra’ or ‘macro-text’.103 
Intra-textual, systematic interpretation overlaps with grammatical interpretation, in 
so far as a systematic reading of the text causes the meaning attributed to linguistic 
signifiers – in, for example, a definition clause – to be spread throughout the text.104 
Extra-textual contextualization takes place with reference to meaning-generative 
signifiers (also texts) in the textual environment.105 In statutory interpretation, as far 
as the signifiers are concerned, the focus is firstly on other legal precepts and 
institutions and on the legal system as a whole. Legislative enactments (and the 
Constitution) are always construed as forming part of a wider network of legislation 
– in which the Interpretation Act,106 holds a particular position for interpretive 
purposes and other law-texts such as precedents. 
In respect of the political and constitutional order (referred to above), society and its 
legally recognized interests and the international legal order are all consciously taken 
account of in respect of both constitutional and statutory interpretation. This requires 
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cognizance of the macro-text and the existing common-law canons of construction. 
The logic that flows from the above, therefore, is that it is impossible to separate the 
text and the macro-text, especially since the macro-text tends to provide the ‘source 
of concrete situations’ – without which statutory interpretation is impossible.107 
In the case of Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South 
Africa,108 the court highlighted the process of the systematic (contextual) 
interpretation in constitutional interpretation, as follows: 
 
‘The process of constitutional interpretation must therefore be context-
sensitive. In construing the provisions of the Constitution it is not sufficient 
to focus only on the ordinary or textual meaning of the phrase. The proper 
approach to constitutional interpretation involves a combination of textual 
and structural approaches. Any construction of a provision in a constitution 
must be consistent with the structure or scheme of the Constitution. This 
provides the context within which a provision in the Constitution must be 
construed.’ 
 
The overlaps between systematic and purposive (or teleological) interpretation are 
confirmed in case-law.109 It is clear that the preamble and long title of a legislative 
text play a distinctive role in the interpretation of its individual provisions. This is 
because a systematic reading of individual provisions, in the context of the text as a 
whole, requires the broadest possible spectrum of textual elements to be taken into 
account.110 A purposive interpretation is conducted through a systematic reading of a 
provision to be construed in the context of the instrument as a whole, and (thereby) 
in interaction with the provisions whose ‘purposive potential’ is to be ascertained.111 
This purposive or teleological interpretation is examined more closely below. 
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3.6.3 Teleological Interpretation or Purposive Interpretation 
Teleological interpretation has been described as purposive interpretation attributing 
meaning to a provision – mindful both of its (possible) objective(s) or ratio, and of 
the aspirational values of the legal system as a whole.112 This method of 
interpretation emphasizes fundamental constitutional values and is often referred to 
as ‘value-coherent’, ‘value-orientated’ or ‘value-activating’.113 The emphasis on 
values – more specifically constitutional values – emanates from section 39(2), in 
respect of which it is established that for purposes of interpretation, the values that 
underlie a democracy must be heeded.114 It is therefore mandated that the aim and 
purpose of legislation must be ascertained against the background of these 
fundamental values. This purposefulness or purpose-consciousness is identified as 
the key in both statutory and constitutional interpretation, and is necessary to ‘honour 
the operational intent (or effect-directedness) of the enacted law’.115 However, 
purposive interpretation in the abstract and by itself can in fact be counter-productive 
as explained supra. It has to be understood that the interpretive process cannot start 
off (and proceed) as an exercise giving effect to the purpose or objects of a provision, 
for the simple reason that the purpose or object cannot be known prior to 
interpretation. It has to be established and determined ‘through interpretation’.116 
It is cautioned that if this process is not followed in the said manner, it would cause 
the interpreter to surmise and ‘conjecture in the process of interpretation to be wide 
open’.117 The interpreter of the enacted provision has to start off with the assumption 
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113 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 119. A good illustration of teleological 
interpretation can be seen  in Matiso v Commanding officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4) 
SA 592 (SE), at para 46, where Sachs J explains the teleological approach as follows: ‘The 
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that the provision has a purpose (or ratio legis) that will surface in the course of 
interpretation. In so doing, the interpreter attributes meaning to a provision. It is 
submitted that this purpose has to be taken seriously and would effectually be 
realized in giving effect to the ‘intention of the legislature’ as it were. The ratio legis 
that emerges as interpretation proceeds, can eventually be developed into a response 
to the contingencies of an actual or hypothetical concrete situation.118 As discussed 
under the heading ‘Systematic Interpretation’, the merged effect of the systematic 
interpretation together with teleological or purposive interpretation reveals how the 
process of interpretation and application emerges as the ratio legis.119 
From his analysis of the decision in African Christian Democratic Party v the 
Electoral Commission and Others,120 Wessel Le Roux sets out the guidelines for 
teleological interpretation, as follows: 
‘(a) establish, through recognized procedures of interpretation, the 
central purpose of the provision in question; 
(b) establish whether the purpose would be obstructed by a literal 
interpretation of the provision, and if so 
(c) opt rather for an alternative interpretation of the provision that 
‘understands’ or promotes its central purpose; 
(d)  ensure that the purposive reading of the constitutional provision also 
promotes the object, purport and spirit of the Bill of Rights.’121 
 
The interpretation of the Constitution in the afore-mentioned manner, is another way 
of saying that the Constitution ought to be interpreted – mindful of the time-frame in 
                                                            
118 Du Plessis ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Canons of and Aids to Statutory Interpretations’ 
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respect of which it has bearing.122 This characterization is also a general way of 
restating the mischief rule.123 According to the mischief rule as set out in Hleka v 
Johannesburg City Council,124 what is evident is that the purpose of interpretation is 
to suppress the mischief and to promote the remedy designed for it’s elimination.125 
The logic that underlies the mischief rule has also found relevance in constitutional 
interpretation, and basically sees ‘the previous constitutional system’ of the country 
as the mischief to be remedied by the operation of the new Constitution. In terms of 
this reasoning, the Constitution is regarded as a ‘remedial measure that must be 
construed generously in favour of redressing the mischief of the past and advancing 
its own objectives for the present and the future’.126  Teleological interpretation is 
therefore described as a ‘forward-looking interpretation based on what can be learnt 
from past experiences’.127 
3.6.4 Historical Interpretation 
Historical interpretation refers to the use of the ‘historical context’ of legislation.128 
Such historical context includes factors such as circumstances which gave rise to the 
adoption of legislation (mischief rule) and the legislative history (prior to legislation 
and preceding discussions).129 Du Plessis qualifies this further in providing that 
precepts pertaining to the genesis and demise (i.e. the arrangements regarding the 
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historical classification) of statute law are all part of what can be used in historical 
interpretation.130 According to Von Savigny, historical interpretation requires the 
interpreter to enter ‘into and identify’ with the historical situation from which a law 
emerged. The ‘spirit of this history’ is regarded as being more significant than the 
‘historical facts’ – particularly in respect of ascertaining the ratio legis.131 
There is merit in the argument that teleological interpretation without a historical 
foundation, is, in fact, ‘empty’.132 While some authors have preferred the use of the 
word ‘empty’, it is submitted that it is more accurate to describe a teleological 
evaluation without a historical analysis, as being incomplete.133 Nevertheless, this 
thinking has not always been favourably received. While the Constitutional Court in 
S v Makwanyane and Another134 allowed the clear, undisputed and relevant reports of 
a technical committee (which advised the drafters of the Interim Constitution) as 
evidence of why no specific reference to capital punishment was included in the 
Interim Constitution, the High Court in De Klerk and Another v Du Plessis,135 
rejected the drafting history of the Interim Constitution on the basis that it was 
irrelevant to its interpretation. 
De Vos is also critical that when considering the recent history of South Africa’s 
transition (from apartheid to constitutional democracy), one must avoid an 
‘exclusivity’ that results in an overtly narrow reading of the Constitution.136  What is 
therefore clear, is that while this particular component of interpretation is important, 
it cannot be used exclusively,137 or decisively,138 on its own. 
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3.6.5 Comparative Interpretation 
 
In examining the classical Von Savigny model, it is evident that Von Savigny did not 
include comparative interpretation as one of the methods of legal interpretation. 
However, in South Africa, comparative interpretation has been mandated as part and 
parcel of the process of constitutional interpretation.139 
A closer inspection of section 39(1) provides that: 
 
‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum ... 
must consider international law and may consider foreign law,’140 
and confirms that the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole are located in 
what is referred to as a ‘transnational constitutional reality’,141 which basically assists 
in determining the meaning of the provision in a local or domestic reality.142 An 
illustration of such a ‘transnational evaluation’ is seen in the case of S v Makwanyane 
and Another,143 when the court – in considering the constitutionality of capital 
punishment – had to heed the significance of such transnational sources.144 In 
considering the role of international and foreign law in constitutional interpretation, 
Chaskalson P laid down the following guidelines: 
 
‘The international and foreign authorities are of value because they analyse 
arguments for and against the death sentence and show how courts of other 
jurisdictions have dealt with this vexed issue.’145 
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Further to this, he maintains: 
 
‘In dealing with comparative law we are required to construe the South 
African Constitution, and not an international instrument or the Constitution 
of some foreign country, and this has to be done with due regard to our legal 
system, our history and circumstances, and the structure and language of our 
own Constitution ... We can derive assistance from public international law 
and foreign case-law, but we are in no way bound to follow it.’146 
 
The stance maintained by the court in Makwanyane, that in the interpretation of the 
Constitution the structure and language or transnational authorities must be relied on 
with regard to the uniqueness of our Constitution, our history and circumstances have 
been adopted and reflected in subsequent case-law.147 A notable flaw in Chaskalson 
P’s assertion, that even though assistance may be derived from both international and 
foreign law, a court is in no way bound to follow such law, reveals the critical 
distinction between foreign law and international law – that foreign law may be 
considered and that international law must be considered, and in practice appears to 
be ignored for purposes of constitutional interpretation.148 The influence of 
international and foreign authorities will be discussed fully in Chapter 6. 
3.7 Some Points to Consider in the Implementation of the Adapted 
Von Savignian Model as Presented Above 
 
3.7.1 The Von Savignian Model that is adapted by Du Plessis – encourages and 
pre-supposes reliance on a multiple strategy of interpretation. It recognizes 
the grammatical, contextual, purposive and historical modes of 
interpretation, as being equally significant. In effect the strategy that 
emerges is an eclectic one. 
In the process of interpretation, the grammatical, systematic, teleological, 
historical and comparative considerations must be weighed against one 
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another to decide on an outcome without, however, attributing a superior 
status to any of these considerations. While no reading strategy or particular 
mode of interpretation can ensure a ‘ready-made’ answer, what the 
classification as outlined above, provides the interpreter with, is a more 
complete or ‘fuller reading’ of a provision. 
3.7.2 Another argument in support of the systematization of the canons and aids 
to construction in accordance with the Von Savigny Quartet, is that the 
proposed model has stood the test of time in that it is historically credible 
and legitimate. 
Because the Von Savignian model accommodates existing common law 
canons of construction, it quite easily forges links in the areas of statutory 
and constitutional interpretation. 
3.7.3 The proposed systematization also serves a classificatory function. The 
practical significance of this can be appreciated by those teaching as well as 
being involved in the day-to-day construction of statutes and the 
Constitution. 
3.7.4 The proposed classification also emphasizes the similarities between 
statutory and constitutional interpretation – clearly indicating that they can 
be used to invoke similar reading strategies. This means that statutory 
interpretation can benefit from developments in constitutional 
interpretation.149 
In terms of the application of the five ‘techniques’ or ‘reading strategies’ outlined in 
the discussion on the canon-guided reading strategies above, even though they were 
initially intended to apply to constitutional interpretation, their relevance and 
application with regard to ordinary statutory interpretation is apparent.150 Botha 
describes this mode of interpretation as a practical, inclusive method of 
interpretation. He submits that the components of a practical methodology are 
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‘complementary and interrelated’, and ‘should be applied in conjunction with one 
another.151 
With a transformative Constitution, it is expected of judges when interpreting it – to 
be mindful of what the Constitution seeks to achieve. In the South African context 
therefore, judges have to consider South Africa’s unique history and to understand 
that the Constitution was drafted to ensure that the atrocities of apartheid are never 
repeated.152 Judges are therefore required to give due consideration to the social, 
economic and political context within which the Constitution operates, before 
proceeding to give an interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution.153 The duty 
to fulfill socio-economic rights requires the state to adopt appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures. With regard to 
the implementation of the duties imposed by socio-economic rights, the state must 
not only act affirmatively to realise these rights, but there is also the requirement that 
the state must act reasonably to meet its obligations.154 As a result thereof, the 
Constitutional Court has used a reasonable standard of scrutiny which has been 
applied in the cases of Soobramoney,155 Grootboom,156 Treatment Action 
Campaign,157 Khosa158 and Mazibuko.159 From an examination of the courts 
reasoning and analysis with regard to case-law, what is evident is that the 
Constitutional Court has not been explicit about which factors determine the 
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interpretation reflected in the above case-law, illustrates a value-based methodology, 
which includes the balancing, harmonization and prioritization, the Constitutional 
Court has not ‘developed a clear and unambiguous justification to the interpretation 
of the Constitution.’161 
Notwithstanding that the courts have applied the teleological, the purposive and the 
contextual theories of interpretation,162 it is submitted that none of the theories seem 
to offer an in-depth analysis of the statutory provision, as does the proposed deontic 
theory. The deontic theory of interpretation – which requires a judge to reflect on the 
ethical and moral legal reasoning, goes beyond merely placing the right in its context 
and conducting a value-based enquiry. It requires a careful consideration of all of the 
factors that determine the strictness of scrutiny that have to be considered to achieve 
social economic and social justice. In order to give effect to the considerations 
outlined, the proposed deontic theory for interpretation would operate in accordance 
with an eclectic methodology, that would be applied pro-actively.163  As illustrated, 
the modus operandi would require an amalgamation of the literal meaning, an 
examination of the context, ascertaining the purpose of the legislation, and testing all 
of the above against the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution. An 
eclectic methodology or the modus operandi for the operation of the proposed 
                                                                                                                                                                        
housing programme to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed section 26 (1) 
which guarantees everyone the right of access to adequate housing. The Constitutional Court 
granted the order. In the Treatment Action Campaign (No 2), the respondent applied for an 
order declaring the state’s mother to child transmission (MTCT) of HIV at birth prevention 
programme to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed section 27 (1) which 
guarantees everyone the right of access to health services. The Constitutional Court granted 
the order. In Khosa, the applicant applied for an order declaring sections of the Social 
Assistance Act, which excluded permanent residents from access to social grants, to be 
unconstitutional on the grounds that they infringed section 27 (1) (cc) which guarantees the 
right of everyone to have access to social security. The Constitutional Court granted the 
order. In Mazibuko, the applicant applied for an order declaring the City of Johannesburg’s 
free water policy which provided each household with 6 kilolitres of free water per month to 
be unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed section 27 (1) (b) which guarantees 
everyone the right of access to sufficient water. The Constitutional Court refused to grant the 
order.  
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deontic theory of interpretation, compares favourably with the practically inclusive 
method of interpretation164 discussed above.   
3.8  The Principles that Underlie Constitutional Interpretation 
 
A comparison between statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation 
yields some interesting results as will be explained in the discussion that follows. 
While the examination has indicated obvious overlaps between ordinary statutory 
interpretation and constitutional interpretation, it is maintained that the Constitution 
is not an ‘ordinary’ statute.165 As a result, it warrants special consideration. What 
emerges is that as ‘an exceptional form of statute’, special rules and techniques of 
construction must apply when interpreting the Constitution.166  In a comparative 
study between ordinary statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation, it 
was revealed that the following principles of statutory interpretation must apply to 
constitutional interpretation: 
1) Every word must be given its true and legitimate meaning and in construction 
it is improper to omit any word which has a reasonable and proper place in it, 
or to refrain from giving effect to it meaning.  
2) That words should not be taken out of their context in the construction of 
Constitutions, as is also the position with statutes. 
However, what is apparent, is that unlike ordinary statutes, most of the rights as 
contained in the Constitution – and in particular Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights – are 
couched in broad and open-ended language, which may even be described as abstract 
language. Dworkin provides that: 
 
‘because the Bill of Rights consists of broad and abstract principles of 
political morality, (the) ... correct application of these principles depends on 
moral sense, not linguistic rules’.167 
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This submission is particularly relevant when determining the principles that ought to 
apply to constitutional interpretation. While the normal rules or principles of 
construction with regard to statutory interpretation would apply, they have to be 
employed in a ‘more flexible, imaginative and subtle way’168 in constitutional 
interpretation. It is not without justification that in its interpretation and application 
with regard to the rights in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, special rules have 
evolved with regard to constitutional interpretation. The transformative nature of the 
Constitution has resulted in a new jurisprudence which requires a new methodology 
for the process of interpretation. section 39(2) of the Constitution – which clearly 
mandates a value-based methodology – has been largely instrumental in determining 
what these rules ought to be. With a transformative Constitution therefore, the role of 
the judge needs to be more nuanced. In order to achieve social, economic and 
political justice, these rules and principles must embody moral and ethical 
considerations and obligations inherent in deontic reasoning. The proposed deontic 
theory for interpretation, which embraces such elements and requires a pro-active 
approach by the courts to the process of interpretation,169 is suggested as a model for 
both constitutional interpretation and ordinary statutory interpretation. 
 
3.8.1 A Constitution must be interpreted Broadly and Liberally170 
In examining section 39(2) – which provides that one ought to ‘promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’171 – it is evident is that the section clearly 
illustrates a decisive shift away from the literal theory. 
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It is however submitted that ‘purposivism’ should not be accepted as a general theory 
of interpretation172 in the place of literalism – because the acceptance of purposivism 
as a general theory may result in certain critically important values and principles not 
being given due consideration in the process of interpretation. The words ‘spirit’, 
‘purport’ and ‘objects’ indicate that the method of interpretation extends beyond a 
mere purposive approach.173 What is therefore required, is a value-activating 
interpretation, which is reflective of the teleological theory involving deontic 
reasoning over and above inductive and deductive reasoning. Nevertheless, it is 
questionable whether the teleological theory operating on its own is capable of 
achieving the goals of social transformation. The research undertaken seems to 
suggest otherwise. In order to be able to effectively protect fundamental rights such 
as life, liberty and property and to promote a ‘liberal spirit’174 – requires an 
amalgamation of methodologies. Such an amalgamation of methodologies resulting 
in the eclectic methodology that characterizes the proposed deontic theory for 
interpretation. 
3.8.2 Context and the Importance of Language175 
 
Language alone cannot be used to determine the interpretation and application of a 
provision in a supreme Constitution having a Bill of Rights. A Constitution has to be 
always interpreted within a context, or more specifically ‘in accordance with its 
semantic and jurisprudential context,176 Support for this view is reflected in S v 
Zuma:177 
 
‘Respect must be paid to the language which has been used and to the 
traditions and usages which gave meaning to the language.’ 
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This language, particularly with regard to the Constitution, is generally framed in a 
broad and open-ended manner, which raises the question of the clarity of language. 
 
According to Du Plessis, clear and unambiguous language is a fiction. It quite simply 
does not exist.  His submission that the language of a statute can ... only be said to be 
clear once its meaning is ascertained from its intra and extra-textual structure,178 
reinforces the idea that the interpretation of the language requires an examination of 
the contextual setting. This was the pertinent issue in S v Mhlungu,179 where the 
minority judgment (as per Kentridge J) maintained that when the meaning of the 
language was clear, the adoption of alternative meaning when considering the broad 
context of the Constitution placed a strain on the words. The majority judgment (as 
per Mahomed DP) reflected such interpretation. In its analysis, the Constitutional 
Court reasoned that if the clear, literal meaning of language gave rise to an 
acceptable and unjust anomaly, and consequently an alternative interpretive 
interpretation, was more in-keeping with the values of the Constitution – should be 
adopted.180 This is holistic interpretation. 
 
What is obvious from an examination of this case, therefore, is that while the 
minority regarded the clarity of the language as determinant of the correct meaning, 
the majority held the view that the language in effect is but ‘one’ of the factors that 
has to be considered in the process of interpretation.181 It is submitted that the 
reasoning underpinning the majority judgment in Mhlungu compares favourably with 
an eclectic methodology, as propounded. In giving expression to section 39 (2) of the 
Constitution which requires the ‘promotion of the values of the Constitution’, it is 
imperative that courts promote the values and principles that inform the thirteen 
chapters of the Constitution.’182  Bishop and Brickhill describe the process as a 
‘Herculean task’ which our Constitutional Court has struggled with.  In analyzing 
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five constitutional court judgments namely South African Police Service v Public 
Servants Association,183 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others,184 Bertie Van Zyl (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security,185 African National Congress v Chief Electoral 
Officer of the Independent Electoral Commission186 and Van Vuren v Minister of 
Correctional Services,187 They are critical about the approach to statutory 
interpretation adopted by each of the courts.  While the decision in respect of each of 
the above mentioned cases, is clearly indicative of a more purposive approach, the 
authors express their disapproval with the position expounded by the courts which in 
their opinion ‘leans too far away from the text’188.  In fact the authors go so far as to 
assert that when construing the relevant statutory provisions the Constitutional Court 
should have applied a more ‘textually plausible interpretation’.189   
It is submitted that consideration of the text or language is only partly instrumental in 
assigning a meaning to a provision.  The language or the text must be considered 
with regard to the statute in its entirety – which includes the surrounding 
circumstances and the universal values of justice and fairness.  This idea resonates 
with the proposed deontic theory of interpretation which identifies the literal or text-
based approach as being but only one element in the process of interpretation. A 
purposive or contextual interpretation with its consideration of the constitutional 
framework which is specifically mandated by section 39 (2) of the Constitution, is 
better suited to meet the constitutional aims of a transformative constitution. Such a 
‘holistic’ consideration of the factors that entails an evaluation of the text, an 
examination of the context of the legislative framework, with a focus on morality and 
ethics comprise the elements of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation.  The 












188   Bishop and Brickhill ‘In the Beginning was the Word: The Role of the Text in the 
Interpretation of Statutes’ (2012) 129 South African Law Journal at 701. 
 
189   Ibid at 694. 
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place more emphasis on the language of the text is a return to ‘arid literalism’190 
which is associated with the literal theory, and cannot be supported as it does not 
conform with the process of interpretation that is mandated by section 39 (2) of the 
Constitution.  It is the antithesis of the proposed deontic theory necessary for a 
transformative constitutional order. 
 
3.8.3 Legislative History and Background191 
 
Legislative history has been found to be used extensively in countries like the United 
States, France and Germany. The travaux preporatoires, as they are referred to, are 
also used extensively for the interpretation of international treaties. In countries such 
as Germany, Canada, India and the United States, as well as the European Court of 
Human Rights and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, it has been 
observed that legislative history can also be consulted as an aid to interpretation as 
far as the Constitution is concerned.192 
A good illustration of a court having regard to the history and background to 
determine the interpretation of the Constitution, is in S v Makwanyane.193 
The court stated that: 
 
‘The multi-party negotiating process was advised by technical committees, 
and the reports of these committees or the drafts are the equivalent of the 
travaux preparatoires, relied upon by the international tribunals. Such 
background materials can provide a context for the interpretation of the 
Constitution, and where it serves that purpose, I can see no reason why such 
evidence should be excluded. The precise nature of the evidence, and the 
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The court then referred to certain background materials which included the reports of 
various Technical Committees. Provided they were clear and not in dispute, the 
reports were used to show why particular provisions were either included or 
excluded in the interim Constitution. In Makwanyane, the materials were used to 
show that – by deliberately allowing the right to life as provided for in terms of the 
Constitution as, unqualified – those instrumental in drafting the Constitution intended 
to leave the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty up to the 
Constitutional Court to decide upon.195 Yet another controversial decision, where the 
court had to give due consideration to the historical context and background, was that 
in the Soobramoney case.196 The case highlighted that in interpreting the provisions 
of the Constitution, the court had to have an ‘acute awareness’197 of what factors 
prevailed. Therefore, a consideration of the factors which included, for example, 
unemployment, inadequate social security and access to clean water and health 
services,198 was essential to the interpretation of the right to health care as provided 
for in terms of the Constitution. 
 
The idea of placing a right in its context by giving due consideration to the factors 
that prevailed prior to the Constitution, is fundamental in interpretation of a 
transformative Constitution. It also speaks directly to the role of judges in the process 
of interpretation in the current constitutional era. In order to achieve the aims of 
social transformation and to ‘address the needs of the most vulnerable and 
marginalized’199 would require an evaluation of all the ethical and moral 
considerations and a pro-active stance to the process of interpretation when 
deliberating – as was evidenced in both Makwanyane and Soobramoney. This is the 
operation of a proposed deontic theory of interpretation, which has relevance to both 
statutory and constitutional interpretation. This theory is also holistic in nature, 
where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.  Holism as a philosophy has a 
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peculiarly South African connection, having been expounded by South Africa’s 
philosopher statesman JC Smuts in his book on the subject.200  
 
3.8.4 Interpretation Favouring the Liberty of the Individual201 
 
Generally, the approach adopted by the courts in instances of ambiguity in the 
interpretation of a provision, where the fundamental rights of the individual are at 
stake, is that a  provision must be interpreted in a manner that favours the liberty of 
the individual. This is the well known maxim known as in favorem libertatis.202 
Further, where there is a vagueness and flexibility of language, the courts were able 
to employ greater creativity in the interpretation process. It is therefore interesting 
that even in relatively early jurisprudence, as reflected in the judgment of Bhyat v 
Commissioner for Immigration,203 the approach of the Court was that – apart from 
absurdity, repugnancy, anomaly and inconsistency which are the normal 
circumstances that would yield an interpretation more favourable to the individual – 
hardship was also to be considered as factor to be considered. However, it is 
unfortunate that, in spite of this, our courts in the past under the old order have used 
this particular criterion as a determining factor with notable reluctance, when an 
individual’s fundamental rights were brought into question. 
Nevertheless, as a result of section 39(2) which mandates a value-coherent method of 
interpretation when individual rights are involved,204 it is clear that the maxim in 
                                                            
200   General Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950) the fourth Prime Minister of South Africa and a 
British Commonwealth military leader, statesman and philosopher in his book Holism and 
Evolution (1926) described ‘holism’ as: ‘The tendency in nature to form wholes that are 
greater than the sum of the parts through creative evolution.  This factor called “holism” in 
the sequel underlies the systematic tendency in the universe, and is the principle which makes 
for the origin and progress of “wholes” in the universe…this whole-making or holistic 
tendency is fundamental in nature, that it has a well-marked ascertainable character and that 
Evolution is nothing but the gradual development of progressive series of wholes, stretching 
from inorganic beginnings to the highest levels of spiritual creation.’ 
 
201 See Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights at 612, where the principle 
‘Ambiguity and the in favorem libertatis principle’ is discussed. This has been modified to 




203 1932 AD 125 at 129. 
 
204 Section 39 (2) provides that :  
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favorem libertatis would automatically apply. It is observed that even though quite 
early in our jurisprudence there was an attempt by courts to delineate and 
determinate what factors were significant and therefore required to be considered 
where an individual’s fundamental rights were at stake, this is no longer necessary. 
An examination of the provisions of the Bill of Rights clearly supports interpretation 
in favorem libertatis. 
However, it has to be mentioned that the rights and individual’s liberties, as provided 
in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, are subject to section 36 – the limitation clause. In 
terms of section 36 (1), ‘rights must be limited only in terms of the law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all the relevant factors, including the: 
a) The nature of the right; 
b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) The nature and extent of the limitation; 
d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e) The less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’205 
 
What this in effect means, is that in order to determine whether there has been a 
violation of a provision of the Bill of Rights, both the section which encapsulates the 
fundamental right and section 36, must be examined together. The process therefore 
ensures that in its application – which involves a ‘judicious weighting up of 
competing societal and ethical values’206 – confirms that the maxim in favorem 
libertatis would be applied in a manner so as to ensure that the rights of the 
individual would not be compromised. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 ‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.’ 
 
205 Section 36 of the Constitution deals with the limitation of rights and is referred to as the 
Limitation Clause. 
 




3.8.5 Reading-down Interpretation In Conformity with the 
Constitution207 
  
Devenish describes the process which requires reading-down as a process of 
interpretation conforming with the Constitution, as constituting a ‘presumption of 
constitutionality’. This presumption arises where a rigid Constitution makes 
provision for a bill or draft legislation to be scrutinized by a particular statutory body 
in order to determine its legal compatibility with the Constitution.208 What this means 
in a constitutional dispensation involving a testing right, is that courts of law will not 
lightly invalidate an Act of parliament, but instead attempt to interpret a provision in 
a way that is compatible with the Constitution.209 
According to Hogg,210 in terms of Canadian constitutional law there are three 
consequences of the presumption of constitutionality: 
(i) In choosing competing, plausible characteristics of the law, the court 
should normally choose that one which would support the validity of 
the law; 
(ii) A finding of fact need not be strictly proved by the government, it is 
sufficient that there should be a rational basis for the finding; and 
(iii) Where the language of a statute is equally capable of two 
constructions, one of which would be in conflict with the 
Constitution and the other compatible with it, the latter should be 
preferred. This interpretational technique is known as reading-down. 
The processes – as articulated by Hogg – clearly comprises the reading-down as 
interpreting in conformity with the Constitution, explained above.211 
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To re-iterate the position in terms of current South African law, where one of two 
conflicting interpretations of a statutory provision clearly promotes the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights – then that particular one is preferred over the one 
that does not do so.212 Because the Constitution is a value-laden document, it means 
that the values ‘must be promoted and nurtured and applied’.213 The promotion and 
implementation of a rights culture in South Africa, is without a doubt a ‘crucial 
constitutional function of the judiciary’.214 Reading-down or interpretation in 
conformity with the Constitution, which requires that all laws must be seen through 
the prism of the Bill of Rights, is consistent with deontic reasoning215 and favours the 
operation of the proposed deontic theory. It is not surprising, therefore, that in terms 
of both the Interim and the Final Constitution, the reading-down interpretation in 
conformity with the Constitution is regarded as a fundamentally important technique 
of interpretation. 
 
3.8.6 Value-Based Interpretation216 
 
As already discussed in this and other chapters in this thesis, an examination of 
section 39 reveals that the methodology of interpretation mandated by this section is 
a purposive or value-based method of interpretation.217 As the supreme law of the 
land, the Constitution does not only contain provisions that ensure inter alia formal 
checks and balances on state power, but first and foremost, it is a value-laden 
document. It is underpinned by a number of either express or implied values and 
norms.218 
                                                            
212 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-139. 
 
213 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 200. 
 
214 Ibid at 201. 
 
215 See Chapter 1 for a definition of the terms and a discussion of the origins of Deontology and 
Deontic Reasoning. 
 
216 A value-based methodology is pivotal to the operation of the teleological theory of 
interpretation. See discussion at 2.5 and 2.5.1 in Chapter 2, for an examination of the merits 
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In reflecting on the role of judges, Dworkin asserts that judges are bound when 
delivering judgment to adjudicate in accordance with the principles derived from 
political morality, that are ‘presupposed by the laws and institutions of the 
community’.219 He therefore argues that the only ‘acceptable grounds’ are the 
‘principles embedded in the body of settled law’.220 He explains further that when 
interpreting the provisions of a statute, the statute has to be ‘read against a 
background of common-law principles’.221 The South African Constitution with its 
justifiable Bill of Rights and the underlying values and principles can indeed be 
regarded as providing this background standard, referred to above. 
This position is affirmed in Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd,222 where the Court – 
in referring to the interpretation clause of the Constitution – maintained that it is: 
 
‘not merely an interpretive directive, but a force that informs all legal 
institutions and decisions with the new power of constitutional values’. 
 
These constitutional values and principles do not only provide the ideals and goals to 
which South African society aspires, but they form the articulated set of guidelines or 
the ‘yard stick against which everything is viewed and reviewed’.223 It therefore 
raises the question about how to give effect to the ‘values’ of the Constitution – 
particularly in a diverse society like South Africa, which has a history of oppression, 
racism, sexism and discrimination. Tully’s succinct response to the problem is clear 
– ‘to continue to inform the language of constitutionalism in which the demands are 
taken up and adjudicated’.224 In a transformative Constitution, therefore, judges need 
to embrace this challenge through interpretive discourse, in order to speak for the 
weak and marginalized groups in South Africa. While the constitutional processes 
exist, the ‘new’ challenge for constitutional interpretation is not only to give effect to 
the fundamental constitutional values, but to meet the demands for social 
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transformation.225 What is needed is a theory of interpretation that requires one to 
look beyond the fundamental constitutional values, in order to meet this challenge. It 
is submitted that the proposed deontic theory which requires an evaluation of ethical 
and moral considerations including the need for social and economic equality in the 
interpretation and the pro-active application of the law, is postulated as the theory 
that would be most suited to meet the ‘new’ challenge in a democratic era.  
3.9 The Interpretation and Application of Section 39226 
 
The ambit of section 39 is not restricted to the interpretation of Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution but applies to all law.227 The use of both international law and foreign 
law is ‘inevitable and sanctioned.’228 In respect of the process of interpretation, 
therefore, reference to both international and foreign authorities is necessary. The 
reference to sources outside of South Africa should be regarded as beneficial for the 
development of South African law, and should undoubtedly influence our emerging 
jurisprudence.  
Nevertheless, while the obvious benefits or advantages of referring to international 
and foreign law is apparent in case-law,229 it must be been emphasized that such 
comparison has to be done ‘with due regard to the uniqueness of our Constitution, 
our history and our circumstances’.230 This sentiment is also shared by scholars that 
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226 Section 39 of the Constitution provides:- 
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while American jurisprudence, for example, can prove to be beneficial and 
interesting, one has to be aware that the circumstances in South Africa and the 
United States of America differ considerably, and one should be mindful of this if 
such a comparison has to be made.231 
Section 39(2) also deals with the interpretation of legislation other than the Bill of 
Rights. An examination of the contents of the section reveals that it does expressly 
prescribe a purposive or a teleological method of interpretation. Therefore, the fact 
that this section requires that all courts, tribunals or forums must fulfill the aim and 
purpose of legislation in light of the Bill of Rights, and therefore ‘authorises a 
departure from literalism in the interpretation of law.232 This section allows for courts 
to abandon their stale, positivist style of interpretation and employ a ‘value-
orientated method of interpretation’.233 A case that is worth reflecting on in respect 
of this, is Jacob Zuma v The National Director of Public Prosecutions.234 
Nicholson J’s judgment, is fraught with inconsistencies, incongruities and 
controversy. While the judgment raises a plethora of political and legal issues, it is 
not the intention of the writer to venture into a political discourse – but rather to use 
an analysis of the approach adopted to statutory interpretation which influenced the 
court’s decision.235 In considering the relevant provisions, namely section 22(2) (c) 
of the National Prosecuting Authority Act,236  Nicholson J found that it was 
necessary to focus on the ‘intention of the legislature’ (para 76 and para 77). What is 
obvious from these paragraphs of the judgment, is that Nicholson J adopts an 
unmistakable literal analysis of the legislation in question. Unfortunately, the 
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approach of the judge to interpretation reflects a literal theory of interpretation which 
is not only jurisprudentially unsound, but also inherently flawed.237 
Nevertheless, while the judge’s approach in respect of para 76 and para 77 has been 
criticized on the basis that it reflects a qualified contextual approach, a more careful 
analysis of the judgment of Nicholson J reveals an ambivalence on the part of the 
judge as he also supports a purposive or an unqualified contextual approach to 
interpretation.238 In referring to section 39, a value-orientated method of 
interpretation is given expression to: 
 
‘If it is clear that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court must promote 
the values that underlie an open and democratic society that is based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom. The provision of the right to make 
representations to an accused would pay appropriate tribute to his right to 
human dignity, given the opprobrium that is normally attendant upon a 
criminal trial’. 
 
The approach employed in the above paragraph is clearly in keeping with that 
mandated by the Constitution. It is unclear, therefore, why the judge chose to also 
support the literal method of interpretation – in other parts of the judgment. The use 
of the literal theory in the Nicholson judgment is incorrect, on the basis that it gives 
credence to a discredited and archaic system. With the advent of the new 
constitutional democracy, South African jurisprudence made a paradigmatic shift 
away from a system based on parliamentary sovereignty, to a purposive or value-
based methodology of interpretation.239 Nevertheless, notwithstanding that a 
purposive or a teleological approach is mandated by the Constitution, what can be 
garnered from an examination of case-law240 is that there are still a number of recent 
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cases where courts have invoked the orthodox primary rule of interpretation – which 
reflects a literal theory of interpretation.241 
 
Because section 39(2) is a peremptory provision, it means that the section mandates 
or obliges the interpreter to promote the values and objects of the Bill of Rights.242 
As a result, the interpreter is required to consider factors outside the legislation. A 
consideration of the context is regarded as being an inevitable part of the process of 
interpretation. It enables the right in question to be put in perspective. The 
interpretation of statutes must always start with the Constitution and not with the 
legislative text.243 This position is affirmed by Ngcobo J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environment Affairs and Tourism – who declared that ‘the starting 
point in interpreting any legislation is the Constitution’.244  What is evident from an 
examination of case-law, is that South Africa’s history is regarded as being integral 
to the process of interpretation, since it provides the context for understanding the 
various provisions in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court therefore attempts to 
use South Africa’s history as a ‘grand narrative’ to justify its interpretations.245 In so 
doing, in applying a ‘forward-looking’ approach to interpretation, and giving effect 
to social transformation, the intention is to ‘prevent a recurrence of the injustices of 
the past’.246 Indeed, such an approach to interpretation is characteristic of a 
transformative constitution. 
3.10  An Examination of the Seminal Constitutional Court 
Cases that Illustrate the Emerging Jurisprudence of 
Transformation – Reflecting Deontic Interpretation 
Many of the cases that are discussed below are referred to in this chapter as well as 
others throughout the thesis.  They are expounded in greater detail below to show 
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that they reflect the emerging jurisprudence of transformation that supports a deontic 
theory of interpretation.   
In taking their directive from section 39 (2) – to ‘promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights,’ what is evident is that courts are mandated to interpret 
legislation to give effect to the values and norms that underlie a democratic 
constitutional order. While there is no exact meaning of what the phrase entails – the 
interpretation and application of section 39 (2) has seen our courts promote values 
such as democracy, independence, accountability, responsiveness and openness as 
well as a ‘myriad of other structural values that inform the Constitution.’ 247   
Taking its cue from the Canadian case – of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd that: 
‘The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter is to be 
ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be 
understood in other words, in the light of the interests it was meant to 
protect.  In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken and the purpose of the 
right or freedom in question is to be sought, by reference to the character and 
larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the 
specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, 
and where applicable to the meaning and purpose of the other rights and 
freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter.’248  
the landmark decision of S v Makwanyane and Another249 emulates this position.  
Mahomed J perceptively highlights the factors that ought to inform the process of 
statutory interpretation.  He asserts that: 
‘South African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is 
defensible and represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of, 
that part of the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and 
repressive and a vigorous identification of and commitment to a democratic, 
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universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos, expressly 
articulated in the Constitution.’250 
The notable shift in emphasis from a literal interpretation with its focus on the 
ordinary grammatical meaning of the word, to a more encompassing or teleological 
interpretation with due consideration of the wider context and purpose for the 
promulgation of legislation, has been favoured by our Constitutional Court for 
statutory and constitutional interpretation in the current open and democratic 
constitutional dispensation.  From the above dictum, it is emphasised that while 
literal or ordinary grammatical meaning must be taken into account, it is not 
necessarily conclusive.  The literal meaning is but one consideration – and it will 
only be accepted if it accords with a ‘purposive’ or ‘generous’ interpretation – that 
‘gives expression to the values of the Constitution.’251  In S v Mhlungu,252 which is 
perhaps one of the most controversial cases to have applied the generous or 
purposive approach to interpretation, the majority judgment (as per Mahomed) 
identifies the language as one of the factors in the process of interpretation.  This 
idea that language has to be considered collectively with other factors, which 
includes an amalgamation of the various methodologies of interpretation, finds 
resonance with an eclectic methodology which supports the operation of the 
proposed deontic theory of interpretation.   
In Investigating Directorate Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai 
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 
and Others253 the Constitutional Court had to consider whether section 29 (2) of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act254 – constituted a limitation to privacy – and to 
determine further whether the limitation is constitutionally justifiable in terms of the 
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provisions of section 36 (1) of the Constitution.  In his ground breaking judgment 
Langa DP, in reflecting on the proper approach to statutory interpretation as provided 
in terms of section 39 (2) states that: 
‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law 
and customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights,’ 
that all statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights.  In 
essence therefore all law making authority must be exercised in accordance with the 
Constitution.  The Constitution is located in history which involves a transition from 
a society based on division, injustice and exclusion – as such the process must 
recognise the context in which we find ourselves.255  In the process of interpretation 
therefore, regard has to be given to the foundational values that underpin the 
constitutional democracy.  Some of these values include – human dignity, the 
achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms, and non-
racialism and non-sexism.  What this in effect means in the process of interpretation 
is that in construing the relevant section 29 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 
that the search and seizure of property had to be carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution.256 
This position is affirmed by Ngcobo J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 257 who makes a resounding statement 
that interpretation starts with the Constitution.  The interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights has seen the cardinal values such as human dignity, equality and freedom 
being applied to specific situations.  Exemplary in this regard is the case of Bato Star 
which related to the allocation of quotas in the fishing industry.  The amount of fish 
that could be caught for commercial purposes was restricted by a quota system.  The 
relevant legislation that had to be interpreted was section 2 of the Marine Living 
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Resources Act258 - which provided that the Minister ‘must have regard to’, the 
objectives and principles as provided for in terms of the section when making 
allocations in terms of the Act.  The case therefore depended on the interpretation 
and application of the phrase ‘have regard to.’ The interpretation of the phrase by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal gave the words their ordinary grammatical meaning. This 
meant that the question of equity had to be considered with other factors as it was not 
necessarily of special concern.  The Constitutional Court however, maintained a 
contrary view point.  In applying a purposive methodology the question of 
interpretation required that equity should be considered as an overriding 
consideration – and not simply as an element in the process as was decided by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.  
Ngcobo J articulated his position as follows: - 
‘I accept that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “to have regard to” has in 
the past been construed by the Courts to mean “bear in mind” or “ do not 
overlook”.  However the meaning of that phrase must be determined by the 
context in which it occurs.  In this case that context is the statutory 
commitment to redressing the imbalances of the past, and more importantly, 
the constitutional commitment to the achievement of equality.  And this 
means that the phrase as it relates to section 2 must be construed purposively 
to “promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”.  That object 
is “the achievement of equality”, a foundational value that is affirmed in 
section 9 (2) of the Constitution.’ 
Such a purposive value-based methodology was also clearly evidenced in United 
Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa259  which 
concerned the constitutionality of four pieces of legislation described as a ‘package’ 
of legislation.260   In construing the relevant legislation, consideration was given to 
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the founding values of the Constitution – which are provided for in section 1. The 
Court therefore read the provisions of the legislation against the context of the 
Constitution – as a whole.  In giving effect to a contextual or purposive methodology 
– which is epitomised by section 39 (2), the approach that was adopted was that: 
‘A court must endeavour to give effect to all the provisions of the 
Constitution.  It would be extraordinary to conclude that a provision of the 
Constitution cannot be enforced because of an irreconcilable tension with 
another provision.  When there is tension, the courts must do their best to 
harmonise the relevant provisions, and give effect to all of them.’261     
The directive that section 39 (2) must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights – is slightly more nuanced in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) 
Ltd262.where the Constitutional Court took the approach that section 39 (2) requires 
an interpretation that ‘better’ promotes this spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights263. Therefore in the Agricultural Land Act264, which had to be construed, the 
Constitutional Court criticised the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal that a 
literal or textual reading was to be attributed to the Act.265 The notion of  the 
‘legislators intention’ which supports a literal methodology was also challenged on 
the basis that in trying to establish the ‘intention of the legislature’ the question that 
arises is for how long was it intended that the position would continue?  The enquiry 
therefore highlights the obvious flaws inherent in the literal theory.266  The position 
that was maintained was that statutory interpretation must be determined in the 
context of the statute which includes its purpose and must be read in its entirety,267 
which is reflective of teleological interpretation.  In light of this meaning, the 
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purpose of the Agricultural Land Act- included the authority accorded to the Minister 
to exercise the powers anticipated for future acquisition by a provincial government 
to assume responsibility for the administration of laws falling within the functional 
area of agriculture.268   Therefore as illustrated in the above mentioned case, the 
courts are required to adopt an interpretation that best promotes or advances the 
totality of the rights and values entrenched in the Bill of Rights. This is pro-active 
interpretation.    
In applying the principle that our courts must give expression to the values of human 
dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights there must be regard to far-
reaching consequences in the development and evolution of South African 
jurisprudence.  This has not been more prevalent than in the education sector which 
has resulted in a plethora of cases being decided by the Constitutional Court on an 
array of matters pertaining to education.  The resultant effect thereof has seen the 
interpretation, application and enforcement of rights being guided by the 
constitutional values and principles.  The Höerskool Ermelo269 case provides an 
example of the application of these principles.  The case dealt with the right to 
receive education in the official language of ones choice in a public educational 
system. The medium of instruction at the Höerskool Ermelo was Afrikaans. The 
main issue before court was whether the HoD may lawfully revoke the function of 
the governing body at a public school – to determine its language policy and to 
confer the function on an interim committee appointed by him.  The relevant 
legislation required the interpretation of section 22 and section 25 of the Schools Act. 
The approach and values of the High Court mirrored that of Minster of Education, 
Western Cape, and Others v Governing Body, Mikro Primary School and Another270, 
where the position of the Supreme Court of Appeal was that section 22 of the 
Schools Act entitled the HoD to revoke the school’s language policy and the power 
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revoke the power to determine the language policy and to confer the power to an 
interim committee271.  The Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the 
High Court and found that the HoD had no power whatsoever to revoke the 
competence of the school to determine the language policy.272  The decision of the 
Constitutional Court differed markedly from the lower courts.  In placing the right in 
its context, it was maintained that the right to education and to be educated in the 
language of one’s choice, was explicitly provided for in terms of section 29 (2) of the 
Constitution. In interpreting the Schools Act therefore it was necessary to place the 
right to education in its context. This required that one had to consider the broader 
constitutional scheme that education was to be made progressively available and 
accessible to everyone.273  In deciding what was fair in the circumstances, it was 
necessary to take heed of the South African legacy of apartheid and the inequalities 
and disparities in the education sector.274 It was therefore emphasised that a key 
consideration and one which should have been given more focus and emphasis was 
the ‘need to ensure that the stranded learners were provided with a school to 
attend.’275  The basis of the reasoning and analysis of the Constitutional Court was 
unmistakably a broad purposive or more accurately a teleological method of 
interpretation.  
The MEC for Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School,276 is a 
further illustration of teleological interpretation applied by the courts. A closer 
examination of what transpired requires consideration. According to the facts of the 
case, the Rivonia Primary School refused to admit a Grade 1 learner on the basis that 
it had reached its maximum capacity of 120 Grade 1 learners. The mother of the 
child, complained firstly to the Department of Education and thereafter to the MEC 
of the province. The Department overturned the refusal and instructed the principal 
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to admit the learner. In February 2011, when the mother brought the child back to 
school, they still refused to admit the child. What followed thereafter was a 
controversial sequence of events, to say the least. As a result of the principal not 
admitting the child, the HoD proceeded to withdraw the principal’s admission 
function, and delegated it to another it to another official. The officials from the 
Department, thereafter arrived at the school and physically placed the child in a 
Grade 1 classroom. The fate of the principal was that she was subjected to a 
disciplinary hearing, for a failure to comply, was given a final warning and had a 
month’s salary deducted.277 
The High Court was satisfied that the Department had acted fairly and reasonably. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal however, overturned the decision, on the basis that the 
Department did not have the legal power to override the school’s admission policy. 
On having lost in the SCA, the MEC appealed to the Constitutional Court – that had 
to decide on the contentious issue of how a conflict between the School’s Governing 
Body and the Provincial Education Department was to be resolved. 
The Constitutional Court held that although in terms of the Schools Act,278 the 
School Governing Body may determine the capacity of the school as an important 
part of it’s admission policy, the Department always had ultimate control over the 
implementation of this policy.279 Nevertheless, the manner in which the HoD had 
exercised his power was not procedurally fair. The court referred to the cases of 
Head of Department, Department of education Free State Province v Harmony High 
School and Another280 and Head of Department of Mpumalanga Department of 
Education and Another v Höerskool Ermelo281in this regard, where it was noted that 
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281 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) at para 56, the Constitutional Court clearly set out what was 
expected of the relevant role-players in terms of the Schools Act 84 of 1996, as follows: 
‘An overarching design of the Act is that public schools are run by three crucial partners. The 
national government is represented by the Minister of Education whose primary role is to set 
uniform norms and standards for public schools. The provincial government acts through the 
MEC for Education who bears the obligation to establish and provide public schools and 
together with the Head of Provincial Department of Education, exercises executive control 
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the ‘parties had failed to engage with each other in good faith to uphold principles of 
co-operative government, and comply with their concomitant duty to avoid 
litigation.’282 The Court referred to section 40(2) and section 41(h) (vi) of the 
Constitution, which basically highlights co-operation as being integral to resolving 
disputes of this nature. The respective sections provide that:- 
 ‘All spheres of government must observe and adhere to the principles of this 
Chapter’;  
 and 
 ‘All sphere of government…must co-operate in mutual trust and good faith 
by, avoiding legal proceedings…’ 
What is obvious from the above provisions, is that co-operation is pivotal in 
resolving disputes between school governing bodies and national or provincial 
government. Unfortunately, from the facts of the case, this did not materialize. This 
is clearly reflected in the following paragraph where it was asserted that : 
‘This case illustrates the damage that results when some functionaries fail to 
take general obligation to act in partnership and co-operation seriously. In 
the early stages of the tussle there was some engagement between the 
parties, albeit tense. The value of that engagement was demonstrated by the 
understanding between the school and the Department at the end of 
November 2010. 
By contrast, the manner in which the Gauteng HoD thereafter exercised his 
powers completely upended the process. The heavy-handed approach he 
used when making his decision raised the spectre that the Department would 
use its powers to deal with systematic capacity problems in the province 
with regard to the role of governing in the Schools Act’s carefully crafted 
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model. It caused antagonism and mistrust, causing the Rivonia Governing 
Body to recoil.’283 
What is apparent from the case is that all the relevant role players had to make a 
concerted effort by co-operation to resolve the matter.  Such co-operation is not only 
optional, but is in fact mandatory. Therefore, in giving effect to section 39(2) which 
mandates a value-based methodology, the approach of the Court is clearly 
teleological.  However, the stance adopted by the majority in the Constitutional 
Court as reflected in the above case as well as others discussed above may be 
described as being pro-active. In NK v Minister of Safety and Security284 where the 
applicant sought damages in delict from the Minister of Safety and Security on the 
basis that she was raped by three uniformed on-duty policemen, the Constitutional 
Court had to consider the scope of vicarious liability of the Minister of Safety and 
Security under the law.  The Constitutional Court focused on the mandate to develop 
the common law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  The 
Court referred to S v Thebus and Another285 where Moseneke J identified the need to 
develop the common law in at least two instances: 
‘The first would be when the rule of the common law is inconsistent with a 
constitutional provision.  Repugnancy of this kind would compel an 
adaptation of the common law top resolve the inconsistency.  The second 
possibility arises even when a rule of the common law is not inconsistent 
with a specific constitutional provision but may fall short of its spirit, purport 
and objects.  Then, the common law must be adapted so that it grows in 
harmony with the “objective normative value system” found in the 
Constitution.’286 
The Court further affirmed the persuasive normative effect of our Constitution that 
was acknowledged by the court in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and 
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Another287.  The Constitutional Court was unwavering in its assertion that the 
common law had to be infused with the values of the Constitution – and that such a 
‘normative influence of the Constitution – had to be felt throughout the common 
law.’288   This is clearly a methodology that transcends a teleological evaluation. In a 
transformative constitution like that in South Africa the overarching consideration is 
that the ‘spirit of transition and transformation should characterize the constitutional 
enterprise as a whole.’289 In a transformative constitutional order as is reflective of 
South Africa presently, the traditional or more commonly accepted theories of 
interpretation that have been used by South African courts, are not adequate to meet 
the challenges of an emerging democracy.  It is therefore submitted that a deontic 
theory of interpretation which is based on ethical and moral considerations and 
incorporates inductive and deductive reasoning and which is to be applied pro-
actively – is most appropriate in a transformative society.  The element of pro-
activism as is highlighted in the Constitutional Court’s approach above, is pivotal to 
the operation of the proposed deontic theory.      
3.11 Conclusion  
 
With its far-reaching consequences, the Constitution has to be regarded as being 
singularly the most important legal instrument in South African history. This has 
certain important consequences. 
First and foremost, a comparison between the Constitution and ordinary statutes, 
reveals a striking commonness or commonality.290  This does not, however, come as 
a surprise, since both ordinary statutes and the Constitution are enacted law texts, 
which means they actually belong to the same text genre(s). As a result, the logic that 
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follows is that the strategies and justifications for their interpretation will also have 
much in common. 291 
Nevertheless, as emphasized, statutes and the Constitution are ‘significantly and 
consequently different’ in certain respects, and this also applies to both statutory and 
constitutional interpretation.292 Due to its proclamation of supremacy (in terms of 
section 2), and the interpretation provision (section 39) clearly mandate the 
purposive or teleological method.  
In reflecting on what is needed in a transformative society, it is emphasized that the 
role of judges needs to more focused on facilitating social justice. It therefore begs 
the question – what theory of interpretation should underpin the process of 
interpretation? What is apparent from an examination of case-law, is that simply 
focusing on a particular theory of interpretation is inadequate. In a transformative 
Constitution, it is necessary to give effect to the combined operation of the theories 
and to amalgamate their respective methodologies to be able to fulfil the aims of 
social justice. It is for this reason that a deontic theory and reasoning through 
creative and pro-active interpretation with an eclectic methodology is proposed for 
both constitutional and statutory interpretation in South Africa.    
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THE RELEVANCE OF THE COMMON - LAW PRESUMPTIONS 
OF INTERPRETATION IN THE CURRENT DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL ERA IN SOUTH AFRICA* 
 
4.1     Introduction 
The focus of Chapter 4 is on an examination of the common-law presumptions of 
interpretation. The purpose in examining the presumptions of interpretation is: 
a)  to assess their significance prior to and subsequent to the current 
constitutional era in South Africa; and  
b) to determine if in their role as ‘verbalization of values vital to the sustenance 
of a just and effective legal order,’1 whether they will continue to contribute 
to the emerging jurisprudence in South Africa. 
 As principles of common-law, the presumptions encapsulate fundamental values and 
inherent principles of justice.  Prior to the new constitutional dispensation, the 
common-law presumptions were in effect a surrogate for the Bill of Rights.  The 
advent of a supreme Constitution has brought about a significant change to the 
perception and attitude of the traditional role of presumptions. 
                                                            
  * In terms of the University Rule DR 8 Submission of Thesis: Every student for a Doctoral 
degree shall be required to submit:- 
(i) a thesis embodying the results of their research, together with (ii) one (1) published 
paper or an unpublished manuscript that has been submitted to an accredited journal, 
arising from the doctoral research…’ 
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publication. The article in its published form appears as Singh ‘A Re-Evaluation of the 
Common-Law Presumptions of Interpretation in Light of the Constitution’ (2012) 75 
Journal on Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law at79-100. For this reason the similarities 
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In terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, there is a constitutional imperative to 
develop the common-law.  This sentiment resonates in the Constitutional Court 
decision of Carmichelle v Minister of Safety and Security, 2where there is an 
obligation on courts to develop the common-law. The Court goes so far as to assert 
that this obligation is mandated and necessary to ensure that the common-law is 
developed to bring it in line with constitutional values. A failure to do so would not 
only be contrary to the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, but could 
possibly contribute to the diminished status of presumptions and eventually also see 
the demise of very important principles of statutory interpretation. 
 
Since the inception of the new order, most common-law presumptions have been 
subsumed into the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Those that are not subsumed are 
complementary and must be developed in accordance with constitutional principles.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that the transformative constitutional era has revealed a 
new classification of presumptions. There are three subdivisions that comprise this 
categorization. These are presumptions that: 
 
(i) Have been (or seem to be) subsumed under the Constitution; 
(ii) Seem to be incompatible or inconsistent with the Constitution; and 
(iii) Seem to have been left unaffected by the Constitution.3 
 
In order to achieve the aims as outlined in this chapter, which is to assess the 
relevance of the common-law presumptions and their role in the constitutional era, it 
is neither necessary nor practical to examine all of the common-law presumptions 
that are used.4   For purposes of the research, the following presumptions – the state 
                                                            
2  2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) par 39: ‘It needs to be stressed that the obligation of Courts to develop 
the common law, in the context of the S 39 (2) objectives, is not purely discretionary. On the 
contrary, it is implicit in S 39 (2) read with S 173 that where the common law as it stands is 
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3 Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 153. The classification as presented by Du 
Plessis is not to be regarded as a rigid classification as presumptions may fulfill more than 
one value-regulative function. 
 
4  Among the host of commonly used presumptions are for example 1) The legislature does not 
intend to alter the existing law more than is necessary; 2) The legislature does not intend 
absurd or anomalous results; 3) The legislature intends to promote public good; 4) The 
presumption applies to general and not to particular instances. 
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is not bound by its own legislation, legislation does not oust or restrict the 
jurisdiction of the courts, statutes do not contain invalid or purposeless provisions, 
and the legislature does not intend that which is harsh, unjust or unreasonable – form 
the basis of the discussion set out below.  
The above-mentioned presumptions are discussed in seriatim, below. 
4.2 The State is Not Bound by its Own Legislation 
 
One of the reasons that this presumption is generally regarded as more contentious 
than most of the others, is that the prima facie– it appears to allow for ‘unbridled 
lawlessness by governmental agencies’.5 This is obviously a misconception about the 
understanding and the operation of the presumption. This is, in fact, created by the 
manner in which the presumption is worded, which is that ‘the state is not bound by 
statute’. The formulation of this presumption that the formula that ‘the state is not 
presumed to be bound’, is ‘highly problematic and misleading’ in that ‘it flies in the 
face of state liability’. It is therefore submitted that the presumption should not be 
applied in a purely mechanical way.6 
 
A closer analysis of the presumption, however, reveals that what the principle allows 
public officials who are responsible for carrying out their duties are not to be 
hampered or hindered in any way.  Hahlo and Khan explain that: 
 
‘An enactment does not apply to the state or its executive arm or to a 
provincial council, local authority or other public body from which it 
emanates.’7 
 
The above immediately begs the question then – what is meant by ‘state’? It applies 
to the executive which is tasked with the administrative functions of the state.8 In his 
illustration of examples of practical scenarios revealing instances when the 
presumption can be invoked, Botha notes that while the driver of a fire engine en 
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route to a fire may disregard a red traffic light9 and an agricultural official who 
combats stock diseases is not bound by statutory requirements regarding hunting 
permits,10 a security official on the other hand – who contravenes a statutory 
provision outside the scope of his duties – cannot invoke the presumption in his 
defence.11 
 
The circumstances expressed above are in keeping with Steyn’s viewpoint that the 
presumption applies to both original and subordinate legislation.12 Nevertheless, this 
view was criticised in Raats Röntgen and Vermeulen (Pty) Ltd v Administrator, 
Cape, and Others,13 where Van Deventer AJ expounded the view that ‘provisional 
administrations are bound by laws of Parliament’.14 This view is actually 
preferable.15 What is abundantly clear, therefore, is that whether or not the state is 
bound, is dependant not only on the legislation in question, but also on the particular 
circumstances or instances that have to be decided on in light of the prevailing 
legislation.16 The suggestion by Labuschagne that the state might be bound by one 
provision of the legislation but not by another, is echoed by Du Plessis – who 
submits that this is possible even if the binding and non-binding provisions appear in 
the same section of the Act.17 
 
In terms of the application of the presumption, it is interesting that Devenish explains 
that the presumption should involve a ‘teleological evaluation’. He maintains that a 
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Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 188, where the author drives the point that the 
fact that the legislative activities of the state prima facie relate to a relationship where the 
state is placed ‘as against’ its subjects and ‘not next’ to them.  It is therefore not based on a 




‘concatenation of factors’ are required to be present before the ‘presumption 
becomes operative’.18 Such a teleological evaluation is also highlighted by Du 
Plessis, who submits that the express or implied rebuttal of the presumption can be 
inferred not only from the language of the provision in question, but also from its 
nature, and, with a view to surrounding circumstances, its objects and 
consequences.19 
 
4.2.1  The Application of the Presumption 
 
It is interesting to note that even prior to the new constitutional dispensation, 
Wiechers suggested that the reversal of the wording of the presumption would more 
aptly reflect the optimal operation of the presumption.20 According to Wiechers, 
therefore, the position is more accurately reflected as follows: the state should always 
be bound by its own legislation, except in instances where it would be hampered or 
impeded in the execution of its governmental functions.21 Van Deventer AJ’s 
advocacy for Wiechers’ view is reflected in the judgment in the Raats Röntgen case22 
– where it was endorsed that: 
 
‘there is much to be said for Wiechers’ view ... that the presumption should 
be reversed and that the state should presumably be bound by all its laws 
                                                            
18  Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 202. 
 
19 Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 174. The presumption was relied on in several 
cases. The leading ones being Union Government v Tonkin 1918 AD 533; SAR & H v Smith 
Coasters (Prop) Ltd 1931 AD 113 and Evans v Schoeman 1949 (1) SA 571 (A). 
 
20  Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 202. 
 
21 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 139. ‘The presumption is first and foremost a 
functional means to the end of ensuring that the execution of the typical functions of 
government – in so far as they are aimed at enhancing the public good and welfare – is not 
unduly hampered.’ 
 
22 1991 (1) SA 827 (C). The Appellate Division listed the considerations to be taken into 
account when considering the application of the presumption which was summarized as 
follows at 262: ‘a) The court may take various factors into account in determining whether 
the presumption is excluded in a particular case, example the language of the enactment, the 
surrounding circumstances at the time when the statute was passed, the objects of the acts, 
the mischief it is aimed at preventing, the consequences if the state were exempted or bound 
(i.e. considerations of public policy) and other common-law presumptions. b) The mere fact 
that a statute was passed for the public benefit is not a sufficient consideration to conclude 
that the state was intended to be bound.  Before it can be held that the state is bound by an 
enactment (where it is not expressly provided for), it must be shown that if the state were not 




except those which, if the state were to obey them at all times, would 
impede the proper execution of its functions.’23 
 
The cases of S v De Bruin24 and R v De Beer25 are particularly relevant to the 
discussion and the understanding of the presumption. Devenish cites the case of S v 
De Bruin as an exemplary of a case where one could ‘justifiably’ invoke the 
presumption.26 In this case, the court had to construe the ambit of the speed 
regulations Act.27 It was maintained that speed regulations should not bind the state. 
As a result, the accused – De Bruin – a policeman who had contravened the speed 
limit because he was running late for an on-site inspection on the state’s behalf, was 
found not to be in contravention of the legislation in question. The court held that the 
relevant speed restrictions would have hampered the carrying out of his duties, and, 
on appeal, he had his conviction set aside. 
 
While the court in the case of S v De Bruin found in favour of the appellant, a 
policeman, the court in R v De Beer that had to consider the predicament of a 
postman who had disregarded the speed regulations – but did not arrive at the same 
outcome. It was felt that the circumstances did not ‘rationally justify’ the operation 
of the presumption, and therefore the court did not ‘exonerate’ the accused ‘from 
compliance with the provisions’.28 
 
4.2.2 The Relevance of the Presumption in the Current 
Constitutional Dispensation 
In reflecting on the classification propounded by Du Plessis,29 the question whether 
the presumption that the state is not bound by its own legislation, is compatible with 
                                                            
23  Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 203. 
 
24  1975 (3) SA 56 T. 
 
25  1929 TPD 104. 
 
26  See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 203 for a critique of the cases of De Bruin and De 
Beer. 
 
27  89 of 1970. 
 
28  Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 204. 
 




the Constitution arises. From an examination of the relevant sections of the 
Constitution, it is obvious that the presumption can no longer be justified. 
 
In terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution – which provides that the rules of 
common law have to be developed in light of the fundamental rights of the 
Constitution30 – the operation of this particular presumption would be problematic. 
In terms of section 2,31 the supremacy clause of the Constitution, it is expressly 
provided that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic. It is therefore 
required that the Constitution should be a yardstick against which all law and 
conduct must be measured. It is noted that government conduct is certainly not 
precluded from such scrutiny. Accountability by governmental organs is further 
endorsed by section 8, which provides that: 
 
‘The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.’32 
 
The logical conclusion emanating from the above provision is that accountability is 
mandatory. Botha therefore quite correctly states that it would be ‘illogical and 
absurd’ if government organs were bound by the Constitution but at the same time 
not be bound by their ‘own’ legislation, which he reasons, in any event, is 
subordinate to the Constitution.33 
 
In upholding the values of the current democratic order – which is based on 
freedom,34 equality35 and human dignity36 – it is maintained that it is imperative that 
in a transformative constitutional state or “Rechsstaat” as it is referred to, one should 
                                                            
30 Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides: ‘When interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ 
 
31 Section 2 provides: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’ 
 
32  (Emphasis Added). 
 
33  Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 92. 
 
34  Section 12 of the Constitution. 
 
35  Section 9 of the Constitution. 
 




be ‘heedful of the principle of legality’.37 The basic principle of legality and the 
presumption that the state is not bound by its own legislation, is ‘inherently 
incompatible’.38 
 
There is further support for this contention in the dictum of Fedsure Life Assurance 
Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council,39 where the 
Constitutional Court maintained: 
 
‘It seems central to the conception of our constitutional order that the 
Legislature and Executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle 
that they may exercise no power and perform no function beyond that 
conferred by law. At least in this sense, then, the principle of legality is 
implied within the terms of the interim Constitution.’ 
 
Even prior to the new constitutional dispensation, Wiechers was opposed to the 
application of the presumption as formulated in the common-law. His opposition was 
voiced about a decade ago and clearly reflected his ‘misgivings about the consistency 
of the presumption with the value of legality’.40 Wiechers points out further, that as 
with the rules of common-law, presumptions have always operated in tandem with 
existing legislation – to ensure adherence to the principle of legality.  
 
Giving due consideration to the fact that in practice, the state could be hampered in 
carrying out its functions if it were bound by legislation, Wiechers correctly 
suggested that the presumption should be applied ‘the other way round’.41 It is not 
surprising that – with the current ‘constitutional demand for accountability of the 
public administration’42 – Wiechers’ viewpoint has in fact been vindicated.43 As part 
                                                            
37 Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 177. The author describes a Rechsstaat as a: 
‘Democratic state founded on the... values of supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of 
law.’ See also Müller ‘Basic Questions of Constitution Concretization’ (1999) 3 Stellenbosch 
Law Review at 274. 
 
38  Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 176. 
 
39  1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) par 58. 
 
40  Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 175. 
  
41  Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 142. 
 
42  Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 177.  
 




of the common-law rules, the principles of justice and fairness that embody the 
presumptions of statutory interpretation have always been part of our law. Now that 
most of the principles underlying the common law presumptions have been 
entrenched in the Constitution, it will be interesting to observe the jurisprudential 
development of this common-law presumption – to bring it in line with constitutional 
principles. In spite of this however, it is rather unfortunate that even though the 
Constitution encapsulates the values that underpin the common-law presumptions, 
one might find less and less application of some presumptions – to the point that they 
could possibly also even ‘disappear’ as a result of disuse.44 
 
4.3 Legislation Does Not Oust or Restrict the Jurisdiction of the 
Courts 
 
It is interesting that Steyn suggested that this presumption is an extension of the 
presumption that statutes do not bind the state. The premise for his argument flows 
from the fact that while the presumption that the state is not bound by its own 
legislation pertains mainly to the executive, the presumption that an enactment is not 
aimed at interfering with or ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, obviously applies 
to the judiciary. The principle of trias politica is used to enunciate this argument.45 
The doctrine of separation of powers requires that the legislature, the executive, and 
the judiciary, operate to a greater extent separately of each other. In accordance with 
the principle underlying this presumption, the legislature has to respect the ‘desired 
state of affairs’ and not interfere with or oust the jurisdiction of the judiciary (the 
courts). By the same token, the executive is also expected to maintain a similar 
‘attitude’ to the courts.  The advent of the 1996 Constitution with a democratically 
elected government ensures that the principles and values of the doctrine of 
separation of powers are developed.  The Constitution is therefore framed in a 
manner that establishes a system of checks and balances when dealing with the roles 
of the legislature, executive and the judiciary.  At the same time the system of checks 
                                                            
44 Botha  Statutory Interpretation (2nd edition) at 52-53. Botha submits that: ‘It is ironic that the 
supreme Constitution should emphasize and entrench the values underpinning the common 
law presumptions, but at the same time should diminish their importance in future.’ 
 




and balances also affirms the limited power of the legislative and executive 
authorities which appears to be confined within the constraints of constitutional 
values and principles.46 The Constitution therefore clearly presents an ideal of a 
democratic society – that is, society in which democracy operates.  In order for that 
ideal society to exist and operate, it specifically requires that the necessary blocks or 
‘basic institutional arrangements for a representative/participatory democracy,’ be 
established and monitored.  These include for example, regular elections, 
democratically elected legislatures at national, provincial and local level and 
structures, institutions and processes to facilitate participation in decision-making 
outside these institutions and in between elections.47  In Merafong Demarcation 
Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa48 Skweyiya J maintained that the 
majority view that the new democratic dispensation provided voters with ‘powerful 
methods’ for voters to hold politicians accountable through regular free elections.  
He makes a resounding statement in support of his contention that: 
  
‘courts deal with bad law but that voters must deal with bad politics.  The 
doctrine of separation of powers to which our democracy subscribes does 
not allow this court, or any other court, to interfere in the power exercise of 
powers by the legislature.’49  
 
Nevertheless it still begs the question about whether our courts would be acting 
within their power to grant orders that determine policy.  This brings into focus the 
question of deference.  Brand describes the process that courts have through the 
judicial strategy of deference as that which in effect results in the deferring to other 
branches of government those questions that they feel that they are incapable of 
deciding on or where they feel would require of them to violate the principles of 
                                                            
46   Ntlama ‘The “Deference” of Judicial Authority to the State’ (2012) Obiter at 135.  
 
47   Brand ‘Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-Economic Rights Cases in South Africa’ 
(2011) Stellenbosch Law Review at 623. 
 
48   2008 (10) BCLR 968. 
 




separation of powers.50  In Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg51 deference operated in 
the formulation of the reasonableness test which focused on procedural or structural 
rather than substantive terms.  The court reasoned that the question of providing 
social measures should be left to other branches of government – as the role of the 
court was limited to the process of interpretation only.52 In the Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign53 the court maintained a contrary viewpoint that 
notwithstanding the fact that all arms of government should respect the doctrine of 
separation of powers, did not mean that courts could not make orders that impact on 
policy. Jowell and Steyn provide that, there is no formula to identify the scope of the 
decision-making body’s discretion.  The court must consider whether the context and 
circumstances of the case require the court to defer on a specific issue. They further 
submit that courts should repudiate any presumptions that matters of public interest 
that fall outside their competence. Lenta however, differs from Jowell and Steyn on 
the basis that courts should be sensitive to legitimate exercises of judgment by other 
branches, and that judges should allow the elected branches considerable latitude for 
policy making within constraints of the Constitution.54  
 
There is much support for the view that a court should only interfere when it is 
absolutely necessary to avoid likely irreparable harm and only in the least intrusive 
manner possible with regard to the interests of others who might be affected by the 
legislation in question.55  From the case of RJR MacDonald v Canada56  a cautionary 
note is sounded about how far the notion of deference may be extended.  It was 
provided that: 
‘Care must be taken not to extend the notion of deference too far. Deference 
must not be carried to the point of relieving the government of the burden 
                                                            
50   Brand ‘Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-Economic Rights Cases in South Africa’ 
(2011) Stellenbosch Law Review at 618. 
 
51   2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para 63- para 65. 
 




54   Lenta ‘Judicial Deference and Rights’ (2006) Tydskrif vir Suid Afrikaanse  Reg at 460. 
 
55   Mclean  ‘Towards a Framework for Understanding Constitutional Deference’ (2010) 25 
South African Public Law  at 466. 
 
56   (1995) 3 SCR 199. 
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which the Constitution places upon it of demonstrating that the limits it has 
imposed on guaranteed rights are reasonable and justifiable.  Parliament has 
its role: to choose the appropriate response to social problems within the 
limiting framework of the Constitution. But the courts also have a role: to 
determine objectively and impartially, whether Parliament’s choice falls 
within the limiting framework of the Constitution.’57          
 
As the individual’s right to access justice in a court of law can be regarded as ‘one of 
the cornerstones of institutional justice’, political powers by way of the legislature 
and the executive are not expected to infringe or violate this right in any way.58 
 
It is therefore provided – that unless expressly stated or implied in legislation – it is 
presumed that the legislature does not wish to exclude or restrict the courts’ 
jurisdiction. What this in effect means, is that if it is the intention of the legislature to 
restrict or oust the jurisdiction of the courts, this must be clearly indicated in the 
language of the statute being considered. This ‘well-recognised rule’ in the 
interpretation of statutes was applied in the case of De Wet v Deetleefs,59 where 
Solomon CJ maintained that: 
 
‘... in order to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law, it must be clear that 
such was the intention of the legislature.’ 
 
Further support for the rule is observed in the dictum of R v Padsha, where Innes CJ 
boldly affirmed that where the rights of an aggrieved person are restricted or 
inhibited  – it has to be done ‘in the clearest language’.60 Devenish is adamant that 
the power to oust the jurisdiction of the courts must be done in ‘unequivocal 
language and with unmistakable purpose’. He maintains that where the ousting is 
‘indirect and elliptical’, courts would be more reluctant to give effect to it.61 The case 
                                                            
57   See Edwards comment on deference in RJR MacDonald v Canada in The Modern Law 
Review 2002 65(6) at 859. 
 
58  Botha  Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 93. The submissions which are made by Botha 
are not repeated in the later editions of his book. 
 
59  1928 AD 286 at 290. 
 
60  1923 AD 281 at 304. 
 




of Mathope and Others v Soweto Council is a case in point.62 The court found that 
section 12 of the Community Councils Act63, did not exclude the jurisdiction of the 
magistrates court or the supreme court. This judgment is not only unassailable, but is 
also very progressive in the application of the law. The court in its analysis based its 
reasoning on an individual’s fundamental right to approach the courts. While section 
34 of the Constitution64 currently entrenches an individual’s rights to resolve a 
dispute in a court of law, this obviously did not apply at the time. 
 
4.3.1 The Application of the Presumption 
The Constitution has significantly affected the application of the presumption that 
legislation does not oust or restrict the jurisdiction of the courts. To fully appreciate 
the operation and significance of this presumption, it is necessary to consider the 
application of the presumption both prior to and after the new constitutional 
dispensation. As a result of South Africa’s erstwhile ‘notorious domestic policies’, 
the rights and liberties of individuals were curtailed considerably by limiting or 
ousting the jurisdiction of the courts. Ouster clauses which excluded the jurisdiction 
of the courts have been identified – as a particularly ‘odious feature’ of the old order 
legislation.65 As a matter of fact, the use of such ouster clauses to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the courts at the time, were regarded as the ‘usual practise’ when 
dealing with so-called ‘emergency legislation’.66 Generally, parliament had the 
power to oust the jurisdiction of the courts where it was deemed to be in the public 
interest. Innes CJ reiterates the position in R v Padsha,67 where it was declared that: 
 
‘It is competent for Parliament to oust the jurisdiction of courts of law if it 
considers such a course advisable in the public interest.’ 
                                                            
62  1983 (4) SA 287 (W) at 289 F. 
 
63         125 of 1977. 
 
64 Section 34 of the Constitution provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to have any dispute that 
can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, 
where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.’ 
 
65 Devenish  Interpretation of Statutes at 197. Devenish makes the point that: ‘The use of ouster 
clauses to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts has been a singularly unfortunate and odious 
feature of our security legislation which sanctioned unlimited detention without trial.’ 
 
66  Cockram Interpretation of Statutes at 112. 
 





What is worth reflecting on in the South African context, is how ‘public interest’ 
insidiously came to be associated with the ‘interest of state security’ and maintaining 
the status quo. Of particular significance is the (now defunct) Internal Security Act.68 
In terms of section 29 of the Internal Security Act, it was expressly stipulated that: 
 
‘No court of law shall have jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of 
any action taken in terms of this section.’69 
 
The courts nevertheless maintained that the legislation in question did not totally 
exclude their jurisdiction. In instances where officials had acted fraudulently or ‘with 
malice or caprice’ – or if they went ‘beyond the limits of competency’ – the courts 
could have intervened. The effect of officials not being required to furnish reasons 
for their actions meant that legislation which had already been considerably whittled 
down in legal force, had now become a ‘de facto nullity’. This problem was further 
compounded, in that the onus of proof alleging fraud or mala fides lay with the 
person alleging it.70Evidence of the status quo is reflected in Bunting v Minister of 
Justice, 71where the position is articulated as follows: 
 
‘A court of law could also interfere if it is demonstrated or shown that the 
Minister had used these powers in a mala fide manner ... But the onus of 
showing that the Minister had not exercised his discretion properly is upon 
whoever alleges that ...’ 
 
In a similar vein, Jansen J in Stanton v Minister of Justice72maintained that: 
 
                                                            
68  74 of 1982. 
 
69 The Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 has been repealed by the Internal Security and 
Intimidation Amendment Act 138 of 1991. 
 
70 Further support for this contention can be found in the case of Stanton v Minister of Justice 
1960 (3) SA 353 (T) 360 A-B. 
 
71  1963 (4) SA 531 (C) 533. 
 
72 1960 (3) SA 353 (T) at 360. See also Stadsraad van Vanderbylpark v Administrateur, 
Transvaal 1982 (3) SA 166 (T) at 175 where the court went further and provided that: ‘The 
alleged unreasonableness must be “inexplicable” except on the assumption of mala fides or 




‘The Minister’s power is ... purely administrative. It is not incumbent on him 
to give reasons for his decision. The onus is on the applicant to establish mala 
fides.’ 
 
Due to the high degree of proof required when alleging fraud or mala fides, it is not 
surprising that Holmes JA in the case of National Transport Commission and 
Another v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd73 described the process as a 
‘formidable’ one. Nevertheless, the case of Hurley and Another v Minister of Law 
and Order74 arrived at the contrary outcome (to the above-mentioned cases), when 
construing if the relevant security legislation. The court’s findings in Hurley were 
based on a ‘restrictive interpretation’ of the ouster clause in dispute. In adopting this 
approach, Devenish maintained that the Court was able to ‘preserve the jurisdiction 
of the courts in a very contentious branch of South African law’.75 This rule – 
embodied in the ‘Hurley principle’ as it later came to be referred to – has been 
accepted and applied in subsequent decisions.76 Indeed, the Hurley judgment is a 
land-mark decision in the history of South African law. 
Under the previous constitutional system which was based on the Westminster 
paradigm, parliament was sovereign. As a result, everything which was enacted by 
Parliament – irrespective of how demeaning, offensive or morally repugnant, for 





73  1972 (3) SA 726 (AD) at 735. 
 
74  1985 (4) SA 709 (D). 
 
75 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 197-199. See the author’s comments and criticism on 
the findings of the Hurley judgment. 
 
76 The decisions in respect of which the so-called ‘Hurley principle’ have been applied include, 
United Democratic Front v State President 1987 (3) SA 296 N; Nqumba v State President 
1987 (1) SA 456 (E) at 460; and Radebe v Minister of Law and Order 1987 (1) SA 586 (W). 
 




4.3.2 The Relevance of the Presumption in the Current 
Constitutional Dispensation 
 
Prior to the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, the Supreme Court78 
possessed an inherent jurisdiction to review administrative action.79 While courts 
generally could review the lawfulness of actions of the administration, parliament 
was sovereign and its laws could not be invalidated. By the use of ouster clauses 
discussed above, statute law could prevent and in some cases even prohibit courts 
from reviewing certain actions. This situation has changed fundamentally with the 
system of constitutional supremacy. 
Because that which is enacted has to be compatible with the values and principles 
enshrined in the Constitution, parliament has to ensure that the principles 
encapsulated in the Constitution are given expression to. In respect of the 
presumption under consideration, these principles are embodied to a large extent in 
section 34 which deals with the right of access to courts, and to some extent in 
section 3380 which deals with the right to administrative justice, and in section 35 
(3)81 which deals with the right of an accused person to approach a court of law to 
have his or her matter heard. For the purposes of this chapter, the focus is mainly on 
section 34. 
An examination of the classification referred to above – as articulated by du Plessis82 
– reveals that the common law presumption that legislation is not to oust or restrict 
the jurisdiction of the courts, has now been subsumed under the Constitution.83 The 
                                                            
78         The Supreme Court is now referred to as the High Court. 
 
79 Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 93. Botha states that: ‘The High Court always 
had an inherent common-law jurisdiction to review such decisions, for example on the 
grounds of mala fides (bad faith).’ 
 
80 Section 33(1) of the Constitution provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.’ 
 
81 Section 35(3) of the Constitution provides that: ‘Every accused person has a right to a fair 
trial...’ 
 
82         Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 153. 
  




relevant section entitling persons access to the courts in terms of section 34 of the 
Constitution, states: 
 
‘Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.’ 
 
The three key elements pivotal to the operation of the right that have been identified, 
are: a) access, b) independence, and c) impartiality and fairness.84 Spelt out more 
explicitly, the right first creates a right of access to a court, tribunal or forum. 
Secondly, in respect of the legal process, the independence and impartiality has to be 
observed, and thirdly, it is imperative that the matter is decided in a fair and public 
hearing.85 
 
With the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, a judicial awareness ... that 
access to court is a fundamental right is clearly reflected in case-law.86 The 
Constitutional Court in the case of Bernstein v Bester NO,87 boldly affirmed that: 
 
‘In all democratic societies the state has the duty to establish independent 
tribunals for the resolution of civil disputes ... In a constitutional state that 
obligation is of fundamental importance and it is clearly recognised as such in 
our Constitution.’ 
 
Further, in the matter of De Lille v Speaker of the National Assembly88, an ouster 
clause purporting to place issue of parliamentary privilege beyond judicial scrutiny – 
relating to the Speaker of the national assembly– was held to be unconstitutional. 
 
It is interesting to note that what emerges from an examination of the above, is that 
while prior to the new constitutional dispensation ouster clauses were regarded as 
singularly the most intrusive restraint to accessing justice – with the advent of the 
                                                            
84  De Waal, Currie and Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 711. 
 
85 Ibid 711-712. See Montsisi v Minister van Polisie1984 (1) SA 619 which is an illustration of 
when section 34 can be used to challenge the validity of time limitation clauses. 
 
86  The case in point is that of Williamson v Schoon 1997 (3) SA 1053 (T). 
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current constitutional dispensation, it is the costs of litigation that have been 
identified as the ‘biggest single impediment’ to accessing justice.89 
Nevertheless, the courts have started to heed the impact of legal costs, and as a result 
thereof, have declined inappropriate constitutional law cases and making cost orders 
against losing applicants.90 Because the principles underpinning this particular 
presumption have been incorporated in the Constitution as fundamental rights, it 
would seem, therefore, that it would no longer be necessary to invoke the 
presumptions itself. What is necessary, however, is to ensure that the principles 
embodied therein continue to be developed in accordance with the spirit and objects 
of the Bill of Rights – to ensure that they are constitutionally sound and continue to 
be relevant. In the current constitutional era, the underlying jurisprudence is no 
longer one of legal positivism. It appears to be akin to natural law – with the 
Constitution as supreme law giving rise to a jurisprudence of constitutional 
transformation. The rules of natural justice that are embodied in some of the 
common-law presumptions have now been subsumed in the Bill of Rights. However, 
where necessary, it is incumbent on judicial officers to apply the presumptions that 
are compatible with constitutional values – to achieve social, economic and political 
justice. 
4.4 Statutes Do Not Contain Invalid or Purposeless Provisions 
What can be gleaned from an examination of the presumption that statutes do not 
contain invalid or purposeless provisions, is that it is almost always couched in 
negative language. While one would expect that with regard to a presumption that 
promotes validity and purposefulness, it would be phrased in more positive terms, 
this is seldom the case.91 Nevertheless, a variety of terms are used to describe this 
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particular presumption, which include ‘futile’, ‘nugatory’, ‘unnecessary’, 
‘meaningless’, ‘invalid’ and ‘purposeless’.92 
On closer inspection, what is obvious about the operation of the presumption, is that 
it ensures that when interpreting statutes, these must be construed to render it 
effective, intelligible and valid – rather than in a manner that would render it 
inoperative and purposeless.93 To re-iterate the position, it is provided that ‘the 
subject matter should rather be of force that comes to naught.’94 It therefore follows 
that if there are two or more interpretations of a provision, the one that renders the 
provision valid and meaningful should be given effect to – rather than one that would 
result in invalidity or confusion. 
The case of South African Transport Services v Olgar95 provides a fitting example of 
the ‘confusion’ alluded to above. Referring to section 15 of the Road Transport 
Act96, it was noted that paragraph (a) of section 15 (2) of the Act was an illustration 
of the confusion created by the draftsman attempting to lump together – in a single 
paragraph – both essential elements and alternative requirements. The result of the 
shoddy draftsmanship was that the paragraph in dispute97 offered two different 
interpretations. To obviate the problem caused by the ‘confusion’ that had arisen, the 
Appellate Division held that if a provision is capable of two meanings, it is necessary 
to give effect to the meaning which is more consistent with the purpose of the 
legislation in question.98 It is therefore provided that where uncertainty, confusion 
and conflict are likely to arise, the operation of the presumption ought to favour a 
                                                            
92 Devenish The Interpretation of Statutes at 207. See discussion in Devenish where the author 
in his analysis of the presumptions uses terms such as ‘futile’, ‘nugatory’, ‘unnecessary’ and 
‘meaningless’ to describe the operation of the presumption. 
 
93  Ibid at 207-208. 
 
94 Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 61. From the cases of R v Pickering 1911 TPD 
1054 at 1058 and R v Correia, we note that: ‘the words of an instrument are to be so 
construed that the subject-matter should rather be of force than come to nought’. 
 
95  1986 (2) SA 684 (A) 693 (H). 
 
96          74 of 1977. 
 
97  Para (a) of Section 15 (2). 
 




construction eliminating these.99 The court in the case of Esselman v Administrateur 
SWA100 adopted a similar stance. 
Where the validity of a provision is being challenged, the tendency is that courts are 
more inclined towards an interpretation that would render an enactment valid, rather 
than giving it a meaning so ‘extravagant or wide that it would result in invalidity’.101 
Both Du Plessis and Devenish concur that in deciding over two or more possible 
readings, that such interpretation must first and foremost be possible.102 It therefore 
follows that the presumption would not apply, if when construing legislation the 
statutory provision under examination is ‘ostensibly susceptible to being rendered 
nugatory’.103 This presumption also applies to subordinate legislation. The applicable 
maxim here is the ut res magis valeat quam pereat rule, which requires that when 
interpreting subordinate legislation, the interpreter needs to ensure that the legislation 
is intra vires and valid rather than ultra vires.104 
The presumption has also been invoked in instances where the court has had the 
arduous task of deliberating over the risk of invalidating key provisions of an 
enactment or of frustrating its objectives.105 In the case of Ex Parte Minister of 
Justice: In re R v Jacobson and Levy,106 the application of the presumption that the 
legislature does not intend legislation which is futile or nugatory – was illustrated in 
the following extract: 
 
‘If the language of a statute is not clear and would be nugatory if taken 
literally, but the object and motivation are clear, then the statute must not be 
reduced to a nullity merely because the language used is somewhat obscure.’ 
 
                                                            
99  Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 189. 
 
100 1974 (2) SA 597 (SWA). The court stressed that an ‘effective and purposive’ interpretation 
was to be preferred above one which would defeat the purpose of the provision. 
 
101  Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 189. 
 
102  Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 209. (Emphasis Added) 
 
103  Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 188. 
 
104  Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 207. 
 
105  Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 61. 
 




The approach of the court in adopting a meaning that furthered the purpose of the 
statute rather than one that frustrated it, was clearly reflected.107 The unmistakable 
purposive methodology of the presumption is clear. It is trite that the most important 
principle of interpretation, is that courts have to determine the purpose of legislation 
and give effect to that object or purpose. The presumption that legislation must be 
effectual and purposeful forms the very essence of contemporary and enlightened 
statutory interpretation.108 While Botha’s cogent advocacy of the purposive 
methodology is commendable, prior to the new constitutional dispensation the 
methodology was generally not favoured by the courts. A predilection by the courts 
for the literal approach prior to the current constitutional dispensation, is clearly 
reflected in case-law.109 
 
4.4.1 The Application of the Presumption 
Particular situations or circumstances might warrant the courts having to invoke 
more than one presumption when deciding on a matter. An analysis of such 
situations merits attention. In instances where a statute creates an offence, but fails to 
provide for a specific penalty – in order to prevent the statute in question from being 
declared invalid or ineffective, the court in such instances has to consider whether an 
appropriate penalty is to be imposed. It is emphasized that, in its deliberations, the 
court must consider: 
 
 The manner in which the provision (that creates the offence) is worded; and 
 Whether the provision does indeed create an offence.110 
 
In this regard –R v Forlee, must be examined.111 
                                                            
107  Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 208. 
 
108 Botha Statutory Interpretation (2nd edition) at 53. It is noted that Botha only discusses the 
presumption – Statutes do not contain invalid of purposeless provisions in the earlier edition 
of his book.  
 
109 The cases of Public Carriers Association & Others v Toll Road Concessionaires (Pty) Ltd 
and Others 1990 (1) SA 925 at 943; Union Government (Minister of Finance) v Mack 1917 
AD 731 and Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 being 
the cases in point. 
 
110  Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 188. 
 




Forlee was found guilty of a contravention of an earlier Union statute, by selling 
opium. It was argued on his behalf that he had not committed an offence since the 
Act in question provided no penalty for the selling of opium.112 The court in casu 
invoked the presumption ‘that legislation did not contain futile or meaningless 
provisions’, and found that a failure to provide a penalty did not render the Act 
invalid – since the court had the discretion to impose the punishment it deemed 
appropriate. The decision understandably provoked robust criticism in the legal 
fraternity. It is maintained that Forlee was incorrectly decided.113 The nullem crimen 
principle, as a whole, reflects the inherent justice of the Roman-Dutch common law 
based on natural law. It is submitted that the principles, maxims and presumptions of 
interpretation are not to be applied in an arbitrary manner, but should be applied in 
accordance with the theory and methodology of interpretation that is consistent with 
the ethos of Roman-Dutch common law.114 The jurisprudence of the new 
constitutional dispensation has spawned a new methodology of interpretation. This 
jurisprudence is akin to natural law characteristic of Roman-Dutch law. It is therefore 
evident that the values that underlie an open and democratic society – as reflected in 
the South African Constitution – epitomise the Roman-Dutch principles of what is 
considered to be fair and just. In the process of interpretation, these values must be 
given expression. In the new constitutional era, the role of a judge has to be a moral 
one, based on the morality of the Constitution. There is a responsibility to apply the 
values of the Constitution to give effect to social justice and transformation. The 
element of morality is inherent in deontic reasoning and supports therefore a deontic 




112  Ibid. 
 
113 Devenish The Interpretation of Statutes at 208-209. In the recent case of Director of Public 
Prosecutions of Western Cape v Prins 2012 (2) SACR 183 (SCA), where Mr. Prins was 
charged in the Regional Court with contravening section 5(1) of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007, he objected to the charged arguing that section 5(1) did not 
provide for a penalty.  The Western Cape High Court held that, as the Act did not specify a 
penalty clause, section 5(1) of the Act did not create an offense and dismissed the appeal. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal on the basis that section 276 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is a general empowering provision authorizing courts to impose 
sentences in all cases. 
 




The case of Esselman v Administrateur, SWA,115 is yet another example where the 
court – in deciding on the correct approach – found it necessary to invoke the 
presumption against invalid or purposeless provisions. The court, in its quest for the 
correct approach, had erred in that it should have adopted a more balanced approach 
in the application of the presumption that promotes public interest and the 
presumption against invalid and purposeless provisions. It is not surprising therefore 
that the findings have been widely criticised. In this case, the applicant petitioned the 
court for an interdict preventing the respondent from removing sand from his farm – 
as he contended that he needed the material for his own purposes. The relevant 
section116 authorised the administration to remove any material for construction and 
maintenance of roads from private property, without having to compensate the 
owner. However, in terms of section 30(d), it was required that in exercising its 
duties, no private owner was to suffer damage. Hoexter J, in his judgment, invoked 
the presumption against invalid and purposeless provisions and construed section 
30(d) of Ordinance of SWA as merely an instruction to minimize damage and 
rendered the enactment as a whole valid in the circumstances. 
It is submitted that this is precisely a case where the presumption that statutes do not 
contain invalid or purposeless provisions should not have been applied – since 
clearly the owner was not compensated. What was required, therefore, was that the 
court should have attempted to ‘weigh up the respective rights of the parties’ so that 
‘justice could at least be seen to be done’.117 The applicant bought the farm because 
he needed the sand for his own purposes. The effect of section 30(d) vested the 
applicant with at least a prima facie right to the sand – which under normal 
circumstances would not have been protected – but in this particular instance 
deserved protection. Therefore, the approach of the court in casu ought to have 
invoked the presumption that an enactment promotes public interest as well as the 
presumption against invalid and purposeless provisions. It is maintained that a more 
                                                            
115  1974 (2) SA 597 (SWA). 
 
116  Section 30 of Ordinance 17 of 1972 (SWA). 
 




balanced application of the presumptions would have undoubtedly led to a ‘more 
acceptable result’.118 
In the absence of a justiciable Bill of Rights, fundamental rights,119 the rights of the 
owner should have been more energetically protected using the presumptions. Even 
though the common-law presumptions should have been a surrogate for the Bill of 
Rights and which should it is submitted, have been invoked when fundamental rights 
were undermined – prior to the current democratic regime, this was seldom done. 
4.4.2 The Relevance of the Presumption in the Current 
Constitutional Dispensation 
Prior to the current constitutional era, the purposive methodology which underpinned 
the operation of the presumption that statutes do not contain invalid and purposeless 
provisions, was rarely applied by courts. It is noted that a purposive methodology 
underpins this particular presumption. It is therefore maintained that there is merit in 
the argument that the presumption is ‘indeed conducive to purposive interpretation’ 
and ‘holds its own in the new constitutional dispensation’.120 
Referring to the three distinct categories of presumptions discussed above,121 a 
careful examination of the presumption that legislation does not contain invalid or 
purposeless provisions, reveals that the presumption does not fall squarely within any 
of the categories outlined by Du Plessis above. Clearly the presumption has not been 
subsumed under the Constitution and is also not incompatible with the principles 
encapsulated in it. The position is, in fact, quite the contrary. However, in respect of 
the third category which recognises presumptions that are left unaffected by the 
Constitution, the presumption does have some bearing. This lends itself to a 
                                                            
118  Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 65. 
 
119 The fundamental rights which are referred to are upheld in terms of Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution and include the following rights: equality; human dignity; freedom from slavery; 
servitude and forced labour; privacy; freedom of religion, belief and opinion, freedom of 
expression; freedom of association; freedom of trade, occupation and profession; adequate 
health care, food, water and access to social security; and administrative action. 
 
120       Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 189. 
 




discussion of the interpretation provision of the Constitution and the operation 
thereof. 
Section 39 is a peremptory provision. This means that all courts, tribunals or forums 
are under an obligation to review the aim and purpose of legislation in light of the 
Bill of Rights. The so-called plain meaning approach is no longer applicable.122 In 
other words, it is submitted that the current constitutional order requires that there 
must be a departure from the strictly literal or legalistic approach when dealing with 
questions of interpretation.123 This sentiment is echoed by Ngcobo J, in a dictum in 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,124 
where he postulates that: 
 
‘legislation must be interpreted purposively to promote the spirit, the purport 
and the objects of the Bill of Rights ... the emerging trend in statutory 
construction is to have regard to the context in which the words occur, even 
where the words to be construed are not unclear and ambiguous.’ 
 
The purposive methodology epitomised in the approach above is also reflected in 
other recent case-law. This includes African Christian Democratic Party v The 
Electoral Commission;125 Baloro v University of Bophuthatswana126 and the 
Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegan Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd.127 The last-
mentioned case merits closer attention. In this case, what emerges is that as a result 
of adopting a purposive or value-orientated method of interpretation, Moseneke J – 
in the interests of justice – found in favour of the applicants and awarded them 
restitution in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.128  In terms of section 
39(2) of the Constitution which requires that all statutes be interpreted ‘through the 
                                                            
122 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 90-91. 
 
123 Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2nd edition) at 32-71. 
 
124  2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para 72. 
 
125  2006 (5) BCLR 579 (CC). 
 
126  1995 (8) BCLR 1018 (CC). 
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prism of the Bill of Rights’,129 one sees Moseneke J engaging in a ‘moral evaluation’ 
relating to the dispossession of land rights in South Africa.  
 
Because the interpretation clause is regarded as a ‘force that informs all legal 
institutions and decisions with the new power of constitutional values’,130 it is 
maintained that this presumption, in particular, has a positive prognosis in the current 
constitutional era131 – as it is in accordance with the principles inherent in a 
transformative constitution. 
4.5 The Legislature Does Not Intend that which is Harsh, Unjust 
or Unreasonable 
 
It is submitted that the presumption that the legislature does not intend that which is 
harsh, unjust or unreasonable – in its embodiment of the intrinsic values of justice 
and fairness – has to be regarded as singularly the most crucial presumption that 
could have been invoked to uphold and protect civil rights and liberties, prior to 
South Africa’s introduction of a Bill of Rights. It is not surprising that in its 
encapsulation of the principles of natural law, this particular presumption enjoyed 
considerable esteem in Roman-Dutch law.132 The principle underpinning the 
presumption is reflected in the words of Johannes Voet about the nature of the law. 
He provides that it ‘ought to be just and reasonable ... (for) it preserves equality and 
binds citizens equally’.133 Quite clearly, what is observed is that in the South African 
context, and in the absence of a Bill of Rights, this particular common-law 
presumption which epitomised justice, fairness and equality could conceivably have 
been considered as a surrogate for the Bill of Rights. 
 
                                                            
129 See case of Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO and Others 
2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) par 21. Langa DP explains that the ‘new’ methodology in 
interpretation requires that: ‘All law-making authority must be exercised in accordance with 
the Constitution.’ 
 
130  Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588. 
 
131  Du Plessis The Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 191. 
 
132  Devenish The Interpretation of Statutes at 162. 
 




In terms of the operation of this presumption in statutory interpretation, the approach 
of the courts has been that where a statute was capable of more than one 
interpretation, or where the slightest degree of doubt arises when construing a 
provision of a statute, expression could be given to the presumption that the 
legislature must have intended that which was just, equitable and reasonable. 
Therefore, in the case of Principal Immigration Officer v Bhula,134 the court applied 
this presumption by stating that: 
 
‘Where, ... two meanings may be given to a section, and the one meaning 
leads to harshness and injustice, whilst the other does not, the court will hold 
that the legislature rather intended the milder than the harsher meaning.’ 
 
In a similar vein, when issues of vested rights were in dispute, the underlying 
protection of fundamental rights that were central to the operation of the 
presumption, ensured that such onerous provisions were strictly construed. Steyn 
submits that the interpretation of such (onerous) provisions ought to be interpreted 
strictly – so as to ensure that the outcome is the least unreasonable or inequitable.135 
This submission was met with approval in the case of Transvaal Investments Co v 
Springs Municipality,136 where it was held, as per Solomon JA, that: 
 
‘It is a well-established rule in the construction of statutes that where an Act is 
capable of two interpretations, that one should be preferred which does not 
take away existing rights, unless it is plain that such was the intention of the 
Legislature.’ 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that this particular presumption embodied the very 
essence of the fundamental principles of justice and fairness, unfortunately under the 
pre-democratic system of parliamentary sovereignty, parliament basically had free 
reign to enact absolutely any law it wanted to – irrespective of how unjust, unfair, 
unethical, immoral or unreasonable it was. However during the apartheid era the 
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courts could have been more assertive in protecting rights. Clearly, this was not 
always the case. 
 
4.5.1 The Application of the Presumption 
Prior to the new democratic order, regardless of the presumption that the legislature 
does not intend that which is harsh, unjust or unreasonable, statutes which were 
innately unjust or unreasonable were nevertheless still given effect to by the courts. 
The main reason for this could be attributed to the fact that when construing the 
relevant legislation, courts were inclined to give effect to the ‘plain meaning’ of the 
words or the ‘intention of the legislature’. From the case of Principal Immigration 
Officer v Bhula,137 the position of the court was as follows: 
 
‘where a statute is clear the court must give effect to the intention of the 
legislature, however harsh its operation may be to individuals affected 
thereby’. 
 
It is, however, the following submission made by the previous Appellate Division 
when deliberating, that ‘this court has no power to adjudicate on the reasonableness 
or unreasonableness of an Act of Parliament’, since the ‘function of the court is to 
declare the law as given by the Legislature, and not to make it’,138 that raises 
pertinent questions about the obligations of courts in the realm of judicial law-
making. 
 
As a result of applying a literal methodology, as reflected above, courts during the 
apartheid era were instrumental in upholding and giving effect to ‘notorious racial 
and draconian security legislation’.139 The correct approach of the courts when 
construing provisions that allowed for inroads into the liberty of the individual – who 
is neither charged nor convicted of an offence – should have been that such 
provisions be restrictively interpreted. Thus, the court’s approach to the 
                                                            
137  1931 AD 323 at 336. 
 
138 See S v Takaendesa 1972 (4) SA 72 (RAD) at 77, where the court as per Beadle CJ 
maintained that: ‘…(there) is no justification for a court of law assuming the mantle of the 
legislature and itself amending the statute.’ 
 




interpretation of the ‘idle person’ provision in respect of the Native (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act140 in the cases of In Re Vakaza141 and S v Sibiya142 – has been 
criticized because it should have been subjected to a restrictive interpretation. 
 
The findings of the court in the case of S v Werner,143 where the court rebutted the 
operation of the presumption by necessary implication when construing the 
provisions of the Group Areas Act,144 was also flawed. In this case, Indian and 
Coloured families who were unable to find suitable accommodation in residential 
areas designated for Indian and Coloured families, settled in a so-called White area. 
King J, in trying to prevaricate about the role and function of the courts, made the 
submission that: 
 
‘an Act of Parliament creates law but not necessarily equity. As a judge in a 
Court of Law I am obliged to give effect to the provisions of an Act of 
Parliament. Speaking for myself and if I were sitting as a Court of Equity, I 
would have come to the assistance of the appellant.’145 
 
The above is an apt example of the ‘ridiculous dicta’ that Du Plessis speaks of. The 
mode of reasoning adopted by the court in the application of the presumption is 
nonsensical and ridiculous, as it makes the interpretation of equity entirely dependant 
on the wording of the enactment.146 Theoretically it would seem that while the 
principles of fairness and justice that were pivotal to the operation of the presumption 
– and which could quite easily have operated as a surrogate for a Bill of Rights – did 
not materialise, with some notable exceptions.147 Under a system of parliamentary 
sovereignty, whereby parliament could enact any law and if the aim and the 
‘intention of the legislature’ was clear, as reflected in case-law discussed above, the 
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145  See S v Adams 1979 (4) SA at 793 (T) at 798 G. 
 
146  Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 84-85.  
 
147          See for example Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 and 
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courts had no choice but to apply the law – no matter how harsh, unjust or 
unreasonable it was. 
 
4.5.2 The Relevance of the Presumption in the Current 
Constitutional Dispensation 
The principles underpinning the presumption that harsh, unjust or unreasonable 
results are not intended – are fully in keeping with the spirit and scope of the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. In a post-apartheid constitutional 
order, the importance of a right to equality cannot be over-emphasised. Section 39 
the Constitution speaks of the type of society that the people wish to create and 
emphasises that it has to be based on equality, dignity and freedom148 – which are 
reflective of a transformative constitutional order. It is therefore quite clear that 
section 9,149 the equality provision, is not only the cornerstone of democracy but that 
it is given recognition as the first right, in terms of the Bill of Rights. Because South 
African society was previously based primarily on inequality and discrimination that 
were perpetuated by apartheid laws. Built into the equality provision is a mandate 
that measures have to be taken to ensure the protection of the rights, as well as the 
advancement of people who have been discriminated against as a result of past 
racially and discriminatory laws and practices.150  To attempt to redress and 
ameliorate the situation to which most people of South Africa were subjected to for 
decades, is indeed no small feat. For this reason, the implementation of affirmative 
action policies and the promulgation of legislation such as the Promotion of Equality 
and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act,151 which have as their genesis the 
equality provision of the Constitution, must be seen as steps in the right direction. 
 
                                                            
148         De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 146. 
 
149 Section 9 (1) of the Constitution provides that: ‘Everyone is equal before the law and has the 
right to equal protection and benefit of the law.’ 
 
150 Section 9 (2) of the Constitution provides that: ‘Equality includes the full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative 
and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.’ 
 




From an examination of the operation of the equality provision, as expounded above, 
it is obvious that before the new constitutional dispensation and introduction of the 
Bill of Rights, the jurisprudence premised on the presumption that statute law is not 
unjust, inequitable and unreasonable, did not apply to the extent to which one would 
have expected.152 The courts, in particular, were criticised because of their failure to 
apply the presumption where the rights of individuals were at stake. As can be 
garnered from an examination of relevant case-law, where courts could have seized 
the opportunity to mitigate the rigours of apartheid, this was easier in theory than in 
practice.  
 
The position on the role and function of the judiciary in the current constitutional 
dispensation is substantially different to that which prevailed during the apartheid 
era. The replacement of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty by constitutional 
supremacy means that the overriding consideration of statutory interpretation is that 
the fundamental values must be considered within the framework of the Constitution. 
The courts are now obligated to reconcile the aim and purpose of legislation with the 
provisions in the Bill of Rights. From the case of Matiso v Officer Commanding, PE 
Prison,153 Froneman J articulated his position on the subject as follows: 
 
‘The values and principles contained in the Constitution are, and could only 
be formulated and expressed in wide and general terms, because they are to be 
of general application. In terms of the Constitution the Courts bear the 
responsibility of giving specific content to those values and principles in any 
given situation.’ 
 
However, in view of the fact that the values that underlie this particular presumption 
are considered as being the pillars on which our Constitution is based, the reliance on 
the application of this particular presumption is no longer necessary, as it is 
incumbent on judicial officers to give effect to and promote the values that underlie 
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In evaluating the role of presumptions in statutory interpretation, what is obvious is 
that the reliance on presumptions in statutory interpretation since 1994 has not 
depreciated. In fact, it is observed that not only has the Constitutional Court relied 
extensively on presumptions for the purposes of constitutional interpretation, but 
although many of the common-law presumptions have been subsumed into the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, as highlighted in the discussion above, presumptions 
have continued to be invoked by the courts for purposes of statutory interpretation.154 
What has emerged has been an interesting inter-relationship between statute law, the 
common-law and the Constitution. 
In the case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security,155 the Constitutional 
Court affirmed that there is a general obligation on courts to develop the common-
law appropriately, in accordance with section 39 (2). The Court was emphatic that 
this obligation was not to be regarded as ‘purely discretionary’. The case of Bhe v 
Magistrate of Khayelitsha and Others156 is also relevant.  From the case, it is noted 
that customary law has not evolved to meet the changing needs of community life. 
Had customary law been permitted to develop in an ‘active and dynamic manner,’157 
the initial position in Bhe’s case would have been significantly different.  Clearly it 
would not have excluded women from inheriting on the grounds of gender.158  What 
is apparent is that the judgements of Carmichele and Bhe were not only innovative 
and creative, but indeed quite pro-active in dealing respectively with the 
development of the common and customary law.  As the Constitution specifically 
mandates that the rules of common-law and customary law have to be developed in 
accordance with the principles enshrined in the Bill of Rights, it is therefore expected 
that the presumptions which form part of the common-law, will continue to 
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‘augment, enrich and enhance the Constitution’159  in facilitating and understanding 
of the operation and application of law in the current constitutional order. 
The Constitution enjoins the judiciary to consider, respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the foundational values on which the current system is based.160  This is reflected in 
section 7(2) of the Constitution which provides that: ‘the State must respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil rights in the Bill of Rights.’  Section 7(2) clearly epitomises the 
ethos of a transformative Constitution. 161 It conveys the idea that the State is not 
simply only required to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of rights, but it 
must also ensure that it protects, enhances and realises the enjoyment of these 
rights.162 
Section 39 clearly mandates a value-based methodology. Implicit therein, is the 
responsibility of the judiciary to heed the call ‘to improve the quality of life of all 
citizens.’163  Section 39 therefore in operating together with Section 7(2) of the 
Constitution which applies directly to the promotion of social and economic rights, 
has resulted in the emergence of a ‘new’ jurisprudence. Such jurisprudence requires a 
new, creative, innovative and pro-active approach to interpretation, as evidenced in 
the Carmichele, Bhe and Rivonia School cases.  A pro-active approach to the process 
of interpretation, which is based on legal reasoning and is infused with ethical and 
moral considerations, to promote social advancement, is what is required in a 
transformative constitutional system. These are the core elements that comprise the 
deontic theory of interpretation, which is proposed for interpretation in the era of 
constitutional democracy in South Africa.  In this regard the presumptions of 
interpretation involving principles of justice, fairness and equity still have an 
important role to play. 
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THE RELEVANCE OF THE CANONS AND MAXIMS OF 
INTERPRETATION IN A SYSTEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is on the canons and maxims of interpretation. The chapter 
therefore examines some of the more popular or commonly used common-law 
maxims and canons of construction.1 The aim is to determine: 
a) whether these common-law rules which may be regarded as being outmoded 
and archaic – still apply; and  
b) their relevance and beneficial application in the current democratic 
constitutional order. 
Rules of interpretation are commonly referred to as the ‘canons of construction.’2 In 
fact, however, they are not rules or laws, in the ordinary sense of the word.  No 
canon can ever conclusively resolve a dispute over the meaning of a statute, nor is a 
court required to apply a canon.3 The canons are merely generalisations about the use 
                                                            
1  For  purposes  of  the  research,  the  focus will  be  on  some  of  the more  commonly  used 
maxims and canons of  interpretation.  In examining the Rules of Restrictive  Interpretation, 
the Eiusdem Generis Rule and  the Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat Et  Ipsa Lex will  form  the 
basis of  the discussion.  In  terms of Extensive  Interpretation,  Interpretation by  Implication 
(and the rules relating thereto), and Interpretation by Analogy will be dealt with more fully. 
Canon  law  is  the  body  of  laws  and  regulations made  by  ecclesiastical  authority  (Church 
leadership), for the government of a Christian organization or church and its members. It is 
the  internal  ecclesiastical  law  governing  the  Catholic  church,  the  Eastern  and  Oriental 
Orthodox churches, and the Anglican Communion of churches.   The way that such church 
law  is  legislated,  interpreted  and  at  times  adjudicated  varies widely  among  these  three 
bodies  of  churches.    In  all  three  traditions,  a  canon was  originally  a  rule,  adopted  by  a 









of language and are therefore regarded as the ‘customs of writing.’4 What is obvious 
from an examination of the process of interpretation, however, is that any discussion 
on the application of the rules of interpretation – in particular the maxims and canons 
of interpretation – is incomplete without considering the role of the judges who have 
to apply these rules. There are a number of factors ‘constitutional and otherwise’ that 
support the law-making discretion of judges or courts during the interpretation of 
legislation.5 These factors will be examined more fully to help shed light on the 
subject and to provide a more nuanced understanding of the role of judges in the 
realm of judicial law-making in the current democratic constitutional dispensation. It 
is submitted that the role of the judge in a transformative constitution needs to be 
compatible with the goals of such a system, which in the South African context is to 
give effect to social transformation involving civil, political as well as socio-
economic rights. In a transformative constitutional state, it is clear that the courts 
should focus on attempting to ameliorate the conditions of inequality and the 
eradication of poverty – by striving towards the attainment of social justice through 
transformation. The role of the judge it is submitted should therefore involve a moral 
function. 
Before the current democratic constitutional order, Dugard observed that ‘Critics of 
the South African judiciary have been accused of failing to understand its role in the 
legal process.’6 While there is a perception that South African judges, unlike their 
American counterparts, ‘do not make law but only declare it’,7which is in effect the 
operation of the iudicis est ius dicere sed non dare maxim, the same author stresses 
that critics ought to be reminded that while the Justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States have a more political role to play, the function of the South African 
judge can be described as being purely judicial.8 This position has been changed 
                                                            
4  Ibid. In the case of a statute, certain canons of construction can help a court ascertain what 
the drafters of a statute – usually the legislature – meant by the language used in the law.  
When a dispute involves a contract, a court will apply other canons of interpretation, or 
construction, to help determine what the parties to the agreement intended at the time they 
made the contract. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/construction (Accessed on July 2012) 
 
5  Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 163-165. 
 







significantly with the advent of the new constitutional order. As ‘guardians of 
constitutional values’,9 section 39(2) of the Constitution mandates that it is now the 
responsibility of the judicial officer to reconcile the aim and purpose of the 
legislation with the provisions of the Constitution, and to uphold and give expression 
to the values that underlie an open and democratic society. This is not a matter of 
choice or election but one of obligation which is inherent in a deontic theory of 
interpretation. 
The creative application of the rules of interpretation, by way of the canons and 
maxims of interpretation, are not to be seen as ‘a foreign principle falling outside the 
ambit’10 of their functions – but should be regarded as being very much part of what 
is required by a judicial officer in giving effect to his ‘discretionary powers’.11 The 
crux of this important debate is dealt with in more detail below. 
 
5.2 The Role of the Judge in the Realm of Judicial Law-Making 
 
In examining the role of judges in the process of interpretation, what is fundamental 
to the discussion is the ‘ancient’ question of whether judges create or invent law12 or 
interpret the law only mechanically,13 or are they involved in a more creative law-




The interesting terminology used when describing the process of transition from 
interpretation to application is concretisation. Concretisation is the final stage in the 
interpretation process when the legislation is applied or becomes a reality.14 During 
concretisation, the abstract text of the legislation and the purpose of the legislation – 
which was determined earlier in the process – are correlated with the concrete facts 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 164. 
 




12 Dworkin Laws Empire at 225. 
 
13 Ibid. (Emphasis added) 
 




of the case, in order to reach a meaningful conclusion.15 Some of the other terms 
used to describe the process – are correlation, harmonisation, realisation and 
actualisation.16 In examining the term concretisation and other synonyms, what is 
apparent is that the words tend to convey a move away from the abstract to the 
practical reality of the situation.17 What has to be emphasized, however, is that the 
process is only complete when the prescribed constitutional values and principles are 
also given expression to. Section 39(2) of the Constitution – which requires that 
courts must attempt to reconcile the aim and purpose of legislation within the 
provisions in the Bill of Rights18 – reinforces the role of judges as enforcers or 
guardians of constitutional values thereby giving them a moral function.19 
However, the question of the law-making role of the courts during statutory 
interpretation is a matter of serious contention between on the one hand ‘textualists’ 
or the ‘pure literalists’, and on the other hand the contextualists or the ‘intentionalist 
literalists.’20 According to the textualists who tend to favour the more orthodox 
viewpoint, the role of the courts is a more conservative one, in that the judicial 






17 Du Toit ‘The dimension of Futurity in the Law: Towards a Renewal of the Theory of 
Interpretation’ (1977) Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap at 11. Du Toit points out that the essence 
of statutory interpretation lies in the realization of the possible meanings of the original, 
legislation.  Hence the use of the word ‘realisation’ or ‘actualisation’ to describe the process.  
The meaning of the text is tantamount to its application in a given concrete situation. Hence 
the use of the word ‘concretisation’ to describe the process. 
 
18 Section 39 provides that :- 
 ‘(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common-law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.’ 
 
19 Graham ‘SA Needs New Moral Code, Says Priest’ June 18-24, 2014 The Southern Cross at 
1.  The article acknowledges the need for a ‘moral code’ for the country’s law-making 
processes. Father Mkhatshwa of the Moral Regeneration Movement commented on the 
Constitutional Court Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng submission that ‘religion was to be 
factored into the law-making processes.’ It was further emphasized that such a moral code 
must be used to promote the best interests of the people, especially the disadvantaged. 
 




that the ipsissima verba of the legislation must be adhered to – no matter the 
consequences.21 The role of the court, therefore, is only to interpret legislation in a 
mechanical way. If there are any modifications, corrections or additions to be 
effected – such changes should be left to the legislature.22 A case in point is that of 
Engels v Allied Chemical Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd,23 where the viewpoint was 
reflected as follows: 
 
‘The basic reasoning behind this approach is that by remedying a defect 
which the Legislature could have remedied, the court is usurping the 
function of the Legislature and making law, not interpreting it.’ 
 
The contextualists or the ‘intentionalist literalists’, as they are also referred to, 
maintain a contrary view. Proponents of the intentionalist-literalist approach are of 
the opinion that the words of the legislation may be altered – provided that this 
process is clearly discernible from the intention of the legislature.24 Basically, this 
view is in keeping with the school of thought that courts do, in fact, have a creative 
law-making function during the process of interpretation. The stance maintained in 
Zimnat Insurance Co Ltd v Chawanda,25illustrates this thinking: 
 
‘…This is because judges have a certain amount of freedom or latitude in the 
process of interpretation and application of law. It is now acknowledged that 
judges do not merely discover the law, but they also make law. They take 
part in the process of creation. Law-making is an inherent and inevitable part 





22 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 160.  The idea that no changes are to be 
effected to the legislative text, except by the legislature, is consistent with the maxim iudicis 
est dicere non dare – which basically means that ‘it is the province of a judge to interpret the 
law, and not to make it.’  It is noted that maxim is in conflict with the purposive methodology 
and the ethos of the Constitution. 
 
23 1993 (4) SA 45 (Nm) at 54 A-B. 
 
24 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 231. 
 




The literalists’ viewpoint that the courts will usurp the power of the legislature when 
legislation is interpreted creatively, is based on a number of false assumptions, 
anomalies and contradictions.26 
 
The term often used to describe the process whereby changes are effected to the 
ipsissima verba, is the modification of language.’27 However, it has to be stressed 
that it is not essentially the language of the legislation that is modified at all – rather, 
the meaning of the legislation is ‘adapted’ during interpretation to give effect to the 
legislative purpose.28 Du Plessis is quite emphatic that the orthodox viewpoint which 
forms the basis of the literalists or textualists’ school of thought, which prohibits any 
form of modification as described above, could indeed ironically result in an 
incorrect and unjustifiable form of judicial law-making.29 Section 39(2) – which 
mandates the process of statutory interpretation – requires that the courts must 
reconcile the aims and the purpose of legislation with the provisions of the 
Constitution.30It is submitted that in a transformative Constitution, as alluded to, the 
function of the judge has to be a moral function. What is therefore required in the 
process of interpretation, is that judges need to embrace the challenge to give effect 
to social justice, by paying particular attention to the ethical and moral considerations 
in the process of legal reasoning and analysis of cases before them. The theory which 
underpins this rationale and which supports this approach, is the proposed deontic 






26 Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 97. 
 




29 Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes at 37. 
 
30 Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE) at 597-598,  the 
law-making function of the judiciary was expounded by the court as follows: ‘In terms of the 
Constitution, the courts bear the responsibility og giving specific content to those values and 
principles in any given situation.  In doing so, Judges will invariably “create” law… This 
does not mean that Judges should now suddenly enter an orgy of judicial law-making, but 
they should recognize that their function of judicial review, based on the supremacy of the 
Constitution, should not be hidden under the guise of simply seeking and giving expression 
to the will of the majority in Parliament.’ 
166 
 
5.2.2 Factors which support Modificative Interpretation 
 
There are a number of factors that support the law-making discretion of the courts 
during the interpretation of legislation. Some of these include: 
(i) The reading-down principle : where legislation is - on the face of it – 
unconstitutional, but is reasonably capable of another plausible 
interpretation compatible with the Constitution; 
(ii) Section 39 (2) of the Constitution: During interpretation the courts 
must try to reconcile the aim and purpose of the legislation with the 
provisions of the Constitution; 
(iii) Constitutional Supremacy: In terms of section 2 of the Constitution, 
the Constitution is the supreme law of the country; 
(iv) The common law presumptions: In particular, the presumption that 
the legislature does not intend futile, meaningless and nugatory 
legislation; and 
(v) The independence of the judiciary: In terms of Section 165(2) of the 
Constitution, this also facilitates judicial law-making.31 
 
5.2.3 Factors that Limit Judicial Law-Making During Statutory 
Interpretation 
 
(i) The principle and practice of democracy: Reference here is to 
section 1 of the Constitution and the preamble. Although the courts 
are described as being guardians of constitutional values, they are 
not allowed to take over the constitutional role of the legislature. 
They make law only in a secondary sense. 
(ii) The principle of separation of powers: This tends to support the 
textualists’ ideology that courts cannot make any alterations to the 
legislative text. 
(iii) The common-law presumption: that the legislature does not intend to 
change the existing law more than is necessary. 
                                                            




(iv) The rule of law and the principle of legality. 
(v) Judges and judicial officers are accountable and responsible for their 
judgments and actions on three levels: 
 First – personal responsibility; 
 Second – formal responsibility; and 
 Third – substantive accountability with reference to the 
constitutional values of accountability, responsiveness and 
openness expressed in section 1 (d) of the Constitution. 
(vi) Penal Provisions: the courts cannot create new crimes.32 
In attempting to address the question of whether judges make law in the process of 
judicial law-making, one’s attention is directed to the fact that a ‘full understanding 
of the judicial process on the part of the judge must be considered.33 The essence of 
this is captured by Judge Jerome Frank: 
 
‘To do their intricate job well our judges need all the clear consciousness of 
their purpose which they can summon to their aid. And the pretence, the self 
delusion, that when they are creating, they are borrowing, when they are 
making something new, they are merely applying the commands given them 
by some existing external authority, cannot but diminish their efficiency ... 
The honest, well trained judge with the completest possible knowledge of 
the character of his powers and his own prejudices and weaknesses is the 
best guarantee of justice.’34 
 
It is interesting that the learned judge refers to ‘the creating’ of and the ‘making of 
something new’ in the process of interpretation.35 Dugard affirms that once there is a 
clear ‘recognition of such creative powers of the judiciary, in the interpretation of 
statutes’, the law-making task for judges is made easier if they are guided by 




33 Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 381. 
 




36 Ibid at 382. Statsky is in agreement with Dugard that courts do in fact have the power to 
create law, and ascribes much of this to the general language of the statute.  See Statsky 
Legislative Analysis and Drafting at 11, which reflects the authors thinking on this aspect of 
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argument further in asserting that such legal values or principles should be employed 
to guide judicial policy and to assist the election that judicial officers are usually 
faced with. These legal values or principles should form part of the South African 
legal heritage, and must encapsulate the basic political and legal ideal of the modern 
democratic society, in order to promote the well-being and free the potential of the 
individual. These are today encapsulated in the Constitution. 
In reflecting on the key elements, as articulated above, what is clear is that Dugard is 
undoubtedly referring to a value-based method of interpretation. As a value-laden 
document, the Constitution is underpinned by a number of express and implied 
norms and values. The fundamental principles are not only the ideals to which the 
South African society has committed itself, but they also form the objectives which 
should now regulate all aspects of South African society.37 The spirit of the Bill of 
Rights referred to in section 39(2) of the Constitution, is a reflection of these 
fundamental principles. The spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights must be 
promoted during the process of interpretation.38 As guardians of the Constitution, 
judges must give expression to the values – to uphold and protect the Constitution.39 
This means that courts or judges will have to make value judgments during the 
interpretation and application of legislation.40 As a result of section 2 which declares 
the supremacy of the Constitution, and section 39(2) which articulates the manner in 
which laws are to be interpreted in the democratic era in South Africa, a ‘new’ 
jurisprudence has emerged. The value-based methodology mandated by section 
39(2), has resulted in a paradigmatic shift away from positivism to a jurisprudence 
that is akin to natural law. The formalistic literal approach to interpretation has been 
replaced by one which can be described as a purposive, and value-based 
                                                                                                                                                                        
interpretation: ‘…the courts role in applying statutes is very limited because of the doctrine 
of separation of powers.  In practice, however, the court often has a major creative role in the 
application of Statutes.  This is due to the nature a) of the language and b) of the legislative 
process.’ 
 




39 The sentiment that judges are guardians of constitutional values is reflected in Matiso v 
Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE), discussed above. 
 
40 Such value-judgments are consistent with a value-based methodology that underpins the 
operation of a teleological theory of interpretation. See Chapter 2 for a comprehensive 




methodology of interpretation. The methodology of interpretation that must be 
applied must be adapted to be brought in line with the values of the Constitution. As 
reflected in an examination of case-law, the ‘new’ jurisprudence requires a ‘new’ 
theory for interpretation. The proposed deontic theory – which embodies the 
elements of morality as its central feature and requires an amalgamation of the 
different methodologies of interpretation as its modus operandi – is most suited to a 
transformative constitution striving to further the agenda of social transformation. 
As already discussed, concretisation41 is the final stage in the interpretation process, 
during which the facts of the case and the relevant legislation are harmonised within 
the framework of the purpose of the legislation in a holistic manner. The possibilities 
which arise during the process of concretisation may also be influenced by the 
Constitution.42 Sometimes this may require a certain ‘tampering with the ipsissima 
verba of the statute’.43 Such modificative interpretation occurs when the initial 
meaning of the text does not correspond fully to the purpose of the legislation as 
influenced by the Bill of Rights, and its values. It also occurs where the text has 
stipulated either more or less than its purpose, or when the prima facie or the initial 
meaning of the text is in conflict with the Constitution and its inherent values.44 
Because the legislative text ‘bounds state authority’,45 Du Plessis cautions that the 
‘interpreter-judge is no legislator’46 and that such adaptive interpretation is to make 
sense of the legislature’s law as it stands and not to substitute the judge’s law for it.47 
Judges should therefore make the law only in a secondary sense and not in a primary 
sense as does the legislature.  
If the purpose indicates that modification is necessary (and possible), in principle 
there are two possibilities that may arise. Either the initial meaning of the text is 
reduced (restrictive interpretation), or the initial meaning is extended (extensive 
                                                            
41 See discussion at 4.2.1 Concretisationin the Chapter 4. 
 
42 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 166. 
 
43 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 229. 
 
44 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 166. 
 








interpretation). The canons and maxims that define the restrictive and extensive rules 
of interpretation will be explored more fully in this chapter.48 In examining the 
canons and maxims of interpretation, the purpose of this chapter is to provide clarity 
on the following important considerations. The first is directed at assessing the 
significance and relevance of the rules and maxims of interpretation in the current 
constitutional order in South Africa. If the enquiry reveals that the rules are found to 
be applicable and relevant, the next part of the analysis will be directed at 
ascertaining how these rules ought to be applied and given expression to promote the 
values in the Bill of Rights. This would also require an analysis of the relevant 
theories of interpretation.49 It is submitted that the canons and maxims found in the 
common-law are therefore still relevant but must be used to give expression to the 
values encapsulated in the Bill of Rights which are not only liberal but also socio-
economic in nature. 
 
5.3 Techniques of Restrictive Interpretation 
5.3.1 Definition 
 
Restrictive interpretation is applied when the words of a particular provision embrace 
more than its purpose. Courts employ the technique of restrictive interpretation to 
limit or restrict the meaning of the words. The meaning of the text is then modified to 
reflect the true purpose.50 
Restrictive interpretation is justified in order to bring the words in line with the clear 
object of the Act.51 It is submitted that where such object is absent, or perhaps not 
                                                            
48 For purposes of the research, only the more commonly used rules have been selected to 
illustrate their relevance for the operation of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation in 
the current constitutional order. 
 
49 The relevant theories of interpretation are examined in detail in Chapter 2, but are referred 
to  throughout the thesis to highlight the need for a new theory in the new dispensation. Such 
a theory is the proposed deontic theory of interpretation. 
 
50 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 121. De Ville provides that courts 
traditionally apply three forms of restrictive interpretation: noscitur a sociis, eiusdem generis 
and cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. Restrictive interpretation is however, not only 
limited to instances where the above-mentioned rules apply. Any interpretation which 
restricts the broader ordinary meaning of the text in light of the purpose of the legislation, is 
by definition restrictive interpretation. 
 
51 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 65.  
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clearly ascertainable, the technique of restrictive interpretation should be used to 
harmonise the meaning of a statutory provision with the common-law prior to the 
dispensation and in contemporary South Africa to bring it in line with the 
Constitution. The point emphasized here is that restrictive interpretation should be 
used not only to bring words in line with the legislature’s intention,52 but also in line 
with the values in the Constitution. For the purposes of the discussion, the following 
two manifestations of restrictive interpretation are discussed, to demonstrate their 
inherent flexibility:  
Eiusdem Generis Rule; and 
Cessante Ratione Legis, Cessat Et Ipsa Lex. 
 
5.3.2 Eiusdem Generis Rule 
 
This is a well known maxim which literally means ‘of the same kind’.53 The maxim 
is based on the noscitur a socciis principle, that words are known by those with 
which they are associated. This means that the meaning of the words is qualified by 
their relationship to other words, or, said another way, the maxim is used to restrict 
the meaning of general words by reference to specific words in their vicinity.54 
In the general application of the maxim, the procedure revolves around the 
establishing of the following: 
a) Do the words form a genus or class? 





53 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 170. 
 
54 Ibid. See for example, the application of the eiusdem generis rule in Poovalingam v Rajbansi 
1992 (1) SA 283 (A) at 294, where the words ‘or otherwise’ had to be interpreted eiusdem 
generis to include similar procedures by which parliamentary business is transacted. The 
letter did not relate to any business transacted in the House on that date.  The letter also did 
not fall within the ambit of any procedure recognized by Parliament.  The section therefore 
did not provide the respondent with the legal immunity for the consequences of publishing 
the letter.  See also S v Du Plessis 1981 (3) SA 382 (A) at 403-404, where it was held that the 
words ‘or any other means’ in terms of section 118 of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 had to be 




c) Does the statute express any intention as far as the general expression is 
concerned? 
If so, then the general expression must be interpreted eiusdem generis within the 
scope of the matters which form the genus or class and can only be applied if there is 
a definite genus or category.55 
Sacks v City Council of Johannesburg56 has been described as being an ‘exemplary 
illustration of how the maxim should be applied’.57 A traffic by-law provided that 
‘no person shall sit or be on any street, nor shall any person stand, congregate or 
walk or otherwise act in any such manner as to obstruct the free traffic ...’ 
The accused, a prominent trade unionist, had addressed a crowd of people which had 
gathered to hear him speak during an industrial dispute. He addressed the crowd 
from a car on a public street, and, as a result, caused an obstruction of the flow of 
traffic. What is evident from an analysis of the facts and findings in casu, is that the 
process starts off with a consideration of the actual words – whether addressing the 
crowd from a loudspeaker and the consequential traffic congestion it caused could be 
construed as being in contravention of the traffic by-law in question. Apart from a 
consideration of the actual words of the provision, a contextual examination of the 
law – in light of the other conduct mentioned in the by-law and other by-laws 
relating to the subject – proved to be most useful.58 The court was able to establish 
from the object or the purpose of the Act, that the law was intended to make 
punishable only conduct which caused an obstruction by the direct physical act of the 
person. The phrase ‘or other act’ had to be read ‘eiusdem generis’ to give effect to 
the object or the purpose of the statute.59 Therefore, in the final analysis, the court 
found that the traffic by-law did not apply to the individual who addressed a crowd 
of people that had gathered to hear him. This was a consequential obstruction. 
                                                            
55 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 170-172. 
 
56 1931 TPD 443. 
 
57 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 72. 
 
58 Ibid at 72-73. 
 




In reflecting on the outcome of the case, Devenish makes the point that the Sacks’ 
case might reflect that which has been referred to as being the ‘inarticulate premise’ 
of judicial sympathy to liberal values.60 With regard to some of the more 
controversial decisions, it would appear that judges have exercised their choice 
without providing a satisfactory explanation – which suggests that the ‘inarticulate 
premise may have played some part in the preference shown for certain precedents 
and principles, at the expense of others.61 It is therefore acknowledged that if the 
judicial process is regarded as an exercise in choice, and not as a purely mechanical 
operation, it will ‘open the way’ or allow for the judiciary to resolve competing 
claims and to exercise its choice in accordance with articulated judicial policy 
decisions, based on legal valves.62 
The ‘legal values’ that Dugard refers to epitomise a value-coherent or a teleological 
mode of interpretation.63 In terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, the 
fundamental values in the Bill of Rights are the foundation of a normative, value-
laden jurisprudence, during which all conduct has to be evaluated.64 A proponent of 
the teleological approach – Denning explains that the modus operandi of the 
teleological method of interpretation requires that whenever one is presented with a 
choice, one must choose the meaning that most accords with reason and justice.65 
This is precisely the manner in which the judge in Sacks applied his mind to the 
matter at hand, in order to arrive at his conclusion. Devenish is therefore justified in 
his submission that, had an executive-minded judge presided over the case, in all 
likelihood a completely different outcome and finding might have been reached.66 In 








63 See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 247-249, for an examination of the 
teleological theory of interpretation. 
 
64 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 108. 
 
65 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 46. 
 




application.67 The submission that the rule is to be applied with considerable 
circumspection,68 is therefore well received and relevant for the new dispensation. 
S v Buthelezi69 is an apt example of the application that the eiusdem generis rule is 
not to be applied mechanically. In the case, the statute made reference to ‘any place 
of entertainment, café, eating house, race course, or premises or place to which the 
public are granted to have access’. The court held that the words ‘... premises or 
place to which the public are granted to have access’, should be interpreted eiusdem 
generis and therefore they did not include a court-room and a police station as places 
of entertainment.70 Quite interestingly, however, the court in S v Sayed71 maintained 
a contrary view point in the application of the rule. A statute prohibited the 
obstruction of free passage along a public street ‘by means of any wagon, cart, or 
other thing whatsoever’. The court declined to interpret the words eiusdem generis 
and therefore found that the provision also included ‘full boxes of vegetables’ which 
had caused an obstruction – even though a genus or class was clearly discernible 
from the wording of the statute.72 
What is important, is that with regard to both above-mentioned cases is that, the 
actual wording of the particular statute or provision was the first consideration in 
order to determine whether there was in fact an accepted genus or class. While the 
application of the rule appears to have yielded a different outcome in each of the 
cases,73 the determining factor that the court took into consideration was the purpose 
of the legislation – as the rule may not be applied contrary to the legislature’s clear 
intention.74 What is therefore obvious about the role of a judge, is that it is not 
merely one of election, but also requires a moral evaluation of the text and the 
                                                            
67 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 125. 
 
68 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 70-71. 
 
69 1979 (3) SA 1349 (N). 
 
70 See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 71, for the authors comments about 
Buthelezi’scase. 
 
71 1962 (2) SA 128 (C) at 129. 
 
72 See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 73, for the authors comments about Sayed’s case. 
 
73 Reference here is made to S v Buthelezi 1979 (3) SA 1349 (N) and S v Sayed 1962 (2) SA 
128 (c). 
 




context, and therefore extends to both ‘linguistic’ and ‘non-linguistic 
considerations.’75 The amalgamation of the different methodologies is clearly 
evidenced in the courts’ approach to the question of interpretation. While the starting 
point of interpretation is initially a consideration of the words used, this has to extend 
to a consideration of the context and also to search for the purpose of the legislation. 
While the above cases were heard prior to the Constitution, subsequent to the 
Constitution it is necessary, in terms of section 39(2), to also conduct a ‘teleological 
evaluation.’ What is therefore evident is that the court’s approach in the application 
of the canons and maxims of interpretation is reflective of an eclectic methodology, 
which forms the modus operandi for the operation of the proposed deontic theory of 
interpretation. 
 
5.3.3 Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat Et Ipsa Lex 
 
The maxim literally means that ‘if the reason for the law ceases (or falls away) then 
the law itself also falls away.’76 However, an Act of Parliament or enacted legislation 
cannot fall away by reason of custom or circumstances; it is necessary for the 
legislature to actually repeal the legislation concerned. Therefore, there is merit in 
Botha’s argument that the cessante ratione rule is not applied in South Africa in its 
original form.77 
The question that arises – is when does one employ the rule? The rule is used as a 
device of restrictive interpretation, whereby the court gives effect to the purpose of 
the legislation, which justifies the suspension of the operation of the statute.78 This 
becomes necessary where it is revealed – from an examination of the circumstances 
of the case – that it would be futile or unnecessary to apply the legislation.79 One 
statute in particular – which has resulted in courts invoking the application of the 
                                                            
75 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 49. 
 
76 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 122. 
 
77 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 168. 
 
78 Ibid at 169. See the operation of the cessante ratione legis in Suliman v Hansa 1971 (4) SA 
69 (D); Ex Parte Vermaak 1977 (2) SA 129 (N) 133; and Singh v Govender Construction 






cessante ratione rule quite frequently – has been the defunct Stock Theft Act.80 
Before its amendment, section 10(1) provided for the levying of a compensatory fine. 
In some cases, the court was faced with the problem of whether the compensatory 
fine still had to be paid – even though the stolen stock had been returned to the 
owner. The cases of R v Mbamali and Xaba81 and R v Nteto,82 are considered here to 
compare the different approaches to statutory interpretation applied by the presiding 
judges, and to examine the outcome as a result thereof. While the court in R v 
Mbamali and Xaba enforced the letter of the law and levied the compensatory fine, 
in R v Nteto the court held that as the complainant in the matter had already been 
compensated, the purpose of the legislation had been achieved, and a compensatory 
fine was not necessary.83 What is clear, is that while the court in R v Mbamali and 
Xaba adopted the literal methodology in the interpretation of the provision – hence 
the finding that the compensatory fine was still required to be paid – the approach 
and methodology of the court in R v Nteto was unmistakably more purposive and 
value-coherent in nature.84 This is clearly reflected in Gane J’s reasoning, where he 
applies his mind to the question of interpretation of the legislation, as follows:85 
 
‘I think the object of Section 10 of Act 26 of 1923 is to secure compensation 
to complainants; and once however that object has been secured, the 
necessity of the compensatory fine falls away.’ 
 
Devenish’s remarks, that the approach of the court in attempting to ascertain the 
legislature’s presumed intention ‘pursuant to the uncertainty of the legislature’s 
intention’, is in-keeping with a value-based evaluation that is pivotal to teleological 
interpretation.86 In applying the same maxim in De Kock v Resident Magistrate of 
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81 1938 NPD 2. 
 
82 1940 EDL 305. 
 
83 See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 169, for a commentary on the 
application of the cessante ratione legis rule in  Ntetos case. 
 
84 See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 68, for a critique of the application of the cessante 
ratione legis rule in  Mbamali and Xaba  and Nteto. 
 
85 See De Ville - Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation at 123 for the authors comment 
about the operation of the Stock Theft Art 26 of 1923 in Nteto’s case.  
 




Caledon,87 where the provision to be considered provided that ‘no person in any 
district where not less than two attorneys practice, shall be committed and enrolled as 
an agent’, one finds De Villers CJ vacillating between a literal and a purposive 
methodology – with the judge eventually electing to apply a literal approach.88 This 
is decidedly not the way in which the provision should have been applied. 
 
In making reference to the dilemma faced by judges in the process of interpretation, 
where they are often faced with conflicting approaches or competing values of 
construction, the point is made that because there is no hierarchy of rules of statutory 
construction and presumptions, the judge has the discretion to select that which he 
feels is best suited to the interpretation of the statute before him.89 This reinforces the 
point made by the renowned judge Felix Frankfurter, that the process of construction 
is ‘not an exercise in logic or dialectic,’, but rather an ‘exercise in choice ...’.90 As 
seen with the operation of the other maxims of interpretation, what is evident from an 
examination of the relevant cases, is that the process of interpretation is clearly an 
eclectic one – commencing with an analysis of the ordinary grammatical meaning of 
the words, and thereafter requiring a teleological evaluation of all of the facts under 
examination. It is therefore clear that this maxim is compatible with the ethos of the 
democratic constitutional dispensation. 
 
5.4 Techniques of Extensive Interpretation and the Maxims 
Related to Such Interpretation 
5.4.1 Definition 
 
Extensive interpretation is the opposite of restrictive interpretation. This occurs in 
instances where the purpose is broader than the initial meaning of the legislation. The 
meaning of the text is then extended within the framework of the purpose of the 
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88 See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 69, for the author’s criticism of the approach 
adopted by the judge in De Kocks case. 
 
89 Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order at 370. 
 




legislation – to give effect to that purpose. This applies where the legislation has 
specified less, but in fact intended more.91 
Extensive interpretation, however, does not only refer to instances where particular 
words are assigned wider connotations – as described above. It also involves inter 
alia reading further words into a statute by way of implication.92 Generally, when 
courts employ this method of interpretation, they do so with a degree of 
circumspection.93 The important consideration in the process of interpretation is the 
reason for the promulgation of the Act. Once this is ascertained, the courts will look 
to provide a meaning that furthers – rather than one that frustrates the purpose of the 
legislation.94 
As with the techniques of restrictive interpretation, the more commonly accepted and 
used maxims that are applied quite frequently in South African courts have been 
selected, and will form the basis of the analysis. The following mechanisms of 
extensive interpretation – interpretation by implication and interpretation by analogy 
– will be explored more fully. 
 
5.4.2 Interpretation by Implication 
 
Interpretation by implication involves extending the textual meaning on the grounds 
of a reasonable and essential implication which is evident from legislation. Express 
provisions are thus extended by implied provisions.95 It is emphasized that the ‘test’ 
that courts use generally when applying the rules of interpretation by implication, are 
                                                            
91 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 172. 
 
92 An illustration of words being read into a statute by way of implication, is evident in Rennie 
NO v Gordan and Another NNO 1988 (1) SA 1 (A) at 22. This approach has also been 
adopted in the interpretation of the Constitution in Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others 
NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
  
93 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 76. 
 
94 This methodology where courts must attempt to further the purpose of legislation, is 
purposive.  The Constitutional Court has adopted the view that, in general, a generous or 
broad interpretation should be given to the Bill of Rights  See S v Zuma and Others 1995 (4) 
BCLR 401 (SA) para 14; and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another 
v Minister of Justice and Other 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) para 21. 
 




not only instances of usefulness or convenience – but also necessity.96 Such 
implication may arise from inference abstracted from an examination of all the 
provisions of the statute.97 There are various grounds that could result in the 
provisions of the legislation being extended by implication. What is noted, is that 
most of these grounds tend to overlap and are not always easy to prove.98 – as is 
illustrated: 
(i) Interpretation ex contrariis 
The implication here arises from opposites. If the legislation 
provides for a particular case, then the implication is that it makes a 
contrary provision for the opposite case.99 The maxim generally 
overlaps with the expression unius est exclusion alterius rule.100 
(ii) Inclusio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius Rule 
The rule basically provides that the expression of one thing results in 
the exclusion of the other.101 Devenish describes it as the ‘rule of 
logical thought’.102 In Keeley v Minister of Defence,103 the court 
refused to apply the rule, since the court found that in doing so 
would defeat the purpose of the legislation. In terms of the Defence 
                                                            
96 See for example Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter 1938 AD 195, where the court found 
that a municipality has a statutory right to contain a river for the purposes of water supply. It 
also therefore by implication has a right to remove washed-up silt from the dam.  
 
97 See for example Mpehle v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Another 1996 (7) 
BCLR 921 (CK) at 928-930.  The court in casu examined section 149 (4) (d) and section 153 
(4) of the 1993 Constitution, to decide whether the power to terminate the membership of a 
member  of the province, included the power to suspend such a member. 
 
98 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 173. 
 
99 See application of the Ex Contrari is Rule in S v Mjoli and Another 1981 (3) SA 1233 (A) at 
1247. 
 
100 Mureinik ‘Expressio Unius: Exclusio Alterius? (1987) South African Law Journal at 264. 
 
101 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 85. 
 
102 Ibid at 86. In Chotabhai v Union Government (Minister of Justice) and Registrar of Asiatics  
12911 AD 13 at 28, it was said that the maxim: ‘may sometimes afford useful guidance for 
construing a doubtful enactment, but it is not a rigid rule of construction to be applied 
without reference to the context in which the expression… occurs.’ Notwithstanding the fact 
that the quotation refers directly to Chotabhai’s case, it highlights an important aspect of the 
maxims, which is their flexibility in nature, making them still relevant and applicable in the 
current constitutional order to further the aims of social transformation. 
 




Act,104 section 3 stipulated that ‘every citizen’ was liable to undergo 
compulsory military training. The issue in contention, was whether 
the application of the above rule would result in a non-citizen not 
being compelled to undergo military training. In examining the other 
provisions of the Act, the court declined to invoke the rule in the 
circumstances of the case.105 
The application of the rule requires a weighing up of all the relevant 
linguistic, contextual and common-law considerations in order to 
determine whether judicial law-making was justified in the 
circumstances.106 The methodology once again supports that which 
has been proposed in this chapter as well as others – that the process 
of interpretation involves an analysis of an amalgamation of the 
various methodologies of interpretation when construing legislation. 
It is submitted that the inherent flexibility of the maxims and the 
amalgamation of the methodologies that forms the basis of their 
modus operandi, favours the operation of the proposed deontic 
theory in the constitutional era in South Africa.107 
(iii) Interpretation by Implication ex consequentibus 
With regard to the application of the rule in the case below, it is 
necessary to decide whether a prohibition or authorisation, not 
contained in the express words of the provision, is implied.108 
 
The case of Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter109 is relevant to 
the discussion. In the matter, the court had to decide whether a law 




105 See discussion in Botha Statutory Interpretation (4th edition) at 106, for the operation of the 
inclusiouniusest exclusion alteriusrule in Keeley’s case. 
 
106 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 86. 
 
107 The amalgamation of the methodologies compares favourably with the eclectic methodology 
that has been proposed for the operation of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation. See 
Chapter 1, 1.6.4 Eclecticism, for a closer analysis of the terms eclectic and eclecticism. 
 
108 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes at 86. 
 




dam, also included the right to remove silt – which infringed upon 
the rights of a landowner. Once again, in its analysis of the matter, 
what is evident is that the court did not only focus on the linguistic 
aspects of the legislation, but also extended its analysis to the 
balancing of the rights of the Council and those of the landowner. In 
so doing, it was necessary to give effect to all of the fundamental 
jurisprudential issues which also justified judicial law-making – 
more specifically, interpretation by implication – in giving effect to 
the ex consequentibus rule.110 
In applying the rule, Stratford J arrived at the following outcome: 
‘I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion on the 
evidence that without the right to remove the silt, the right 
and power of the municipality cannot be properly enjoyed or 
exercised. If this is the position in fact the law is clear, that 
the right to clean (ie. take away silt) is one conferred by 
necessary implication.’111 
(iv) Interpretation ex accessoria eius de quo verba loguuntur 
Basically the rule provides that if the principal thing is forbidden or 
permitted, then the accessory thing is also forbidden or permitted.112 
In order to apply the rule effectively, it is essential to distinguish 
between accessory powers. It would appear that even though 
accessory powers are much wider than necessary powers – in reality, 
such a distinction is, in fact, an artificial one.113 This is supported by 
the fact that courts tend to use the terms ‘reasonably incidental’114 
and ‘reasonably ancillary’115 interchangeably. In Moleah v 
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University of Transkei and Others116 Van Zyl J drew attention to the 
fact that ancillary and incidental powers have either to be reasonably 
incidental or reasonably ancillary to the conferred power.  He 
maintained further that although ancillary and incidental powers are 
broader concepts than necessary or essential powers, the use of the 
adjective ‘reasonably’ implies necessity.117 
 
Due to the fact that the approach that has been adopted, for purposes of the 
research, with regard to the rules and the presumptions of interpretation, has 
been to focus on only selected rules and presumptions of interpretation, in 
examining the canons and the maxims of interpretation, it is emphasized that 
only the selected maxims form the crux of the debate. For the reasons 
submitted, the natura ipsius rei118 and the ex correlativis119 are only noted 
here as maxims that may also be employed to extend the purpose of the text. 
 
5.4.3  Interpretation by Analogy 
 
This method of interpretation involves extending the legislative provisions from one 
case to an analogous one – where the language of the legislation concerned does not 
expressly provide for such a case. If legislation applies to certain instances and its 
purpose can apply equally to other instances, the provisions of the legislation in 
question must be extended to such other instances on the basis of equality of ratio.120 
Maxwell refers to this technique as ‘equitable construction’, and submits that the rule 
was not very popular in England.121It is noted that due to the obvious influence of 
                                                            
116  1988 (2) SA 522 (TK). 
 
117 Ibid at 538. 
 
118 The maxim is concerned with inherent relationships. So, for example, the power to issue a 
regulation implies the power to withdraw it. 
 
119 The maxim deals with mutual and reciprocal relationships. 
 
120 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 174, 
 
121 Maxwell On Interpretation of Statutes 1969 at 236.  The author defines ‘equitable 
construction’ as extending to general cases the application of an enactment, which literally, 
was limited to a special case, on the ground, in the words of Coke, that ‘it was the wisdom of 
ancient parliaments to comprehend much matter in few words.’ He further advances a 
definition of the ‘equity’ according to Powden as that which enlarges or diminishes the latter 
according to its discretion…Experience shows us that no lawmakers can foresee all things 
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English law on South African law, the South African courts and judiciary, as a result, 
have also shown an aversion to analogical interpretation.122 
Steyn has asserted that interpretation by analogy should also be considered as 
interpretation by implication.123 He has submitted further that – even though our 
courts have shown a resistance to employ this particular technique of interpretation – 
its use may be justified. This is on the basis that no matter how ‘painstakingly and 
exhaustively statutes are drafted, it is virtually impossible for a legislature to foresee 
every concatenation of circumstances that may arise – hence the drafting of 
legislation in such a manner that would allow for the ‘combinations of factual 
situations’124 not provided for expressly in the provision. Steyn’s research on the 
subject has revealed that interpretation by analogy was not applied in Roman-Dutch 
law where it would make inroads into the rule of law – for example, as indicated 
below: 
 
(i) In the case of legis correctivae and leges exorbitanes – i.e. statutory 
provisions which change the common law or make inroads into the 
principles of common law; 
(ii) With regard to laws which impose penalties or remove or limit rights 
– i.e. casibus odiosis; 
(iii) In the case of leges singulars or personales – i.e. laws presumably 
intended for specified circumstances or particular persons; and  
(iv) In provisions where restrictive words or expressions such as ‘only’ 
or ‘to this extent only’ are used. In such cases, an extended meaning 
would be in conflict with the apparent intention of the legislation.125 
It has been observed that because interpretation by analogy is a consequence of the 
purposive theory of interpretation found in Roman-Dutch law, it involved a 
                                                                                                                                                                        
which may happen, and therefore it is fit that if there be any defect in the law, it should be 
reformed by equity…’  
 










‘jurisprudential synthesis of natural law’ to be justified and hence applied.126 
However, due to the influence of English law and the dominance of parliamentary 
sovereignty prior to the new democratic dispensation, our courts were reluctant to 
apply a purposive methodology, and generally declined to fill in gaps or omissions in 
statutes.127 Nevertheless, there have been a few exceptions where our courts have 
decided otherwise. A case in point is S v Mpofu,128 where the court found that where 
there is clear evidence that an article or section thereof has been omitted as a direct 
result of a printer’s error, the court is obliged to insert or provide the missing words. 
This position is also reflected in Ex Parte Wilson,129 where the court held that: 
 
‘this is a case not provided for and accordingly an order of Court is 
necessary and it seems to the Court that a procedure must be adopted which 
will correspond as nearly as possible to that laid down in the Act and 
regulations already referred to and that the officials should act in accordance 
with the spirit of the provision quoted, and attempt, as nearly as possible, to 
follow them out’.130 
 
It is noted that while prior to the new constitutional era our courts vacillated over the 
role of judges – particularly with regard to the filling in of gaps of provisions in 
legislation – this position has been changed fundamentally since the inception of the 
Constitution and, in particular, by section 39(2).131 As guardians or enforcers of the 
Constitution, judges are mandated to give effect to the ‘spirit, purport and object of 
the Bill of Rights’. This reinforces the creative element that is fundamental to 
judicial law-making and the moral obligation on the part of judges to give expression 
to the values of the Constitution so as to facilitate and promote transformation. 
Dugard endorses the creative role of judges in filling in gaps of a statute where 
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 ‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common-law or customary law, 





jurisprudentially justified. It is maintained that in terms of the process of 
interpretation, these rules are not used to guide a judge to a particular interpretation, 
but to justify an interpretation already arrived at by judicial intuition.132  Labuschagne 
describes the creative law-making function that occurs during statutory 
interpretation, as secondary or a ‘sub-ordinate law-making function’ that inevitably 
forms part of the process.133 He explains further that legislation, as a document, is 
‘incomplete’, and it is only when the court applies the legislation that it becomes 
‘real’ and a ‘complete’ functional statute.134 For this reason, it is submitted that the 
role of the judge is accentuated by the fact that they are expected to play a role in 
ensuring that ‘the final link in the legislative chain’,135 is in keeping with the aims 




As has already been discussed, the role of the judiciary – to promote the values of the 
Constitution – is clearly mandated in terms of section 39.136 However, what is 
apparent, is that the discretion of the judiciary to modify or adapt the initial meaning 
of the text, is limited.137 If the purpose of the legislation is not sufficiently clear, or if 
it does not support a modification or adaptation of the initial meaning of the text, the 
legislature has to rectify the errors or supply the omissions in the legislation.138 
 
There may, however, be cases that arise whereby the court would not be able to 
supply an omission in the particular legislation.139 In such instances, the common-
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136 Section 39 (1) of the Constitution  provides that:- 
 ‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom……’ (Emphasis Added) 
 








law may be referred to in order to complete the concretisation process.140 Such 
judicial law-making is ‘legitimate’ – provided it takes place within clearly defined 
parameters that reflect the principles and ethos of the common-law and the 
Constitution.141 Due to the fact that, section 39(2) of the Constitution, provides that 
the common-law has to also be in-keeping with constitutional values, requires that 
the common-law is brought in line with the values and principles of the Constitution 
in the process of interpretation.142 
As discussed in this chapter and as is shown throughout this dissertation – what is 
evident from examination of the various rules, maxims, techniques and aids to 
interpretation, is that in the process of interpretation is eclectic. While the process 
initially starts with the literal theory and an examination of the ordinary grammatical 
meaning of the words (literal theory), in order to ascertain the ipsissima verba, the 
enquiry tends to further lend itself to conducting a contextual examination of the 
background (contextual theory). A search for the purpose for the promulgation of the 
legislation is also highly relevant to the evaluation (purposive theory). The process 
is, however, not complete until the legislation is tested against the values and 
principles of the Constitution (teleological mode of interpretation). The combined 
operation of the methodologies of interpretation, as indicated above, is eclectic.  
The creative application of the discretion of judges is now mandated in terms of 
section 39(2) of the Constitution – which provides that the ‘spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights must be promoted during the process of interpretation’, while 
section 39(1) refers to an open and democratic society based on democratic values, 
of which freedom, equality and human dignity are singled out as being the corner-
stones or pillars.143 The moral and ethical elements that comprise the basis of the 
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Rights.’ (Emphasis added) 
 
143 Section 39(1) of the Constitution provides that:- 
 ‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 




enquiry in terms of section 39, informs the proposed deontic theory that has been 
identified as being the preferred theory of interpretation in the current constitutional 
era. Section 39(2) mandates that the common-law and customary law have to be 
developed to reflect constitutional values. From Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security,144 the stance of the Constitutional Court is reflected as being not purely 
discretionary, but that there is in fact an obligation on courts to develop the common 
law appropriately. As a result of this constitutional mandate, it is clear that section 39 
(2) and section 7, invites pro-activism.   
 
What is evident from case-law,145 is that the methodology for the interpretation and 
application of the canons and maxims of interpretation resembles the eclectic 
methodology that is suggested as the modus operandi for the operation of the 
proposed deontic theory. To meet the needs of a transformative society however, a 
pro-active interpretation and application of the law is essential.  Such a pro-active, 
eclectic methodology is what characterises the operation of the proposed deontic 
theory of interpretation in the current constitutional era in South Africa. 
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145 See for example, Keeley v Minister of Defence 1980 (4) SA 695 (T); S v Mjoli and Another 
1981 (3) SA 1233 (A) and Mpehle v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Another 




THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN 
LAW ON SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Due to the interpretive directive in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution – that 
‘when interpreting legislation ... every court, tribunal and forum, must consider 
international law and may consider foreign law’,1 the influence of international and 
foreign law is the crux of the discussion in Chapter 6. This immediately raises a host 
of questions about the nature and existence of international law. The first of these is 
whether international law qualifies as a system of law. 
According to John Austin’s theory that law is the command of a political superior (to 
a political inferior) – backed by a threat of sanction – international law does not 
qualify as law. Hart, who rejected Austin’s command theory of law, was willing to 
accept international law as a species of ‘law’.2 However, of all of the submissions 
that have been made to assess whether international law qualifies as a system of law, 
Pollock’s identification of specific elements has been considered as being the most 
satisfactory response to the question. Pollock asserts a legal system of law, is where 
there is a political community and recognition by its members of settled laws binding 
upon them. In terms of the criteria articulated by Pollock, international law therefore 
qualifies as a system of law, for three reasons: 
i. Because there is a political community – over 191 modern states – there is the 
existence of a political community. 
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ii. There is a set of established rules and principles that comprise the 
international legal order. 
iii. The members of the international community recognize these rules and 
principles as binding upon them.3 
While history has revealed incidents of violation of international law, generally it is 
observed that states do comply with international law. To put it categorically, 
‘international law is not binding because it is enforced, but it is enforced because it is 
already binding’.4  While the origins of international law can be traced as far back as 
the ancient histories of the Egyptians, Jews, Greeks and Romans, it was not until the 
Roman and medieval times that the scholarly jurists had a role to play in the 
development of international law. Due to the fact that in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries the Netherlands was a leader of economic and intellectual life in 
Europe, it is not surprising that the Dutch contribution to the development of 
international law was most significant. Grotius, the acclaimed ‘father of international 
law’, and Van Bynkershoek a distinguished judge who wrote extensively on 
maritime and commercial law, were the most instrumental in shaping the new 
international order.5  What is noteworthy about the contribution of each of these 
writers, is that it also reflected the genesis of the natural law versus the positivism 
debate. While Grotius’s work De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres – which reflected the 
idea that ‘the law of nature is a dictate of reason’ – contributed to modern natural 
law, Van Bynkershoek’s emphasis on the importance of consent in the form of 
custom or treaty as the basis of international law, revealed him to be one of the early 
positivists.6  While the natural law versus the positivism debate underpins the field of 
international law – its undeniable influence on other aspects of law cannot be 
ignored. It is emphasized that this debate is also significant in the field of statutory 
interpretation – particularly with regard to the theory or the methodology that should 
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5 Ibid at 9-10.De Jure Praeda was not published during Grotius’s lifetime. It discovered in 
1864 and published in 1868. De Domino Maris (1702), De Foro Legatorum (1721) and 
Quaestionum Juris Publici (1737) were amongst the works that were undertaken by Van 
Bynkershoek. 
 




inform the process of statutory interpretation – and it is therefore a theme that 
reverberates throughout this chapter and others. 
It is clearly evident that an examination of the statutory process in the preceding 
chapters has revealed that the interpretation and application of section 39 has 
transformed the process of interpretation – from a ‘mechanical re-iteration of what 
was supposedly “intended” by parliament’, to that which is now permitted by the 
Constitution.7 As a result, a transformed methodology – which prescribes the manner 
in which laws are to be interpreted – has seen the emergence of a new jurisprudence. 
This jurisprudence is clearly no longer one of positivism, but is akin to natural law. It 
therefore raises the question as to the extent of the influence of international and 
foreign law in shaping the ‘evolving’ jurisprudence in a post-democratic 
constitutional era in South Africa. For this reason,8 this chapter is intended to: 
a) explore the mandate contained in section 39(2); 
b) formulate an understanding of the distinction between international law and 
foreign law; and 
 
c) determine how the influence of international law and foreign law has 
transformed (and continues to transform) the methodology and theory of 
interpretation in the current constitutional order in South Africa. 
 
6.2 Comparative Law 
6.2.1 Is Comparative Law a Method, a Discipline or a Science?9 
Constantinesco considers that the prime purpose of the science of comparative law is 
to classify world legal systems into a few large families. Watson’s definition is 
similar to that of Constantinesco, to some extent. He submits that comparative law is 
                                                            
7 Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th Edition) at 103. In Union Government v Mack 1917 AD 
731, it was held that the intention of the legislature should be deduced from the words used in 
the legislation; in other words the plain meaning of the text in an intentional disguise. 
 
8 See discussion in Chapter 3, 3.7 The Interpretation and Application of section 39. 
 
9 See Venter Constitutional Comparison – Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa As 





to be regarded as an academic discipline in its own right. He qualifies his statement 
on the basis that it is a study of the relationship – above all the historical relationship 
– between legal systems or between rules of more than one system. Kokkini-
Iatridow, from her examination of the subject, disagrees with Constantinesco. She is 
of the opinion that even though comparative law is capable of developing into an 
independent scientific discipline, it is not to be regarded as a science.10 
However, of all of the views on the subject, the submission by Peter de Cruz – that 
comparative law is neither a branch of law, nor a body of rules, but is a method of 
study – is the most sound. His well-considered, well-structured definition of 
comparative law is articulated as follows: 
 
‘Modern comparative law draws on a range of disciplines, but is eclectic in 
its selection. It recognizes the important relationship between law, history 
and culture and operates on the basis that every legal system is a special 
mixture of the spirit of its people, and is the product of several intertwining 
and interacting historical events which have produced a distinctive national 
character and ambience’.11 
 
It is submitted that the above definition is without doubt a more a comprehensive 
one than the others presented above. It has, at its core, some important elements in 
its formulation – that the others seem to ignore. Elements encapsulated in Peter de 
Cruz’s definition (and lacking in the others) are: 
 
(i) a recognition of history and culture; 
(ii) an appreciation of a special mixture of the spirit of its people; 
(iii) the acknowledgement that, as a final product, every legal system is 
unique; and 
(iv) the assertion that the discipline itself is eclectic. 
 
What is apparent, is that the view that a reader interested in justificatory practices in 
the interpretation of statutes in any particular system can come to understand that 
                                                            
10 Ibid at 16. (Emphasis added). 
 




system better by attempting to understand what it is not- is indeed quite perceptive.12 
There is no one-size-fits-all, or no standard recipe for valid comparative research.  
However, giving due consideration to the factors as identified above, when effecting 
a comparison it will surely yield well-conceived and executed research.  
Nevertheless, the view that being overtly concerned with the nature and 
methodology of the pursuit of legal comparison may prove to be an obstacle in the 
ascertaining of useful results13– is beneficial. 
6.2.2 Understanding the Purpose for Comparative Law 
The process of legal comparison depends, to a large extent, on the purpose for which 
it is undertaken. The purpose of legal comparison can therefore vary widely – 
depending on the particular purpose of the research. According to Zweigert and 
Kötz, generally, the more specific purpose that legal comparisons would be 
conducted, are for the following reasons: 
 
(i) As an aid to the legislative process. 
(ii) As an instrument of interpretation of law. 
(iii) As a vehicle for teaching law. 
(iv) As a means of promoting legal unification. 
(v) The development of a common private-law system (particularly in 
Europe).14 
 
Kazuyuki Takahashi suggests that there are two purposes for effecting a comparative 
study: 
 
 To look for possible solutions to constitutional problems – to which other 
countries could have found a solution; and 
                                                            




14 Ibid at 19.  According to Zweigert and Kötz, the more profound the purpose of comparison 
becomes, the more paragidmatic will be the tertiumcomparatonis and its distinction from 
compatibility; the more the emphasis is on the production of new and verified scientific 
knowledge, the more important does the sensible compatibility most likely be co-determined 




 A more detached and objective manner of observing foreign constitutional 
laws with a sense of general curiosity.15 
 
Engaging in a comparative analysis is beneficial for the following reasons: 
 
(i) Knowing about constitutional issues and theories discussed in 
foreign countries, is always stimulating and fascinating; 
(ii) It helps widen ones perspective about other possibilities of 
constitutional thinking; 
(iii) It provides new ways or frames of looking at constitutional law; and 
(iv) It enables one to become aware of constitutional issues that could 
have been missed, and also of potential issues sure to arise in the 
near future in ones own country. 
(v) It provides an understanding not only of the constitutional laws of 
foreign countries, but also of ones own – through raising awareness 
of similarity and difference in respective laws.16 
 
The benefit of adopting the latter objective approach – as outlined above – is 
significant for a number of reasons. As a relatively ‘new’ democratic constitutional 
state, South Africa is in a position that enables its judiciary to turn to, consider, and 
to reflect on, constitutional issues in foreign jurisdictions – and to find possible 
solutions when confronted with similar problems. Generally, an effective 
comparison with foreign jurisdictions does not only reveal similarities, the 
differences in respect of the operation of law, the application of theories and 
approaches to statutory interpretation are also noted. It is therefore intended to adopt 
a similar approach to a comparative analysis of international and foreign law – to 
that articulated by Takahashi above.  In the South African context the role and 
emphasis of international law is particularly relevant. Whereas international law was 
                                                            
15 Jackson and Tushnet Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law at 47. 
 
16 Ibid. See also MacCormick and Summers Interpreting Statutes-A Comparative Study at 24, 
where it is submitted that; ‘one of the great virtues of a comparative approach in legal and 
jurisprudential studies, is the heightened awareness of its own system, both in reminding one 
of its traditional and well understood strengths and weaknesses, and yet also, all the more, in 
enabling one to notice and appreciate hitherto unnoticed features.’ This statement is 
particularly relevant for purposes of the research as comparatively the South African 
Constitution is a relatively new constitution compared to most other jurisdictions. 
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previously regarded as a threat to the state, it is now viewed as one of the pillars of 
democracy. 17        
6.3 A Consideration of the Features of Selected Constitutional States 
and their Influence on South Africa Law 
The jurisdictions which have been selected include: 
(i) Canada; 
(ii) United States of America; 
(iii) Germany; and 
(iv) United Kingdom 
The reason for the selection of the above mentioned jurisdictions relate mainly to 
the fact that they have been instrumental in influencing the development of South 
Africa law over the past few decades particularly in constitutional law and 
human rights.  
6.3.1 Canada 
Modern Canadian constitutionalism is significant for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, as a former British-colonial dispensation, founded upon the supremacy of 
the British Parliament, that prevailed in Canada over a hundred years, it was 
transformed in 1980 into a system directed by a supreme Constitution and 
Charter of Rights.  Secondly, and that which makes it relevant to the research, is 
that constitutional jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court has become an 
‘influential reference point’ in the development of constitutionalism18.  This is 
especially the case in countries like South Africa with a history of parliamentary 
sovereignty modelled on the Westminster System.19 
                                                            
17   Dugard ‘International Law and the South African Constitution’ (1997) European Journal of 
International Law at 77.  
 
18 Venter Constitutional Comparison-Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa as 
Constitutional States at 27. 
 
19                 De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context at 42.  See the authors’ 
discussion of the Westminster system which is described as follows: ‘The Westminster model 
has its origin in Britain.  Of particular importance is the fact that the Westminster 
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The Supreme Court of Canada is not established in terms of constitutionalism, 
but is a feature of an ordinary federal state.  Section 52(1) of the Canadian Act20 
introduced an important element to Canadian constitutional law.  Previously due 
to the British-colonial supremacy of a parliament doctrine, the courts 
constitutional testing function related mostly to matters of federal-provincial 
legislative authority.  The introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms in 1980, projected the fundamental rights dimension of the constitution 
to the fore, and in so doing making the Constitution an ‘absolute standard.’21 
Another significant contribution that the Supreme Court has made to the process 
of interpretation of rights entrenched in the Charter, is that it has set out the two 
basic sets of tests or standards for the validity of law interfering with one’s 
constitutional rights, namely reasonableness and proportionality.22  Further, the 
approach of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd23 has often 
been referred to in a number of judgements in South African Courts.  In the cases 
of S v Zuma24 and The Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical 
Fruits25 the Constitutional Court, followed the position of the Canadian Supreme 
Court by making reference to the following dictum of the case of R v Big M Drug 
Mart Ltd:  
‘In my view... the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be 
sought, by reference to the character and larger objects of the Charter [of 
                                                                                                                                                                        
constitutional model is premised on the British Constitution and is actively a series of 
conventions, ordinary laws in the form of statutes, common-law and case law, that broadly 
regulate state power as well as the regulations between the State and its citizens.  Where the 
Westminster model has been adopted, particularly in former British colonies such as pre-
democratic South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe, the practice has been to reduce the 
Constitution to writing.  An important feature of the Westminster system is that of 
parliamentary sovereignty or parliamentary supremacy which basically means that there is no 
Bill of Rights which denies Parliament the power to destroy or curtail liberties.  Parliament is 
said to have the power to make any law on any subject.’  
 
20 Canadian Act of 1980. 
 
21 Venter Constitutional Comparison-Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa as 
Constitutional States at 94-94. 
 
22 Ibid at 96. 
 
23 1985 18 DLR (4th) 321. 
 
24 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
 




Rights and Freedoms] itself, to the language chosen to articulate the 
specific right or freedom to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, 
and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific 
rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the 
Charter. The implementation should be ...a generous rather than a legalistic 
one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for 
individuals the full benefit of the Charter’s protection.’26 
Many courts both South African and Candian, have often referred to R v Big M 
Drug Mart Ltd to re-inforce support for the application of the purposive 
methodology, as is evidenced here. The obvious influence of Canadian 
constitutionalism in shaping the emerging jurisprudence in South African law in 
this respect apparently in South African case law is noted.27 
6.3.2 United States of America 
The following influence of the United States constitutional model may be 
regarded as being significant to the development of the South African 
Constitution. An important feature of the United States constitutional model is 
that of constitutional supremacy. Like the South African Constitution, which 
declares its supremacy, the United States Constitution, is also premised on the 
idea that the Constitution is the highest law and that all law and conduct are 
required to comply with it.28 
The inclusion of Bill of Rights which serves to protect individuals’ freedoms and 
liberties is an important contribution. Constitutionally protected rights in the Bill 
of Rights were also responsible for a so-called ‘rights culture’ in the South 
African context. The manner in which this operates is two-fold, not only are 
                                                            
26 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 18 DLR (4th) 321 at 95-96. 
 
27   R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 18 DLR (4th) 321 has been cited in S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 
(CC) and Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 
199 (CC). 
 




fundamental rights protected, but it also serves as a limit on the power of 
government not to infringe on freedoms and liberties of individuals.29 
Another important feature that has been borrowed from the United States system, 
is that of judicial review.30  The techniques that facilitate such a process in South 
African law, include the reading-in, reading-down, severance.31 
6.3.3 Germany 
Similar to the model of the United States of America, the German model 
operates on that of constitutional supremacy.  This brings into focus the concept 
of Rechstaat, which basically affirms that the Constitution is the highest law and 
all law and conduct must be subject to the Constitution.32  In terms of the South 
African Constitution, the notion of constitutional supremacy has far-reaching 
implications. From a historical perspective, it is obvious that the German 
constitutional model, was drafted in reaction to Nazi atrocities, so as to ensure 
that the inhumane conditions to which people were subjected, are never repeated. 
Likewise the South African constitutional model was drafted in response to 
notorious and abhorrent apartheid legislation.33  To that extent the similarities are 
noted. 
Another ‘important layer’ to the German Constitution, is that in an attempt to 
secure democratic rule, the German Constitution which is the Basic Law of 1949, 
has established a value-based democratic order.34  Such a value-based order, 
resonates with the current South African constitutional dispensation. This is 
particularly the case in respect of section 39(2) which mandates a value-




30 Ibid at 45. 
 
31 See Chapter 3, 3.4 for a discussion of Reading-in, Reading-down, Severance and 
Reading in Conformity with the Constitution. 
 
32 De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 49-50.  See also Muller’s article 
‘Basic Questions of Constitutional Concretisation’ (1999) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review at 269-
283 for a discussion of foreign terms adopted into South African law. 
 
33 Ibid at 49. 
 




Due to the fact that section 39(2) authorises a departure from literalism, what has 
emerged as a result thereof has seen a distinct shift from literalism to 
purposivism.  The emerging jurisprudence thereof is no longer one of positivism, 
but may be regarded as being akin to natural law.  This is significant in the 
current constitutional era in South Africa, since an emerging jurisprudence 
requires a new theory and methodology for the process of interpretation of 
legislation.  To redress the social inequalities of a racially divided and segregated 
society, it is suggested that this ‘new’ theory must incorporate ethical and moral 
considerations and must be applied pro-actively.  As a result of the invaluable 
contribution by way of assimilation of a value-based order, that is the dominant 
feature of the German constitutional model into the South African system, has 
created the impetus for the formulation of a new theory of interpretation in South 
Africa.  The theory as suggested, is the proposed deontic theory of interpretation. 
6.3.4 United Kingdom 
The Westminster constitutional model has had its origin in Britain.  The 
influence of the Westminster constitutional model on South African law has had 
far-reaching consequences. In Britain, Parliament comprises the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords.  Parliament is of central importance as it 
exercises sovereign or supreme law making powers.35  This is a distinct feature 
of the Westminster model, that is been referred to as parliamentary sovereignty.  
According to this doctrine, parliament has complete law-making powers.  
Therefore in terms of the model, courts do not have the power to decide on the 
constitutionality of legislation.36  According to Dicey, the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty may be defined as follows: 
‘Neither more nor less than this, namely that Parliament has under the 
English Constitution the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever, and 
                                                            
35 De Vos et al South African Constitutional Law in Context at 42. 
 




further that no person or body is recognised by the Law of England as 
having a right to override or set the Legislation of Parliament.’37 
What is evident is that the doctrine was imposed on South African law during the 
British-colonial rule. In accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, during the apartheid era, the South Africa courts in general applied 
mainly a literal or textual approach when interpreting the law.  As a result of 
giving effect to the so called will of parliament or command of the sovereign, 
many of the laws which were applied, were applied without any consideration of 
ethical or moral elements, or how harsh or unjust the laws were. This position 
changed significantly with the introduction of the Interim Constitution and the 
supremacy status of the Constitution.  The new South African democratic 
Constitution has been instrumental in enabling the judiciary to give effect to the 
values that reflect an open and democratic society. 
In contrast to the United Kingdom, in South Africa a paradigmatic shift from 
parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy, has clearly transformed 
the approach to statutory interpretation from a literal or textual methodology to a 
more value-based methodology.  The idea of the independence of the judiciary 
re-enforces the idea that judges in a transformative constitutional democracy 
ensure that they consider the ethical and moral considerations in interpreting 
legislation to give effect to social and economic aims to achieve social justice. 
6.4 The Position Adopted by South African Courts to 
International Law before 1994 
As alluded to, before 1994, South Africa’s constitutional system was modelled 
significantly on that of Britain, premised on parliamentary sovereignty. The effect 
was that South African courts frequently referred to English Law rather than Roman-
Dutch law particularly in the field of public law. Because the tendency in English 
                                                            




Law was to treat customary international law as municipal law,38a similar position 
was adopted by South African courts. 
6.4.1  Customary International Law 
For decades, South African courts assumed that the rules and principles of customary 
international law might be applied by municipal courts as if they were in some way 
part of South African law. Consequently, it was not required that international law 
had to be proven to be a foreign legal system.39 
In 1971, in South Atlantic Islands Development Corporation v Buchan,40 the court 
refused to admit an affidavit from an expert on international law on the grounds that 
international law was not foreign law and therefore could not be proved by affidavit. 
South African courts therefore showed cogent support for the Monist Approach 
(which is the doctrine of incorporation) in respect of customary international law.41In 
most instances, the position maintained by South African courts was that they 
applied customary international law without questioning its place in the legal order.42  
In a number of cases – commencing with South Atlantic Islands Development 
Corporation v Buchan43 in 1971– the courts expressly asserted that international law 
‘forms part of our law’ and that it was the duty of a municipal court ‘to ascertain and 




38 Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective (4th edition) at 45. 
 
39 Ibid at 51. 
 
40 1971 (1) SA 234 (C) at 238 B-F. 
 
41 Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective (4th edition) at 42-43.  The Monist 
School whose advocates were Kelsen, Verdoss and Scelle, maintain that international law 
and municipal must be regarded as manifestations of a single conception of law. As a result, 
the Monists argue that municipal courts are obliged to apply rules of international law 
directly without the need for any act of adoption by the courts, or transformation by the 
legislature. Dualists, whose protagonists include Triepel and Anzilotti, see international law 
as completely different systems of law. Therefore they contend that international law may be 
applied by domestic courts only if ‘adopted’ by such courts or transformed into local law by 
legislation. 
 
42 Ibid at 46. 
 
43            1972 (1) SA 234 (C) at 283 C-D 
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6.4.2 Treaties and Municipal Courts 
Because the position in South Africa mirrored that of the United Kingdom, the 
power to enter into treaties was entrusted completely to the executive.44  Before 
1994, therefore, the South African approach to the incorporation of treaties was 
clearly a Dualist Approach; treaties were negotiated, signed and ratified by the 
executive.45  The legislature played no part in the treaty-making process. Only those 
treaties incorporated by an Act of Parliament became part of South African law. This 
explains why treaties usually did not become part of municipal law without some act 
of legislative incorporation.46  With the new dispensation section 231 (4) of the 
Interim Constitution provided that ‘the rules of customary international law binding 
on the Republic shall, unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament, form part of the law of the Republic’.  The omission of the word 
‘binding’ from the 1996 Constitution has led commentators to argue that all rules of 
customary international law including those to which South Africa may have 
‘persistently objected’ are now very much part of municipal law.47 
The need for legislation to transform a treaty into South African law was clearly 
illustrated by Stein CJ in Pan American World Airways Incorporated v SA Fire and 
Accident Insurance Co Ltd,48 where it was maintained that it was: 
 
‘trite law … that in this country the conclusion of a treaty, convention or 
agreement by the South African government with any other government is 
an executive and not a legislative act. As a general rule, the provisions of an 
international instrument so concluded, are not embodied in our law except 
by legislative process…’49 
 
                                                            
44 Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective (4th edition) at 48. 
 
45 Ibid at 53. 
 
46 Ibid at 48. 
 
47   Keightely ‘Public Interntational Law and the Final Constitution’ (1996) South African 
Journal on Human Rights at 408. 
 
48 1965 (3) SA (A) at 161 C-D. 
 
49 The dictum was confirmed by the Appellate Division in S v Tuhadeleni and Others 1969 (1) 




Prior to 1994 the courts vacillated in their approach to the place of international law 
in the South African legal order, this changed significantly with the new 
constitutional dispensation, and, in particular, section 39 – the interpretation 
provision of the Constitution. 
 
6.5 The Position Adopted by South African Courts to 
International Law and Foreign Law in the New Constitutional 
Order 
6.5.1 An Examination of International Law 
From an examination of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, that is, in terms 
of section 233,which provides that: 
 
‘when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over 
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law;’ 
 
and section 39, which declares that: 
‘(1)  when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law,’ [Emphasis added] 
 
It is clear that the courts are under an obligation to ensure that South African law is 
interpreted to comply with international law – particularly with regard to human 
rights. While a court must consider treaties to which South Africa is a party in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, no such rule exists in respect of treaties to which 
South Africa is not a party, where the Bill of Rights is not an issue.50 A treaty to 
which South Africa is not a party is res inter aliosacta and may not be considered 
qua treaty, although it may be considered as evidence of a customary rule. 
                                                            




Different considerations apply in respect of a treaty to which South Africa is a party, 
but has not been incorporated into municipal law. Firstly, a municipal court may 
have recourse to an unincorporated treaty in order to interpret an ambiguous statute. 
Secondly, an unincorporated treaty may be taken into account in a challenge to the 
validity of delegated legislation on the grounds of unreasonableness.51Although there 
is no clear judicial support for this proposition, the question has twice been raised 
and left open by the erstwhile Appellate Division. In the cases of Winter v Minister 
of Defence and Others52 and S v Tuhadeleni,53 the Appellate Division left open the 
question of whether proclamations might be tested against the terms of the mandate 
for South West Africa – a treaty which was not incorporated into municipal law. 
Dugard correctly maintains that this is a sound proposition, since the concept of 
reasonableness is inextricably linked with presumptions of legislative intent, and 
there is a presumption that the legislature in enacting a law did not intend to violate 
South Africa’s international obligations.54 
With the advent of the new constitutional order in 1994, both the Constitutional 
Court and other courts have shown an inclination to be guided by international law. 
In Glennister v The President of the Republic of South Africa,55 the majority court 
maintained a firm stance on the status of the international law and its influence on 
South African law.  The position of the court is reflected in the dictum as follows:  
 
‘It is possible to determine the contents of the obligations section 7(2) 
imposes on the State without taking international law into account.  But 
section 39(1)(b) makes it constitutionally obligatory that we should.  This is 
not to use the interpretive injunction of that provision ... to manufacture or 
create constitutional obligations.  It is to respect the careful way in which the 
Constitution itself creates concordance and unity between the Republic’s 
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52 1940 AD 194 at 198. 
 
53 1969 (1) SA 153 (A) at 176-177. 
 
54 See Dugard’s comments on the findings of the cases of Winter v Minister of Defence and 
Others 1940 AD 194 at 198; and S v Tuhadeleni 1969 (1) SA 153 (A) at 176-177 in 





external obligations under international law, and their domestic legal 
impact.’ 
 
 While the decisions of the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights 
have usually been referred to, South African courts have also been influenced by the 
‘views’ of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the reports of the 
United Nations with regard to human rights.56  This is manifestly reflected in one of 
the earliest decisions, S v Makwanyane and Another,57 which involved the 
constitutionality of the death penalty. In this judgment, Chaskalson P, laid down 
clearly articulated guidelines for reliance on international and foreign law in 
constitutional interpretation by stating that: 
 
‘Customary international law and the ratification and accession to 
international agreements are (sic!) dealt with in S231 of the Constitution, 
which sets the requirements for such law to be binding within South 
Africa.In the context of Section 35(1), public international law would 
include non-binding as well as binding law… International agreements and 
customary international law accordingly provide a framework within which 
Chap 3 [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and understood, and for that 
purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments… may 
provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions of 
Chap 3. 
In dealing with comparative law we must bear in mind that we are required 
to construe the South African Constitution, and not an international 
instrument or the Constitution of some foreign country, and that this has to 
be done with due regard to our legal system, our history and circumstances, 
and the structure and language of our own Constitution …we can derive 
                                                            
56 Ibid.  See also discussion in De Vaal and Currie The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 
570 on the status of international instruments relating to socio-economic rights.  The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1996 (ICESCR) is the 
most important international instrument relating to socio-economic rights. Other instruments  
protecting rights that have been ratified by South Africa are the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979), the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child (1995) and the African Charter of Human and People’s 
Rights (1981). 
 




assistance from public international law and foreign case-law, but we are in 
no way bound to follow it.’58 
 
The above dictum is significant for a number of reasons. First, in construing the 1996 
Constitution, it is required that a South African court must consider international law 
and may consider foreign authorities. Such authorities are to be considered because 
they are of value in their own right.59  Chaskalson P in fact laid down a binding 
precedent effectively granting constitutional authorisation to consider international 
law and foreign law when interpreting constitutional provisions not found in the Bill 
of Rights. What is evident, however, is that he does not explicitly say whether – in 
the interpretation of such provisions – a court is enjoined to consider public 
international law. Considering the language in which the above dictum is phrased, it 
is probably not specific enough to read it as imposing such an injunction. However 
section 39 requires that international law must be considered.  It is thus highly 
advisable (but advisable nonetheless), to consider international law in constitutional 
interpretation – except in terms of the ‘black letter’ provisions in section 231 and 
232 or the presumption embodied in section 233 that international law must not just 
be considered, but indeed observed as binding with regard to municipal law. Second 
is the observation that binding as well as non-binding international law provides a 
framework within which the Bill of Rights can be evaluated and understood. Third, 
the court in Makwanyane was emphatic that in the interpretation of the 1996 
Constitution, with its own structure and language – transnational authorities must be 
relied on with due regard to the uniqueness of our Constitution, our history, and our 
circumstances.  It is noted that such an approach to interpretation should therefore 
operate in accordance with its own theoretical framework, as is the proffered deontic 
theory of interpretation.  It is emphasized that even though assistance may be derived 
from international law and foreign law, a court – according to the judge – is in no 
way bound to follow either of them. Nevertheless, in spite of this, a criticism of the 
manner in which Chaskalson P suggests that one ought to interpret international and 
foreign law, is that it is flawed because he overlooked a critical difference between 
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international law and foreign law for purposes of constitutional interpretation, which 
is that international law must be considered and that foreign law may be 
considered.60 
 
The case of Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others61 is also relevant in this regard. The applicants 
in the case sought to set aside section 20(7) of the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act62 – providing for amnesty from criminal and civil proceedings – 
on the grounds that it was inconsistent with section 22 of the Interim Constitution, 
which provides that every person shall have the right to have justiciable disputes 
settled by a court of law, or, where appropriate, another independent or impartial 
forum. The applicants in the case maintained that the state was obliged by 
international law – particularly the Geneva Conventions of 1949 – to prosecute those 
responsible for gross human rights violations and that the provisions of section 20(7) 
which authorised amnesty for such offences, constituted a breach of international 
law.63 
 
In terms of the international convention it was provided: 
 
‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary 
to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to 
be committed, any of the grave breaches.’64 
 
Mahomed DP postulated his finding on the place of international law, as follows: 
 
‘The issue which falls to be determined in this court is whether Section 
20(7) of the Act is inconsistent with the Constitution. If it is, the enquiry as 
to whether or not international law prescribes a different duty is irrelevant to 
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61 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC). 
 
62 34 of 1995. 
 
63 See Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32- 178, for a 
commentary on the findings of the court with regard to the AZAPO case. 
 




that determination. International law and the contents of international law 
treaties to which South Africa might or might not be a party at any 
particular time are, in my view, relevant only to the interpretation of the 
Constitution itself, on the grounds that the lawmakers of the Constitution 
should not lightly be presumed to authorise any law which might constitute 
a breach of the obligations of the state in terms of international law.’65 
 
The Constitutional Court thought that the issue which falls to be determined was 
whether section 20(7) was inconsistent with the Constitution and the enquiry as to 
whether or not international law prescribes a different duty is irrelevant to that 
determination.66  In according the meaning of section 39, the court thought it was 
directed only to have regard to public international law. The approach therefore was 
that, international law would have to be binding in terms of the black-letter 
constitutional law qualified to be ‘(public) international law’, as envisaged in terms 
of section 39(1).67  What is evident from the position adopted by Mahomed DP in 
the AZAPO case, is that he did not treat ‘binding’ as well as ‘non-binding’ 
international law as a framework within which the Bill of Rights ‘can be evaluated 
and understood’.68 The judgment was therefore not well received amongst legal 
scholars and academics on the basis that it failed to adequately address the question 
of whether conventional and customary international law obliges a successor regime 
to punish the officials and agents of the prior regime for international crimes. The 
court’s reading and application of section 39(1)(b) has been criticised as being 
superfluous, for the reason that if a court, tribunal or forum is bound to follow 
‘binding’ international law, there is no need for any further impetus to drive it further 
by additional provisions.69 
 
                                                            
65 Ibid at 688 para 26. 
 
66 See Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-172-32-179 for Du 
Plessis’ comments on the courts reasoning and analysis if the AZAPO case. 
 
67 Reference is made to the Interim Constitution. At the time that the matter was being litigated, 
section 34(1) of the Interim Constitution was the Interpretation Clause- the equivalent of 
section 39(1) of the Final Constitution. 
 
68 See Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-178 - 32-179 for 
Du Plessis’ criticisms of the stance maintained by Mohamed DP  in the AZAPO case. 
 




The extent to which the decisions of the above judgments have influenced 
subsequent cases is evident in Government of RSA and Others v Grootboom and 
Others.70 The case dealt with the interpretation and meaning of section 26 of the 
Constitution.71 The right to housing in the form of basic shelter was at the heart of 
the dispute.In construing the section, which guarantees everyone’s right to adequate 
housing and enjoins the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources to achieve the realisation of this, the court had to also 
consider the place of international law.72 What is noteworthy about Yacoob J’s 
reference to Chaskalson P’s dictum in Makwanyane, is that he added a significant 
qualification: 
 
‘The relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the 
weight to be attached to any particular principle on the rule of international 
law will vary. However, where the relevant principle of international law 
binds South Africa, it may be directly applicable.’73 
 
In Grootboom, the court thus maintained the distinction between international law 
binding on South Africa and other sources of international law that must be 
considered in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.74 The Grootboom court 
focussed its inquiry on Articles 11.2 and 2.1 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and highlighted the differences 
between the interpretive significance of the provisions of the Covenant and section 
26 of the South African Constitution. The court was also of the opinion that the 
general comments (issued) by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights of the ICESCR, was significant in that it constituted a guide to 
                                                            
70 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
 
71 Section 26 of the Constitution provides that - 
 ‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
 (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an 
order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may 
permit arbitrary evictions.’ 
 
72 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-179. 
 
73 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC),2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 26. 
 
74 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-180, for Du Plessis’ 
comments on the findings of the Grootboom case. 
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the interpretation of section 26.  By allowing itself to be guided by the Committee in 
this way, the Grootboom Court not only restored the Makwanyane standard on 
recourse to non-binding international law, but also developed the standard further to 
acknowledge the importance of reliance on an applicable text in the interpretation of 
international law.75 
 
The findings of S v Makwanyane are significant because they invalidate the death 
penalty on the basis of its conflict with inter alia the right to life, and because it was 
regarded as being cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.76Although the 
Constitution does not provide a comprehensive definition of the right to life, the 
Constitutional Court judges presiding over the matter agreed that the right to life 
incorporates the right not to be deliberately put to death by the state. O’Regan J, in 
her judgment, explained that the right to life meant more than simply the guarantee 
of a physical existence. It was also inextricably ‘entwined’ with the right to human 
dignity.77  She articulates her reasoning as follows: 
 
‘…The Constitution seeks to establish a society where the individual value 
of each member of the community is recognised and treasured. The right to 
life is central to such a society. The right to life, thus understood 
incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to human dignity and life are 
entwined. The right to life is more than existence. It is a right to be treated 
as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially 
diminished. Without life, there cannot be dignity.’ 
 
In S v Makwanyane, the court treated the right to life, the right to equality, and the 
right to dignity as collectively giving meaning to the prohibition of cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment – as provided for in terms of section 11(2) of 
the Interim Constitution. The court therefore made ‘extensive and decisive use of the 
contextual interpretation’.78In this regard, the Constitutional Court, referring to S v 




76 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 260. 
 
77           Ibid at 267-268. 
 




‘whilst paying due regard to the language that has been used, [an 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights should be “generous” and “purposive” 
and “give expression to the underlying values of the Constitution”’.80 
 
Basically, what was emphasized, was that if there was a clear meaning of a 
provision, it cannot be ignored in favour of a ‘generous’ and purposive’ meaning of 
the provision. But at the same time, the dictum stresses that while the literal meaning 
must be given ‘due regard’ to, it is not necessarily determinant of meaning. In other 
words, a literal meaning will be an acceptable interpretation of a provision, only if it 
is consistent with a ‘generous’ and ‘purposive’ interpretation that ‘gives expression 
to the underlying values of the Constitution.81  This is clearly a value-based or a 
value-coherent method of interpretation, which is the essence of the teleological 
method of interpretation. Likewise, in the above-mentioned AZAPO case, the 
Constitutional Court relied on international law, when construing section 20(7) of 
the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act82 in according a meaning to 
the provision, in order to promote harmony between international law and municipal 
law. The stance in casu maintained by the court is unmistakably purposive. 
 
What is significant with regard to the above-mentioned cases, is that in construing 
the relevant provisions, the court initially focused on the ordinary, literal or plain 
meaning of the words. The provisions were also examined contextually. However, 
before arriving at its finding with respect to the relevant sections in all the above-
mentioned cases, there must be purposive or teleological enquiry to establish the 
meaning of the provision – by giving due consideration to the underlying values of 
the Constitution.83 Because the mode of interpretation of international treaties and 
instruments is teleological, it is logical that in construing the relevant provisions, the 
same standard and mode of interpretation should apply in interpreting the provisions 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
79 1995 (4) BCLR 401 SA; 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
 
80 1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC); 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 9. 
 
81 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 136. 
 
82 Act 34 of 1995. 
 
83 See De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th edition) at 136, for a discussion of the 




of the Constitution. As a result of this, the Grootboom court had to consider but was 
not be necessarily bound by the comments of the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of ICESCR – with regard to what comprised 
the notion of ‘a minimum core’ of socio-economic rights.84 
It is noted that the approach of the judge in giving consideration to the elements that 
comprised ‘a minimum core’ of socio-economic rights, can, without doubt, be 
regarded as furthering the agenda of social transformation. The Court’s search for 
factors that go beyond ascertaining the purpose for the provision or placing the right 
in its context, and this is in keeping with the proposed deontic theory of 
interpretation which requires that in the process of interpretation, regard must be 
given to moral and ethical considerations. It is therefore apparent that without being 
aware of it, the court in Grootboom had applied concepts in judicial reasoning that 
are consistent with deontic logic. 
From an examination of the interpretation and application of international law, what 
is also evident is that the methodology of interpretation requires the adoption of an 
amalgamation of the different methods of interpretation. This is consistent with the 
eclectic method of interpretation referred in earlier chapters. This methodology also 
forms the basis of the modus operandi of the proposed deontic theory.85 From an 
examination of Makwanyane, AZAPO and Grootboom, what has emerged in the 
above-mentioned judgments constitutes a new jurisprudence which is reflective of 
the Constitutional Court’s position and approach to international law into South 
African law. 
6.5.2 An Examination of Foreign Law 
The South African constitutional jurisprudence not only reflects the influence of a 
wide range of international human rights law instruments, but there is also evidence 
of the influence of foreign constitutions. Some of the more influential include the 
German Basic Law, the Canadian Charter, the United States Constitution, and the 
                                                            
84 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-179- 32-180 for Du 
Plessis’ comments on the findings of the Grootboom case. 
 
85 See Chapter 1, 1.6 Definitions of Terms and Concepts for a discussion of the modus 




Indian Constitution – which were all instrumental in developing and shaping the 
South African Constitution and its Bill of Rights.86  
In K v Minister of Safety and Security,87 O’Regan J’s position on foreign law was 
clear. She maintained that: 
 
‘There can be no doubt that it will often be helpful for our courts to consider 
the approach of other jurisdictions to problems that may be similar to our 
own… 
Consideration of the responses of other legal systems may enlighten us in 
analysing our own law, and to assist us in developing it further. It is for this 
very reason that our Constitution contains an express provision, authorising 
courts to consider the law of other countries when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights.’88 
 
Further reference to foreign law is evident in the following dictum by Kriegler J, in S 
v Mamabolo (E Tv, Business Day and Freedom of Expression Institute 
intervening)89– in his submission that: 
 
‘... where a provision in our Constitution is manifestly modelled on a 
particular provision in another country’s constitution, it would be folly not 
to ascertain how the jurists of that country have interpreted their 
precedential provision.’90 
 
The view maintained in the above dicta about the significance and relevance of 
foreign law, is acceptable in light of the fact that as a fairly ‘new’ democracy, the 
                                                            
86 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-183.  See earlier 
discussion in this chapter for an examination of the selected jurisdictions in 6.3 A 
Consideration of the Features of Selected Constitutional States and their Influence of 
South African Law. Further see Davis ‘Democracy-its Influence upon the Process of 
Constitutional Interpretation’  South African Journal on Human Rights 103-121 where the 
author in his article carefully analyses the jurisprudential developments of the law in other 
jurisdictions for example Canada, India, United States and Bophuthatswana and their 
influence on the emerging constitutional democracy in South Africa. 
 
87 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC), 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
 
88 Ibid at paras 34-35. 
 
89 2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC), 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC). 
 




older jurisdictions and constitutions are able to provide precedents and 
jurisprudential analysis that are beneficial for interpretation of South African law and 
our Constitution. However, while effecting comparisons with other jurisdictions can 
indeed prove beneficial, ‘the wholesale importation of foreign doctrines and 
precedents’91 is to be avoided. In Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another,92 
Kriegler J was guarded in his approach to the influence of foreign jurisdictions. It 
was maintained that: 
 
‘…And when I conduct comparative study, I do so with great caution.The 
survey is conducted from the point of view afforded by the South African 
Constitution, construed on unique design and intended for unique 
purposes.’93 
 
In emphasising the uniqueness of the South African constitutional system, he 
followed the position adopted by the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane, that: 
 
‘we must bear in mind that we are required to construe the South African 
Constitution ... with due regard to our legal system, our history and 
circumstances and the structure and language of our Constitution’.94 
 
Therefore, it would seem that even though reference to foreign law is expressly 
provided for in terms of section 39(1), it was not the intention of the drafters of the 
Constitution that foreign doctrines and precedents be applied in an unqualified 
manner. The danger of over-reliance on foreign jurisdictions, reference to 
inappropriate foreign sources, and shallow comparativism95 – as highlighted above – 






91 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-186. 
 
92 1996 (3) SA at 850. 
 
93 Ibid at para 127. 
 
94 1995 (3) SA 391 at para 39. 
 





The discussion in this chapter involves essentially an examination of section 39 of 
the Constitution. In order to formulate an understanding of the distinction between 
the references to international law and foreign law, it is necessary to explore the 
constitutional imperative contained in section 39 – that ‘every court, tribunal and 
forum a) must consider international law and b) may consider foreign law’. This has 
presented some interesting and thought–provoking ideas about both international law 
and foreign law. 
A jurisprudential analysis of case-law has revealed that in the application of 
international law, international norms and standards must be considered – but are 
not binding in the interpretation of our law. Not only does international law provide 
a framework against which the norms, standards and principles are to be measured, 
but it also provides clarity on the methodology that should underlie the process of 
interpretation. International law influences the way we interpret laws in South 
Africa. As a result of the influences of international law on South African law, laws 
ought to be interpreted purposively.96  This is largely because international 
instruments are interpreted purposively or teleologically. As a result of this 
influence, it is observed that with regard to the method of interpretation, there has 
been a definite paradigmatic shift from the literal to the purposive or teleological 
mode of interpretation. 
Foreign law is also not binding, but may be considered in the process of 
interpretation. What this therefore ensures, is that it creates room and allows for a 
‘creative imagination’ in raising new questions and new possibilities with regard to 
both new and old problems.97 This view is also espoused by Liebenberg who is 
unwavering in her support that a reflection on the consideration of the interpretation 
of the socio-economic rights in other international and comparative jurisdictions 
should generate ‘new’ options and possibilities in considering the emerging 
                                                            
96 This is clearly evident in case law.  See for example  S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 SA; 1995 
(2) SA 642 (CC); and S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC); 1995 (3) SA 
391 (CC) 
 




jurisprudence in South Africa.98 A comparison of the position in foreign jurisdictions 
is therefore useful, in that it allows for a certain degree of flexibility to consider the 
approach to statutory interpretation in other jurisdictions, and to decide on a 
preferred method of interpretation in South African law. 
Van der Walt’s view on constitutional comparativism is innovative and relevant in 
the South African context. He contends that: 
 
‘ As a history of errors, comparative study shows us a range of fallacious 
doctrines, theories and arguments that have already been discredited and 
should be avoided. As a history of possibilities, comparative study shows us 
that certain doctrines, theories and arguments could still be used as possible 
explanations of or solutions for individual problems. As a history of 
examples, comparative study shows us the methods, techniques and 
approaches that are available to us. Like the historical study of law, the 
comparative study of law liberates us from what we need not do; it cannot 
and should not enslave us by telling us what we have to do.’99 
 
Van der Walt’s submission is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it highlights 
the fact that a comparative analysis is extremely useful. It is helpful in that it enables 
the interpreter to consider other possibilities in terms of the array of different 
methods, techniques and approaches that are available. 
 
Secondly, in terms of the submission, the point is made that a comparative analysis 
should provide a set of options that should liberate us, by enabling the interpreter  to 
decide what needs to be done and what is most appropriate – rather than restricting 
                                                            
98          See Libenberg ‘Socio-Economic Rights: Revisiting the Reasonableness Review/Minimum 
Core Debate’ in Woolman and Bishop (eds) Constitutional Conversations at 324, where the 
author is also supportive of the idea that international and comparative sources are not to be 
referred to slavishly, but rather because they broaden the range of options available to courts 
in developing the interpreting of socio-economic rights, that they are also to ensure that the 
court is aware of applicable law standards.  Nevertheless, the South African courts remain 
under a duty to consider which interpretations best advance the values and transformative 
commitments of the Constitution in the current political, economic and social context of 
South Africa.  The crux of Liebenberg’s argument supports the idea that in a transformative 
Constitution that judges are under a moral obligation to heed the commitment for social 
reform and social justice. It is submitted that such ethical and moral considerations are 
central to the operation of the proposed deontic theory of interpretation. 
 




interpretation only to that which is familiar. Section 39 prescribes the manner in 
which the process of interpretation should apply. It is clear that not only must the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society be given expression to, but 
section 39 specifically mandates that international and foreign law are to be 
considered – as they are regarded as being intrinsically part of the process of 
interpretation. This value-based methodology, which underpins the statutory process, 
has resulted in a distinct shift from positivism to that which is akin to natural law – 
with the Constitution as the supreme law, in a sense a surrogate for natural law or a 
higher law. While the tendency after 1994 has been to adopt a purposive theory – as 
it accords with international norms and standards and is in keeping with the values of 
the Constitution – this particular theory is in itself not to be regarded as the 
uncontested ‘Open Sesame!’100for purposes of interpretation. The evolving 
jurisprudence with its influences from South African and international law, requires 
a ‘new’ theory and a ‘new’ methodology for the process of interpretation. It is 
suggested that the proposed deontic theory with an eclectic methodology requires 
that in the process of interpretation one should be inclusive and comprehensive, as 
explained.  
The third point made by Van der Walt is interesting, in that he specifically makes 
reference to a range of ‘fallacious doctrines, theories and arguments’,101 which he 
asserts are to be avoided. It is submitted that by simply focusing on that which other 
jurisdictions have applied, would not only be fallacious, but also counter-productive. 
What a comparative analysis has revealed is that in the process of interpretation in 
South Africa, one ought not slavishly apply a theory, doctrine or approach that has 
worked elsewhere. South Africa’s unique history and background, and factors that 
influence decision-making in South Africa, require an indigenous approach to 
interpretation. I t is therefore submitted that a deontic theory of interpretation, which 
is based on deontic reasoning and requires pro-active consideration of ethical and 
moral elements as its central feature, provides the most viable option to address the 
challenge of social transformation in the current constitutional era. 
                                                            
100 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes at 116. (Emphasis added) 
 







7.1  Introduction 
 
It is submitted that the aims and objectives of the research required for this thesis, as 
articulated in Chapter 1, have been addressed.1  Each of the chapters examined a 
particular aspect of statutory interpretation and a discussion with regard to each has been 
conducted. The approach adopted at the outset was that the multifarious rules and 
principles that inform the field of statutory interpretation had to be scrutinized. The 
purpose was to provide a response to the research problem posed, which was to 
determine whether the Constitution and in particular section 39 have transformed the 
process of interpretation, and, if so, how has this influenced the law in South Africa.2 
The response to the research problem is in the hypothesis. It is submitted that the 
findings of the research are in support of the hypothesis: the Constitution has indeed 
transformed the process of interpretation in South Africa.  
 
Not only has the Constitution transformed the process of interpretation in South Africa, 
but what has occurred as a result thereof is that our courts are obliged to give effect to 
the operation of section 39 – resulting in a transformative Constitution with a new 
emerging jurisprudence. It is no longer one of legal positivism, but one akin to natural 
law, with the Constitution being the supreme law and all that such a Constitution entails. 
The thesis postulates a ‘new’ theory and the ‘new’ methodology – designated as the 
deontic theory, which requires an eclectic methodology. The formulation and 
                                                            
1       See the Aims and Objectives of the research as discussed at 1.3 Aims and Objectives in 
Chapter 1. 
 
2  See the Research Problem and Hypothesis as set out at 1.2 Research Problem and Hypothesis 
in Chapter 1. 
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presentation of this theory of interpretation for the new constitutional order, is supported 
by the findings of the research undertaken, a summary of which is detailed hereunder. 
 
7.2  A Summary of the Observations and Findings of the Study 
 
An examination of the cases that form the basis of the research are important from the 
perspective of their impact on the developing law and jurisprudence and the changes 
effected in the current constitutional era in South Africa. 
 
The most important feature, from an analysis of the subject, has been the transition from 
the formalistic and mechanical approach of legal interpretation to a more purposive, 
generous or teleological method – and that which is often referred to as a value-
orientated method of interpretation.3  The supremacy of the Constitution and the 
operation of section 39(2), in particular, must be regarded as being instrumental in 
ensuring that the orthodox methodology of interpretation is eclipsed by the new 
constitutional order.4 It is therefore obvious from the plethora of case-law decided 
subsequent to the Constitution, that the value-laden approach to interpretation that has 
been applied by courts, has resulted in a manifestly more equitable and just outcome of 
the legal process.5 This compares starkly with the discredited system of apartheid with 
its inherently racist laws that prevailed prior to the new constitutional dispensation. 
 
What is also clear is that the courts have been granted a power to ‘create’ law, in a 
secondary sense. As a result of a number of corrective techniques which have been 
illustrated by the operation of reading-down, reading-in and the severance process, 
                                                            
3 The more commonly accepted theories of Statutory Interpretation have been discussed 
throughout the thesis. Chapter 2 essentially focuses on a critical examination of the theories of 
interpretation. 
 
4 Chapter 3 deals predominantly with an examination of various aspects of the Constitution. The    
importance of the supremacy clause and the significance of section 39, as well as other relevant 
provisions are considered in detail. 
 
5 See for example Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) 
SA 199 (CC); African Christian Democratic Party v The Electoral Commission 2006 (5) BCLR 
(CC); Baloro v University of Bophuthatswana 1995 (8) BCLR 1018 (CC); Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) BCLR 735 (CC) and SV 




during constitutional review,6 a competent court may endeavour, if reasonably possible, 
to modify or adapt legislation to render it constitutional and alive, or may as a last resort 
declare it invalid and strike it down, if it is found wanting.7 
 
It is submitted that the combined effect of this power and the ability of the courts in the 
process of judicial review has effected a paradigmatic shift in emphasis from a literal to 
a value-laden approach to interpretation – resulting in an emerging constitutional 
jurisprudence in South Africa. Since the 1996 Constitution is often referred to as being 
‘post liberal and transformative in nature’,8 it is not surprising that the term 
‘transformative constitutionalism’9 is used to describe this emerging jurisprudence. In 
attempting to address the inequalities in a post-apartheid South African society, 
transformative constitutionalism emphasizes the realization of, inter alia, socio-
economic justice and all it entails.10 Pieterse, a strong protagonist of social 
transformation, identified the attainment of social justice as being a distinct trait of a 
transformative South African Constitution.11  In examining the concepts of ‘social 
justice’ and ‘transformation’ alluded to, Liebenberg opines that the concepts of social 
justice and transformation should inform the way we interpret legislation.12 Du Plessis 
                                                            
6 See Chapter 3 for a complete discussion and analysis of the processes and mechanisms that 
apply in constitutional review or the testing of legislation against the Constitution. 
 
7  Botha Statutory Interpretation (5th edition) at 195-197. 
 
8 Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) South African Journal on 
Human Rights at 146. 
 
9 Ibid. See Klare’s discussion on the influence of a transformative constitution on constitutional 
and statutory transformation.  
 
10 Brand Courts, Socio-Economic Rights and Transformative Politics, (2009) LLD Thesis, 
University of Stellenbosch. 
 
11 Pieterse‘What Do We Mean When We Talk About, Transformative Constitutionalism?’(2005) 20 
South African Public Law at 155. See also Langa ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2006) 3 
Stellenbosch Law Review at 351. 
 
12 Liebenberg ‘Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social Rights’ (2005) 1 




perceptively explains that the transformative nature of the Constitution has far-reaching 
implications for interpretation.13 
 
In the research undertaken, there are many judgments that have illustrated the 
significance of social justice realised in terms of the Constitution.14 The seminal cases of 
the Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others15 
and the Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others16, are 
described as being two of the ‘most conspicuously inspired by transformative 
constitutionalism’.17  In the application of the socio-economic rights, namely section 26 
and section 27 of the Bill of Rights respectively, the Constitutional Court emphasized 
that the responsibility of a competent court was to enforce these rights to provide 
respectively access to the right to housing, (in terms of section 26),18 and the right to 
health care, food, water and social security (in terms of section 27).19 As a result, the 
‘far-reaching implications’ that Du Plessis refers to above, resulted in the granting of 
                                                            
13 Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd 
edition) at 32-81. 
 
14  See also the cases of S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC); Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC); 
Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC). 
 
15   2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
 
16   2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
 
17  Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-82. 
 
18 Section 26 of the Constitution  - the Right to Housing, provides that: 
  ‘(1)  Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
    (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
 (3)No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of 
court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions.’ 
 
19 Section 27 of the Constitution - the Right to Health Care, food, water and Social security, 
provides that: 
‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to – 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
(b) sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, 
appropriate social assistance. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 




declaratory and mandatory orders in Grootboom and the upholding of the state’s 
obligation to supply and administer Nevirapine to pregnant HIV women in Treatment 
Action Campaign.20  The approach of the court in Khosa21 which stressed the political 
community’s responsibility to provide non-citizens who find themselves on the margin 
of that community with the material benefits, and Fourie22 which recognised that gays 
and lesbians have an entitlement to public recognition of their intimate relationships as 
discussed in Chapter 3, is clearly indicative of a more expansive approach adopted by 
the courts in deciding on matters relating to fundamental socio-economic rights.  What is 
apparent from case-law dealing with socio-economic rights, is that the central question 
that the court focuses on is whether the means chosen is reasonably capable of 
facilitating the realisation of the socio-economic rights in question. The court has thus 
indicated that it will assess the reasonableness of the state’s conduct in light of the 
social, economic and historical context and consideration will have to be given to the 
capacity of the institutions responsible for implementing the programme.23  While the 
court in Soobramoney24 raised the standard of the rationality test for socio-economic 
rights claims, the court in Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign adopted a 
slightly different approach in that it proceeded to advance a set of criteria for assessing 
the reasonableness of the state’s acts or omissions. The assessment of the reasonableness 
of government programme25 is influenced by two factors, firstly, the concept of 




20  Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-82. 
 
21   Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (5) BCLR 569 (CC). 
 
22   Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Others 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC). 
 
23 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 
(CC) at para 43. 
 
24   Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
 
25 Michelman ‘Against Regulatory Taking:  of the Two-Stage Inquiry-A Reply to Theunis Roux’ in 




Nevertheless in spite of these interventions, Liebenberg is quite bold in her assertion that 
the law and legal processes alone are not sufficient to ‘bridge the chasm between the 
realities of poverty and inequality that pervade our society.’26  What is needed is that 
when courts decide in respect of cases dealing with socio-economic rights, is that they 
should embrace the challenge that the jurisprudence to be applied must ‘facilitate the 
transformation of unjust social and economic relations entrenched by current laws.’27 
This highlights the responsibility of judges in the interpretative process – to ensure that 
social justice through transformation is achieved. A recent finding by Davis and Klare 
on transformative constitutionalism has revealed that despite the fact that the 1996 
Constitution mandates courts to uphold and protect human rights, some judges in the 
lower courts and Supreme Court of Appeal are ‘reluctant to deviate from traditional 
legal reasoning and fail to be more sensitive to the context, and the potential and real 
consequences’28 of their decisions. It is unfortunate that even though ‘the Constitution 
invites imagination and self-reflection about legal method, analysis and reasoning 
consistent with its transformative goals’,29 certain judges are content to continue to 
operate in the comfort of old methodologies. Klare argues forcefully that in a 
transformative constitutional democracy, such as in South Africa, the role and 
responsibility of judges must be re-visited. He submits that: 
 
 ‘Judicial mindset and methodology are part of law, and therefore they must 
be examined and revised so as to promote equality, a culture of democracy 
and transparent governance.’30 
 
                                                            
26 Liebeneberg ‘Socio-economic Rights: Revisiting the Reasonableness Review/ Minimum Core 
Debate’ in Woolman and Bishop (eds) Constitutional Conversations at 329. 
 
27   Ibid. 
 
28  Davis and Klare ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law’ 
(2010) 26 South African Journal on Human Rights at 403. 
 
29 Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) South African Journal on 
Human Rights at 156. 
 




The sentiment encapsulated in the quotation above is integral to this thesis. This is 
significant because it speaks directly to the theories of interpretation that are applied in 
South African courts, and impacts on the methodology that informs their operation. 
What is revealed from the analysis of the more commonly accepted theories of 
interpretation,31 is that while they are not completely devoid of merit, the paradigm in 
which they operate is inadequate to achieve the goals of social justice and to attain 
transformation in the contemporary constitutional and political system in South Africa. 
This view is supported by Klare, who maintains that it could not have been the intention 
that the new Constitution was to be interpreted using legalistic and obsolete methods of 
interpretation, based on primitive literalism.32 
 
It is therefore submitted that a theory which acknowledges the responsibility of the 
courts and the role of judicial officers to achieve the transformative goals of the 
Constitution, is the most appropriate in the current constitutional order. Bearing this in 
mind, a deontic theory is postulated. In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security,33 the 
Constitutional Court accentuated the importance of the responsibility of judges in the 
South African context. It was stated that: 
 
 ‘Particularly in a country where so few have the means to enforce their 
rights through the courts, it is essential on those occasions when the legal 
process does establish that an infringement of an entrenched right has 
occurred, it will be effectively vindicated. The courts have a particular 
responsibility in this regard and are obliged to “forge new tools” and shape 
innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal.’ 
 
The proposed deontic theory of  interpretation which requires that judges are expected in 
the process of interpretation, to apply ethical and moral reasoning, together with 
                                                            
31 The more commonly accepted theories of interpretation are examined fully in Chapter 2. These 
include the Literal Theory, the Contextual Approach, the Purposive Theory, the Teleological 
Theory, the Intention Theory, the Objective Theory and the Judicial Theory. 
 
32 Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) South African Journal on 
Human Rights at 156. 
 




induction and deduction, all of which are to be applied pro-actively as a ‘new tool’, is 
referred to by the court, in the dictum above – in order to achieve social justice.34 
 
7.3 The Formulation of a New Theory Involving Deontic Reasoning 
 
In a transformative South African constitutional democracy, with the Constitution as the 
supreme law, the paradigmatic shift or transition from literalism to purposivism has not 
only resulted in an emerging new jurisprudence, but has significantly changed the way 
laws are to be interpreted. This idea supports the position that this ‘new’ jurisprudence 
requires a ‘new’ theory and a new methodology to interpretation. In his presentation of a 
general theory of law, Wahlgren submits that while the task of developing a new theory 
might be regarded as being an ‘ambitious, long-term project’, in the same vein he 
acknowledges that it need not necessarily ‘only be the result of extensive philosophical 
investigations’.35 The quest for a ‘new’ theory in a transformative constitutional 
democracy in South Africa, might also have initially been regarded as an ambitious 
project. However, the sound and carefully reasoned judgements of the courts36  
illustrating the ethical and moral elements underpinning the courts’ reasoning and 
therefore emphasizing the approach adopted by judges in assimilating this factor when 
deliberating and adjudicating – has contributed to formulating a new theory of 
interpretation.  The proposed deontic theory of interpretation which has its origin in 
classical philosophy37 with a holistic component and a modus operandi which requires 
                                                            
34 See Chapter 1 for the definition accorded to the deontic theory and the description of the eclectic 
methodology that would apply in the operation of the model. 
 
35 Wahlgren‘A General Theory of Artificial Intelligence and the Law’ Legal Knowledge Based 
Systems; JURIX 1994 at 87. 
 
36 See for example Höerskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education 
Mpumalanga and Others 2009 (3) ALL 386 (SCA); Modder East Squatters v 
ModderklipBoerdery; President of the Republic of South Africa v ModderklipBoerdery 2004 (8) 
BCLR 821 (SCA) and Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy (CCT 51/12) 2013 
ZAZZ 9. 
 
37   From the discipline of philosophy, ‘holism’ is described as the theory that whole entitles, as 
fundamental components of reality, have an existence other than as the mere sum of the parts. 
http://www.thesaurus.com/broese/holism (Accessed on March 2015).  The term holism is 
generally applied to views that treat the meanings of all of the words in a language as 
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an eclectic methodology and pro-active approach to the application of law is, it is 
submitted the most appropriate in the transformative constitutional era in South Africa. 
 
While the court’s approach in the interpretation and the application of legislation in the 
Rivonia School case,38 is reflective of the pro-active manner which underpins the 
methodology for the operation of the proposed deontic theory,39 it is evident that there 
are other recently decided cases that have adopted a pro-active stance without 
acknowledging it by name.40 It is therefore submitted that a transformative Constitution 
requires a theory which embraces transformation.  The proposed deontic theory of 
interpretation with a pro-active mode of application, as opposed to a minimalistic 
approach,41 it is submitted, is a theory of interpretation which is most favourable in the 
current constitutional order. 
 
In order for a proposed theory to qualify as a new theory of legal reasoning, the theory 
must exhibit certain distinct criteria.In terms of its overall structure, therefore, a theory 
must comprise certain basic components. The theory must: 
 
 Have its own distinct model 
It is submitted that the proposed deontic theory as presented, which  operates according 
to its own theoretical framework and modus operandi, has revealed a distinctiveness 
with regard to its application. The proposed deontic theory is one that involves inductive 
                                                                                                                                                                               
interdependent.  The interdependence associated with ‘holism’ is usually taken to follow from the 
meaning of each word or sentence being tied to its use.  The determinants of the meanings of our 
terms are interconnected in a way that leads a change in the meaning of any single term to 
produce a change in the meanings of each of the rest.- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning-holism (Accessed on March 2015) 
 
38 MEC for Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School 2013 (12) BCLR 1365 
(CC). 
 
39  See definition of a deontic theory in Chapter 1, 1.6.2Deontic Theory. 
 
40 See for example Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and 
Others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC); Department of Land Affairs and Others v Goedgelegen 
Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC); and Minister of Home Affairs and Another v 
Fourie and Others 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC). 
 
41 See Woolman The Selfless Constitution - Experimentalism and Flourishing as Foundations of 




and deductive legal reasoning, encapsulates ethics and morality and is applied in a pro-
active manner.42 
 Be a general theory 
What is required here is that a theory must reflect the components that could be 
accepted by scholars of various traditions. The theory as postulated is a general theory 
of application.  The main reason for this submission is that an examination of case law 
has revealed that the theory is capable of being applied to different areas in law,for 
example private law, public law, commercial law and international law, which is evident 
from the  array of legal judgments examined. 
 Be transparent 
What is expected here, is that the components are to be described in a non-technical way 
and all legal and technical terms are explained as they appear. The application of the 
theory will operate on the basis of an eclectic methodology.  An understanding of how 
this would unfold has been illustrated in the jurisprudential analysis of the traditional 
theories of interpretation applied in South African courts 
 Reflect explicitness 
This is necessary in order to ensure that all the relevant aspects of the jurisprudential 
paradigm be included – to make it possible to identify. It has been necessary to explore 
the various rules of interpretation as well as to examine a host of canons and maxims, to 
determine the applicability and relevance of the proposed deontic theory of 
interpretation. An examination of the above has revealed that the proposed deontic 
theory of interpretation may very well be used and applied with regard to the commonly 
accepted canons and maxims of interpretation.43 
 Comprise its own modus operandi 
                                                            
42 See discussion in Chapter 1, 1.4 Background/Overview for the articulation of the elements of 
the deontic theory. 
 
43  See Chapter 5, for an examination of the canons and maxims of interpretation. 
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As defined the proposed deontic theory of interpretation would operate in accordance 
with its own set of rules and methodology.  The methodology or modus operandi that 
informs the proposed deontic theory, has been clearly defined. The modus operandi is an 
eclectic methodology.  What is proposed for the operation of the theory is an 
amalgamation of the modus operandi of the various theories of interpretation, which has 
to be applied pro-actively.  Such pro-activism is identified as being pivotal to its 
operation.  The operation of the eclectic method with a pro-active approach as outlined, 
is unique to the proposed deontic theory.44 
 Be flexible 
What is evident is that the inherent flexibility of the proposed deontic theory, in that it is 
a theory that may be applied to legislation, the common-law and customary law, makes 
it extremely favourable for interpretation in a transformative constitutional system.  
 
The basis of Wahlgren’s work is significant because it supports the rationale for the 
research undertaken. This is that future advancements are dependent on one’s ability to 
develop more adequate theories reflecting their own unique characteristics and 
requirements.45  The research undertaken clearly illustrates that the proposed deontic 
theory of interpretation, as expounded, conforms with all of the criteria, as articulated. 
What has emerged as an important feature in the application of the proposed deontic 
theory of interpretation is that it supports the idea that in interpreting a statute, that the 
statute is to be read holistically. Holism is the idea that something can be more than the 
sum of its parts.  It contends that one must understand reality as a whole.  In applying 
holism to language would result in semantic holism.  The idea behind semantic holism is 
that every word has a meaning only in relation to other words, sentences, or language (as 
a whole), in which it is used.46  In his analysis of the concept of ‘holism’ which in effect 
                                                            
44   See discussion in the eclectic methodology in Chapter 1, 1.6.3 Methodology.  
 
45 Wahlgren‘A General Theory of Artificial Intelligence and the Law’ Legal Knowledge Based 
Systems: JURIX 1994 at 88. 
 
46 Semantic holism, is defined as, the idea that words have no meaning apart from the context, or 
sentences in which they are used. This can, perhaps, be better understood by looking at the 
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was an appraisal of Smuts’ work Holism and Evolution, Mowatt maintains that Smuts 
coined the term ‘holism’ to describe the ‘more’ that he referred to.  Holism is thus best 
described as a force inherent in any object or organism.  Mowatt argues further that 
when holism and the process of evolution are combined they comprise the main forces 
of existence namely:  
(i) Evolution – which is the force of development and growth and 
(ii) Holism – which is the form of regulation and formation. 
However Mowatt emphasises that Smuts did not specifically define holism but rather 
developed throughout his thesis the concept of holism incrementally.47  Likewise, in the 
process of interpretation the court is guided by the basic principle that each of the 
elements or ‘layers’ that comprise its separate parts - should be read as a ‘harmonious 
whole’ within their broader context in a manner that furthers the statutory purpose.48  It 
is therefore submitted that the proposed deontic theory of interpretation which 
incorporates the elements of inductive and deductive legal reasoning, an evaluation of 
ethical and moral considerations and is applied pro-actively in accordance with an 
eclectic methodology, embraces the idea of holism.  The proposed deontic theory of 
interpretation is intended to operate holistically in resolving matters of dispute in the 
interpretation of statutes. 
 
7.4 Prognosis and Conclusion 
 
What can be garnered from the findings of the research and from the rich repository of 
case-law and jurisprudence that the study has explored, is that the emerging 
jurisprudence requires a new legal theory for statutory interpretation in the era of 
constitutional transformation in South Africa. This may, perhaps, not come as a surprise 
                                                                                                                                                                               
meaning of holism, and contrasting it atomism.  Holism can be contrasted with atomism, which is 
the idea that everything can be broken down into smaller parts.  Applied to biology one would 
argue that one can obtain an accurate picture of a duck by breaking down the duck into 
fundamental ‘duck parts.’ 
http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/holism-and-inst.pdf  (Accessed on October 2013) 
 
47     Mowatt ‘Holism and the Law’ (1991) 108 South African Law Journal at 344. 
 




for scholars and lawyers. From his analysis of the conventional theories of statutory 
interpretation since the advent of the Constitution, Du Plessis is unwavering in his 
assertions that the conventional theories of interpretation are insufficient in a 
constitutional democracy. His view is both relevant and receptive to the idea of an 
‘emerging discourse on legal interpretation’.49 In fact, Du Plessis goes so far as to 
suggest the augmented Savignian Quartet, in its adapted form, as a model for both 
constitutional and statutory implementation.50 Another legal scholar who has been 
openly critical of the assessment of the adjudicative performance of the Constitutional 
Court due to the inadequacy of available theories – has been Roux. In one of his seminal 
works, he identifies the need for an appropriate legal theory of interpretation in the new 
constitutional order. He submits that: 
 
 ‘The problems with the currently available theories of judicial review…is 
that none of them is directed at constitutional courts in new democracies. 
What is required therefore, is a new account, drawing on some of the 
political science insights but expressed in terms of an acceptable legal 
theory.’51 
 
While the inadequacy of the conventional theories of interpretation and the need for an 
acceptable legal theory is a subject that has been broached by legal academics and jurists 
– none have endeavoured to suggest an appropriate or acceptable alternative. It is for this 
reason that the research undertaken is relevant, as it provides a feasible, practical and 
sound option by way of a deontic theory of interpretation coupled with a pro-active 
methodology. The proposed deontic theory of interpretation as explicated, is a model 
that is based on ethical and moral considerations and requires an eclectic – pro-active 
methodology to further the aims of social transformation. For the reasons suggested and 
                                                            
49  Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edition) at 32-40. 
 
50  Ibid at 160. 
 
51 Roux T 'Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa' (2009) 7 





supported by a myriad of case-law, as illustrated throughout this thesis, the proposed 
deontic theory is presented as a theoretical framework for interpretation in the 
transformative constitutional era – in South Africa.  As indicated above the deontic 
theory also involves the concept of holism: the sum being more than the parts.  This is 
also a method of legal reasoning and provides a basis for a pro-active application of the 
meaning of a text, as mandated by section 7 and section 39 (2) of the Constitution.  
Deontic reasoning involves balancing conflicting values, harmonisation and 
prioritisation of values, besides the application of the principles of holism.  Values must 
include, besides human dignity, equality and freedom the transformative socio-economic 
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